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The team of the British High Commission, in particular Cat Evans, 
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which helped to develop a perspective on various issues of FATA. 
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All fifty enumerators, male and female, hailing from FATA, deserve 
provided timely and valuable guidance. Kris has been interested in 
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component. They courageously visited some very remote and 
he was working on a survey of FATA in 2008. He is a US Sociologist 
difficult areas. Their contribution is certainly worthy of praise. 
who has been working on development programmes for over 30 
The author is equally grateful to the key informants from FATA as years and offered sociological and historical perspectives that 
well as the guest speakers and experts who shared their knowledge provided various dimensions to this research. 
and experience of FATA during focus-group discussions and 
All views, mistakes, and errors expressed in this report are mine. 
stakeholders' consultations. 
It would be unjust not to acknowledge the support of CAMP's 
Naveed Ahmad Shinwariprogramme managers, Tahir Ali and Mariam A. Khan, who relieved 
Chief Executivethe author of most of the CAMP management responsibilities 
Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP)during the preparation of this report. Special thanks to Mariam A. 
Islamabad, PakistanKhan, Ayesha Zia-ul-Qamar [M & E Coordinator] for conducting and 
2010taking notes of women focus-group discussions. The project 
officers, Rabia Jahangir Khan, Ibne Ali, Hamid Jan and Hamid Jan, 
did a great job of organising, coordinating field work and taking 
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The Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP) has source of suicide bombers, the lack of development as a cause of 
been conducting opinion polls of the people of FATA since 2007. conflict, the importance of military operations, drones and their 
That work produces the ‘Understanding FATA’ series. The goal of impressions on international training for the Frontier Corps are 
this series is to reveal the thinking and the opinions of the people covered. Militancy and religion is an important chapter as is the 
so that policy makers and influential actors in government, civil chapter on Afghan refugees. 
society, the international community, academics, journalists and 
FATA has a unique strategic importance in terms of its impact on 
the broader Pakistani citizenry will have useful, actionable 
the security and stability of its neighbouring Afghanistan and on 
information. This 2010 edition of ‘Understanding FATA’ is a 
the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan and the international community are 
comprehensive assessment of perceptions that the people of 
extremely concerned about how to deal with the situation inside 
FATA have in several key policy areas including governance, 
FATA. The ongoing militancy in FATA seems to be contributing 
society, religion and politics. 
significantly to sustaining the Taliban resistance against the US-
The descriptive material has been expanded to provide the reader led forces in Afghanistan. Poverty, difficult terrain, an archaic 
with a more detailed understanding of contemporary FATA and system of administration, cross-border tribal and ethnic ties with 
the people living there. The statistical work is more than a dry Afghanistan, Pakhtun traditions and the presence of Jihadi 
compilation of opinions; the data is woven into the culture, the militants create a set of overlapping challenges for the 
historic background, the national changes in policy and the ever governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as for the US 
changing historical currents coursing through and around FATA. and the international community. This volume of ‘Understanding 
The goal is to convey the opinions so that their aspirations and FATA’ sheds additional light on all of these issues.
frustrations can be known from the people’s perspective.
To deal with the Pakistan Taliban and foreign fighters, including Al 
The first part of the book places the opinions in the context of the Qaeda, the Pakistani military conducted 15 operations against 
transition of the administrative structure from the British Colonial Taliban and Al Qaeda militant groups since 2002. However, it 
system to the Pakistan Constitutional system. Prior to this, little failed to remove the militants from FATA. Most of the military 
effort has been made to understand how the archaic, Colonial operations against local militants ended up with compromises 
administrative system has helped the emergence of militancy in and, sometimes, agreements. In the recent times, much has been 
the tribal areas. A complete chapter is devoted to the debated and written about insurgency in FATA, but most of the 
administrative structure and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) focus has been on the number of military operations and how 
that came from the Colonial era and came to be imbedded in the these military operations have been conducted. The agreements 
Pakistani Constitution. between the Pakistan government and the militant groups have 
been analysed and severely criticised in the national and 
The second part of the book continues the theme of the Pakhtun 
international media. The survey provides a different ‘picture’ 
in the cross currents of history being made with the focus on the 
based on the sample statistics, instead of anecdotal evidence, of 
international conflict. The opinions of the people concerning 
the landscape of militant groups, their strengths, agenda and 
conflict and terrorism, internal security, personal security, the 
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image in the eyes of the people of FATA. The quantitative data was collected through structured 
questionnaires. The objective was to sample adult males and 
The inability to end violence created frustration within the 
females to ascertain their opinion on key issues related to the 
Pakistan society and the then US administration of G.W. Bush, as 
people of FATA. Because gender plays such an important role in 
well as the international community, that raised serious concerns 
public opinion, the sample was designed to interview equal 
on the will and capacity of the Pakistan military to counter this 
numbers of males and females in each village. Although there 
unique insurgency. More recently successful operations in the 
may be slightly unequal populations of males and females due to 
Swat valley and South Waziristan have enabled the Pakistan Army 
seasonal migration and also emigration, exact, current statistics 
to earn reasonable credit and praises from the US and Western 
were not available to guide a deviation from this 50/50 approach. 
countries. The findings in this survey show that within FATA the 
Expanding from its limited scope in 2007 and building upon 
people have supported these operations in spite of the 
previous surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009, the 2010 survey 
displacements that they have experienced.
continues to track core appraisal areas while revising its nuances 
FATA has been described as a mysterious borderland for and methodology to meet contemporary constraints and 
historians, writers, travellers and journalists. Much written about demands. The 2010 FATA poll was conducted from 25th February - 
it is based on misconceptions. When bad things happen, the 3rd April 2010, with face-to-face interviews of 4,000 residents of 
Frontier fascinates the world. When wars are won, for example FATA.
the Soviets vanquished, then attention falls elsewhere. The goal 
A hierarchical sampling strategy was used to poll adult opinion 
here is to remove the mystery and avoid misunderstandings. Part 
over the geographical area of all six Frontier Regions and the 
of our theme is that the Pakhtun are not a quaint and isolated 
seven Agencies. The first level of sampling was to select 400 
people; they have been and are related to the historical currents 
villages from the 960 villages in FATA. The second level was to 
of the region and the world and, importantly, they are both a rural 
select a representative sample of adult males and females from 
and an urban people with Peshawar, Quetta, Kabul and Qandahar 
each village such that they would add up to a robust sample that 
being their major cities. We will make the argument that it is the 
would minimise the margin of error as described in Appendix III. 
Pakhtun who have been the buffer between empires and not 
Afghanistan. Because the latest Census (1998) is out of date, it was assumed 
that the total population of FATA is less than 4 million people. In 
‘Understanding FATA’ 2010 is based on both qualitative and 
order to achieve the desired margin of error of less than 2% within 
quantitative data. Each chapter presents qualitative background 
a 95% confidence interval for ‘yes/no’ type questions, four 
material from multiple sources and the experience of CAMP. The 
thousand adults were interviewed. This is an extremely robust 
statistical findings are presented with reference to the qualitative 
sample because the opinions polled are for adults and not the 
substance. 
population of children who would be approximately half of the 
To strengthen the qualitative information, ten focus-group total population. Thus we are very confident when comparing, for 
discussions and two-day consultative dialogues were used to example, overall male and female differences of opinion as well as 
gather the opinions. Minutes were recorded, analyzed and differences in multiple choices.
utilized to write this report. Background and historical material 
There are two areas of sampling bias that have to be pointed out. 
used in the report came from a review of historical books, 
The first has to do with the inaccessibility of the villages. Because 
newspapers, reports, articles, journals and the experience of 
42% of the 960 villages were not secure enough for the 
CAMP programmes in FATA. 
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interviewers, the sample of 400 villages was drawn from the Because the only viable future for FATA will be the one that takes 
remaining 557 villages. This introduces a bias of undetermined into account the people’s views on religion, politics, society and 
implications because there isn’t a way to know the opinion of the governance, we hope that this report will generate a fruitful 
people inhabiting insecure villages. Nevertheless, one can debate about the future of the FATA; a debate that includes the 
hypothesize that they may have different opinions with regard to people from the FATA itself, regardless of the their status; a debate 
militancy, the military tactics, law and order, etc. If one wished to that includes policy makers in Peshawar, Islamabad, Kabul, 
be cautious in conclusions, one would have to add, ‘In secure Washington and London. 
areas at this time, the people of FATA believe…’ 
The ‘Understanding FATA’ series is a sincere attempt to inform 
The second area of bias has to do with the starting point method those debates. Some of the answers to some of the key issues are 
used to sample in each village. The technique of selecting a in this series; it may not provide all the answers but it does 
starting point to count off houses and then to knock on a sample underline an important principle: that the people of the FATA are 
of doors is a standard used in many household surveys. The encouraged to speak for themselves and to be heard. 
starting point bias comes from an important cultural fact, that the 
more influential families are closer to the Hujra or Mosque (or in 
the case of the Shia areas, the Imam Bargah) that were the Key findings of the polls are:
starting point. When large samples of population in selected 
2010 survey shows that the people of FATA are more 
towns are conducted (not in this case) the sampling criss-crosses 
optimistic about the direction of the country. In 2009 only 
the village taking in people of all ranks and stations. In this survey, 
16.7% people of FATA were of the opinion that things in 
however, the interviewers counted off in four directions (two for 
Pakistan were going in the right direction. Now, in the 2010 
males and two for females) to sample a total of five males and five 
survey 38% believe that it is going in the right direction. This 
females in each village by taking two and then three houses 
swing suggests that the ongoing efforts by the government 
according to the direction. Hence the bias is toward more urban 
are seen as steps towards improvement. 
and better off families in each village. This bias also leads to 
hypotheses as to differences between rural and urban adults in Concerns for deteriorating ‘law and order’ in Pakistan 
the sampled areas. In the analysis of occupations of the continues. In both 2010 and 2009 approximately one third of 
respondents we do note a greater proportion of professionals and the FATA respondents identified the lack of law and order as 
merchants than would be expected for the rural areas. These the biggest problem facing Pakistan. 
findings may also bias areas of interest such as educational and 
In 2009, 26.6% of the respondents identif ied 
occupational aspirations for their children, but, again, we do not 
‘unemployment’ as a major problem; that dropped to only 
know the facts from the rural inhabitants.
6.6% in 2010.
In summary, the social image of the respondents that should be 
Although it varies by Agency/FR, it is surprising that despite 
kept in mind is that they are in relatively secure villages and that 
the ongoing militancy and military operation in most parts of 
they are village dwellers and not representative of isolated farm 
FATA, the people of FATA continue to prefer living in FATA. For 
families. We say with caution, ‘relatively secure’ because we do 
both years, 2009 and 2010, over half of the FATA respondents 
not want to underestimate the risk and effort by the interviewers 
confirm that they would not leave FATA if given the 
in undertaking the work. It took courage and care for them to 
opportunity. 
enter many of the areas. X
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lOn the justification of US drone attacks, the 2010 data shows gradually and, in the meanwhile, the President of Pakistan 
that 58.8% of the respondents believe that such attacks are would retain his Article 247 powers under the constitution.
‘never justified’. 24.4% of the respondents opined in a 
Support for allowing the Political Parties Act of 2002 has not 
qualified manner that sometimes these attacks are justified 
varied from the 2008 and 2009 polls. Nearly 60% of the 
if they are properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties 
respondents welcomed President Asif Ali Zardari's 
are avoided. Only 4.4% believe that such drone attacks are 
announcement of a political reforms package for FATA in 
'always justified'. However, when examined by Agency the 
2009.
variation of the 'never' category ranges from 99.3% in North 
Waziristan to 12.9% in Kurram. Support for military operations against militants increased 
dramatically over the last year. In 2009 only 16.8% 
As opposed as the respondents are to outside military 
respondents supported the Army/security force operations 
intervention increasing support is found for international 
in Swat, but this year 66.8% of the respondents supported 
trainers, over local trainers, for strengthening the Frontier 
the operation. Apparently, the success of the Swat military 
Corps against militants. 
offensive and the repatriation of over 2 million IDPs to Swat 
'Education and schools' (56.0%) followed by 'security' moulded their opinion in favour of the military offensive. 
(51.7%) and 'health services/hospitals' (50.7%) were the 
Approximately 25% of the respondents had been displaced 
most important services that the Government of Pakistan 
people. This condition significantly influenced their opinions 
should be providing. In the 2009 poll, 'security' was felt as the 
on military strategies and the use of drones; they generally 
top most needed service by 62.9% respondents, suggesting 
support these operations more than do the non-displaced in 
that this year the FATA respondents seem to feel less 
their respective Agencies. 
threatened and have focused on development services for 
their well-being. Suicide bombing was seen as 'never justified' by 42% in 2009 
poll, but this year 57.1% condemned suicide bombing. 
Regarding the future status of FATA as a political unit of 
Pakistan, we see variations over the last four years. Nearly On human rights, there have been substantial changes in 
one third, 30.7%, want FATA to be fully integrated into Khyber priorities from one year to another. In 2010 the 'state's 
Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP), and 24.9% want to have a inability to provide basic amenities of life' (38.4%), and 
separate province. Those who wanted to keep the current 'democracy' (30.8%), were the most important human rights 
governing arrangement was a steady 23% (2008) to 21% issues in Pakistan. In contrast, in 2009 'democracy' (22.8%), 
(2009) during the previous two surveys, but last year only 'independence of judiciary' (18.58%) and 'women rights' 
7.9% of the respondents stayed with the 'status quo.' (18%) were the main issues. We cannot explain the swing.
lDuring the last four years, CAMP has been interacting 41% of the respondents identified 'terrorist attacks' as the 
extensively with the elite, well-informed local leadership of main threat to life; their description and opinion on the 
FATA who advocated for a separate FATA Council. Therefore, Taliban are important findings. It is notable that the people 
this option was introduced in 2010. Only 2.9% of the people, distinguish between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan 
who may have been by chance members of the elite class of Taliban. The reasons for the causes and sources of the Taliban 
FATA, supported a FATA Council with an elected assembly. are very illuminating and they are too complex to summarize 
The idea was that such a council can decide the future of FATA here except to say that two-thirds of the respondents, 64.2%, XI
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have unfavourable opinions about Pakistan Taliban while The radio is the most valued among the sources of information, 
only 36.2% believe that Afghan Taliban are terrorists. The followed by television and newspapers. It is notable that 
idea that the Afghan Taliban are Islamic heroes fighting foreign prepared listening content is as popular as Pakistani 
Western occupation in Afghanistan has dropped from Programming with BBC running at the same level as Pakistani 
40.35% in 2009 to 20.2% in 2010 poll. national radio and the Voice of America via 'Dewa' coming in at 
third place with a fourth of the listeners. The international 
In the 2010 poll, half of the respondents did not know about 
interest by the people of FATA is not surprising considering that 
Al Qaeda and out of those who knew, overwhelming 
they are and have been in the cross currents of history for 
majority, 72.58%, have an unfavourable opinion about Al 
centuries. It reflects the tradition during the Silk Road days of 
Qaeda. A contrast that gives pause to ponder is that more 
listening to news-bearing story tellers in Peshawar.
than 85% of the respondents have an opinion about the US 
and the UK, but respectively, 68.5% and 56.6% of the An important chapter delves into the opinion about other 
respondents have an unfavourable opinion about US and countries and the importance of concepts that they stand for. 
UK policies. The countries are divided into neighbours, other Islamic, 
Western and then the US and the UK are dealt with in a 
Responding to a question about what should happen to 
comparative manner. The findings are diverse and contrast 
foreign Muslim fighters living in FATA, 42.7% believe that 
with the overall unfavourable opinion stated above about the 
they should be forced to leave by the Pakistan Army; 25.3% 
UK and the US. When it comes to the development and military 
think that they should be asked to leave by host 
assistance and training, the people are in favour of support 
communities; and only 2.7% said that they should be 
from the UK and US in spite of their unfavourable ratings.
allowed to stay. 
These findings are but glimpses of the results of the survey. It is 
A question on whether Afghan refugees' should return to 
important to study these statistics in the context provided by the 
Afghanistan, an overwhelming 89.1% said they should. This 
qualitative section of each chapter. The chapters could be used 
is an upward change in sentiments since 2008. The factors 
alone, but the findings from one area of inquiry to another provide a 
of increased tensions and economics because of refugees 
more comprehensive understanding of the people of FATA. 
are described.
There are important changes of opinion by the people of FATA 
Gender differences were revealed in the answers to the 
between 2008 and 2010. However it is clear that security, 
questions about what parents (Males and Females) wanted 
governance, socio-economic development are the main issues that 
most for their male and female children. One finding was 
need to be prioritized if stability and peace are to be brought in to 
that the opinion for boys did not change much from 2008. 
FATA. 
More education, more employment opportunities and 
more security were constants. For girls however, although 
more security and more education were at the top, the 
need for pardah went up by 20% since the 2008 opinion 
poll. Women, by two-fold, wish for more education for girls 
than do men. That being said, women support for 
education for girls as a priority is still less than 25%.
Understanding FATA  2010
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3of India, Afghanistan and Iran. It is also believed that Past - The borderland Pakhtuns 
Aryans formed three parts. The group living in Bakhtar 
are the ancestors of Pakhtuns and settled in Balkh, People living in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) 
Hirat, Kabul and Gandhara. are predominantly Pakhtuns. The origin of their language, 
Pakhtu, is not clear in spite of the tireless efforts of linguists and 
The Pakhtun as a buffer between empireshistorians. Their history comes from a laborious reconstruction, 
pieced together from coins, inscriptions, occasional glimpses of 
In order to understand present-day FATA it is important to look 
1
fragmentary records written by envoys and geographers.   
into the pages of history to know the tribal Pakhtun's constant 
struggle against invaders from Alexander the Great to the Two different theories, one based on religion and the other 
British India and then the present-day Pakistani state. The posited by ethnologists, are used to explain the origin of the 
present border has evolved through centuries of political Pakhtun. 
struggle between the British Empire in India and the empires of 
6One group of religiously oriented historians claims that 
Western and Central Asia.  The frontier region has never been 
Pakhtuns are the descendents of ‘Qais, the thirty-
stabilised due to the continuous invasions from the West, which 
2
seventh Lineal descendent of Saul of Israel’.  Pakhtuns 
resulted in the shifting of the region from one empire to 
generally believe in this theory and speak of themselves 
another. 
3
as ‘Bani Israel’.  Qais was a saintly warrior who lived 
From this history we are aware that the lands that are now near Ghur in Afghanistan in the seventh century. He 
Afghanistan and the North West Frontier of Pakistan have seen converted to Islam and received blessing from the Holy 
 perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). After his death his 
7
country in Asia or indeed the world.  At some point the area descendents moved to Qandahar. Qais had three sons 
remained part of India, then Persia, then again India, then namely Sarbani, Ghilzai and Ghurghusht, from which 
Afghanistan and finally British India. Over long periods the line the three great branches of the Pakhtun race evolved. 
of the Indus, or the escarpment of the mountains west of it, has 
A second group of historians and ethnologists believe 
represented the boundary of constantly shifting kingdoms or 
8that Pakhtuns are the descendents of Aryans who laid 
empires.  During those shifts the Pakhtun were sometimes 
4
the foundation of this new culture in around 1500 B.C.   
overcome and at other times the Pakhtun were the tribal basis 
Most of the modern researchers of this theory agree on 
for the establishment of a small empire ruling over other ethnic 
the birth place of Aryans lying in between the Pamirs 
groups.
5
and Oxus which is known as Bakhtar.  The Dravidians, 
the residents of the area, rather than submit to Aryan The invasions
subjugation, fled the area and migrated to other parts 
When Alexander the Great invaded India in 323 B.C., he of India. At that time Aryans gradually settled in parts 
conquered Afghanistan and then advanced through western 
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part of the sub-continent where he faced resistance from the called the Durrani Empire that consolidated not only the other 
Pakhtun tribes.  Alexander's Army, under the direction of Gen. Pakhtun tribes on both sides of the Hindu Kush, but they also 
Seleucus, subdued the Pakhtun tribes and this region became went on to try to conquer and hold parts of present day Iran, 
part of the Macedonian Empire. Ashok the Great, in 250 B.C., Northern Afghanistan, Kashmir and South into present day 
also ruled over what is present-day Afghanistan and Western Sindh and Delhi in India. This vast empire was not possible to 
Pakistan. hold because the Sikhs, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and others 
rebelled and pushed back in the late 1700s, and, internally, 
In the ninth and tenth centuries A.D. there were Muslim 
leaders in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Quetta and Peshawar were 
invasions from Central Asia and Afghanistan.  At that time these 
always contesting power. 
areas were under the control of Hindu Rajputs. Raja Jaypal was 
the last Hindu to rule over the Pakhtun when he was defeated by In 1826 Dost Mohammad of the Mohammadzai family took the 
Mehmud Ghaznavi in Peshawar. Mehmud Ghaznavi followed throne of Kabul. According to Fraser-Tytler, during his struggle 
the traditional invading route from Central Asia through the to regain territories lost to the Sikhs and to liberate his fellow 
11
men from the Sikh yoke,  in 1837 therefore, Dost Mohammad Khyber Pass. Although he invaded India on seventeen occasions 
- sent troops under his eldest son, Mohammad Akbar Khan, between 1000  1026 A. D., he never consolidated an empire in 
129
through the Khyber to attack the Sikhs.  Aided by Pakhtun India.   
tribesmen, Akbar's army defeated the Sikhs under Hari Singh 
In 1186 Mohammad Ghori from Afghanistan attacked Punjab 13
outside the walls of Jamrud.  The first Afghan War (1839-42) 
and Benares and defeated Rajputs and laid the first foundation 
was the result of the lack of cooperation by the British with Amir 
for a Muslim state in India. The same route was followed, first by 
Dost Mohammad in his struggle to capture Hirat from Persians.   
Chengez Khan (Genghis Khan) in 1212 A.D. when Sultan 
Four years earlier the Russians had promised Amir Dost 
Altutmish was ruling India, and then in 1398 by Amir Timur Lane 
Mohammad that they would help him in capturing Hirat as well 
who wrought enormous destruction before being expelled. In 
as to regain territories of Peshawar from the Sikhs, because they 
1526 Zaheeruddin Babar, the first Mughal Emperor, came from 
belonged to Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan and defeated Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi in the battle of 
Panipat and laid the foundation of the Mughal Empire in the 
Splitting the Pakhtun cultural area
10
Indian Sub-continent. That empire lasted until 1764.   
These struggles show how the Pakhtun areas on both sides of 
The Durrani federation and empire the Hindu Kush served as a buffer zone between the ancient 
cultures. Later, the Pakhtun culture area was not seen as a 
The Mughal Empire started to erode with the death of the last 
nation and only ‘Afghanistan’ north of the Hindu Kush became 
powerful Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir in 1707 because 
the buffer between British India and the Russians in what 
his weak successors were unequal to the task of holding the 
became known as “The Great Game”. In order to counter the 
empire together. Thus began the first, modern, Pakhtun 
Tsarists designs on ‘Afghanistan’ and to protect the North-
consolidation known as the Durrani Federation. In the early 
Western flank of India, the British made an alliance with Sikhs 
1700s the military leader of one of the principal Pakhtun groups, 14
and the deposed Shah Shujah  against Dost Mohammad. Shah 
the Sadozai, led by the military leader Ahmad Shah Durrani 
Shujah was promised the throne of Kabul while possession of 
brought a second Pakhtun group, the Ghilzais, into the 
Peshawar would go to the Sikhs. In a short time the allied forces 
federation. They went on to conquer and form what has been 
captured Kabul and other parts, and Shah Shujah was made 4
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Amir of Afghanistan for a very short time. By January 1841, both 
the British and Shah Shujah were driven completely from the 
15
country.  By 1843 Dost Mohammad had returned from his exile 
The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 
and had regained the control of his country. From then on Dost 
Mohammad never cooperated with British India in relieving the The agreement between Afghanistan and the Britain may have 
pressure of the fellow Pakhtun hill tribes on the Frontier. settled the international discussion, but there remained the 
internal problem for the British Colonial rule. The frontier area 
The Second Afghan War 1878-1880 was fought under the 
was a continuous source of trouble and a threat to the stability 
command of Brigadier General Sir Neville Chamberlain.  By that 
of British India including access to the passes through the Hindu 
time British India had annexed most of the remaining 
Kush. To try to check this threat, British India formulated a policy  
independent parts of India. The subcontinent had become 
of persuasion, control, and armed interventions in these areas.  
substantially the same geographically and administratively. It 
Between 1849 and 1939, there were approximately 58 military 
remained this way through to the time of independence and 
21
campaigns against the Pakhtun tribes by British India.  The 16
partition in 1947.  The Second Afghan War, like the First, was 
conflict finally was resolved in the following way.  In return for 
considered a fiasco by many Englishmen. However from the 
free road access by the British the tribal areas along the Durand 
stand point of the Frontier, of course, the most important result 
Line were given a semi-autonomous status with allowances 
of the Second Afghan War was that the British were now in 
(Mojib) and subsidies to the tribal Maliks and elders.  17
possession of the Khyber, the Kurram and the Bolan Passes.  
Note that these passes continue to be links between the major Several implementing agreements were added. One important 
routes of the old Silk Road that consisted of two routes: 1) the arrangement was the introduction of the Frontier Crimes 
Kabul to Qandahar route and 2) the Peshawar to Quetta route.  Regulation (FCR) in six occupied Frontier districts of the Pakhtun 
These routes were the highway system during the Durrani in 1848. Initially, the ordinary civil and criminal law, in force in 
Empire and continue to be for the Pakhtun culture of British India, was extended to such districts. However, the rate 
22
Afghanistan and Pakistan; they also connect the rural and urban of conviction under the ordinary criminal law was too low.  This 
Pakhtun areas. led the British administration to devise special law for the whole 
Pakhtun region, and, in 1871, a more encompassing set of FCR 18
Both the Amir  of Afghanistan and the British Government of 23
was enacted. They were modified in 1873 and, again, in 1876.  
India were desirous of settling the frontier of Afghanistan.  
These modifications continued through 1901 when, the entire 
Therefore on 12 December 1893 the Agreement was signed by 
North-Western Frontier region of British India was placed under  
Sir M. Durand and Amir Abdurehman. This line, bearing 
the rule of the Governor-General of India, who governed it 
Durand's name, was drawn and can be considered one result of 
through the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab Province and his  
the Second Afghan War. This agreement brought the Khyber 
Political Officers of the British Civil Service.
Pass and the highlands around Quetta within the British Indian 
19 24
sphere. The culture area of the Pakhtun and the Durrani In summary, the FCR  has been operative for more than a 
federation was split, and, to this day, the Pakhtun are a buffer century as a special law prescribing trial procedures for offenses 
20 25 
between nations. and civil disputes in the tribal areas. The judicial system 
enshrined in the FCR of 1901 has been described as a hybrid of 
Colonial-era legal framework and with traditional customs and 
26
norms to which executive direction has been added.
Present - The structuring of FATA
5
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Because of its repressive set of rules that violate basic human FATA, which states that the executive authority of the 
rights such as freedom from collective punishment the FCR is Federation extends to FATA and that it shall be administered by 
regarded as a ‘Black Law’ or ‘Draconian Law’ when judged by the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as per the direction of the 
present-day international human rights standards and President of Pakistan. Most of the laws civil, criminal, electoral 
principles. Nevertheless, it is basically the system of justice in and fiscal  have been extended to FATA and the President may, 
place today. As will be described in the following section, this subject to ascertaining the views of the tribal Jirga, abolish the 
system has become institutionalized in the present Constitution status of a given FATA region/Agency and convert it into a settled 
27
area.  The President may, from time to time, issue directions to of Pakistan.
his agent, as stipulated in Article 145 of the Constitution. No Act 
The British Colonial administrative structure of Parliament or any part thereof is extended to FATA unless the 
President so directs. Clause 7 of the Article 247, bars the 
In order to implement the FCR, the British Colonial rule included 
extension of superior courts, including Supreme Court and High 
a system of administration. That is, a system by which the 
Court, to FATA unless the Parliament so provides under a law. 
Governor-General of India, through the Chief Commissioner for 
Pakhtun The President may make regulations with respect to any matter the Punjab, engaged the local  leaders through a 
Maliks Lungi for the peace and good governance of FATA or any part thereof. ‘Political Officer’ who dealt with the  and holders of 
FATA is represented in the Lower (National Assembly) and the tribes. Because the British Colonial structure was so similar 
Upper (Senate) Houses of the Parliament by 12 and 8 members, to the present Constitutional structure, the parallel details will 
  respectively. However, because the parliament has no be described below. 
jurisdiction over FATA it is not clear what importance the FATA 
Constitutional status of FATA representatives have. FATA is geographically contiguous with 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; however, it has no representation in the 
The Indian Independence Act of 3 June 1947 abrogated all the 
provincial parliament. 
special treaties. Pakistan opted not to base troops in the FATA 
Maliks Loya Jirga The Constitution of 1973 does not allow the people of FATA to region because 200 , during a , signed an 
fully participate in the political process. Only in 1996, the Adult instrument of accession with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the 
- Franchise Act was extended to FATA, while the Political Parties founder and first Governor General of Pakistan, in return for 
Act of 2002 has yet to be extended. This has kept the people of continued allowances and subsidies. 
FATA away from the mainstream politics of the country.
On 14 August 1947, when Pakistan was created as a sovereign 
Hence we see how the Constitution substitutes the President of Muslim state, it also recognized the semi-autonomous status of 
-Pakhtun Pakistan for the ‘Governor General,’ and then created a the  tribes of FATA and the instrument of accession. 
Secretariat headed by the Provincial Governor instead of a With very few changes the 1956, 1962 and 1973 constitutions of 
‘Chief Commissioner of the Punjab,’ and, finally, the title of Pakistan retained the same agreements recognizing the special 
Political Agents replaced the ‘Political Officer’ as the link to the status of the FATA.
tribal Maliki and Lungi.  In that way, aside from the upper and 
In Article 1 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, FATA is included 
lower house members with questionable powers, the 
as one of the territories of Pakistan and Article 246 stipulates 
Constitution retained the nondemocratic structure of 
some 13 Agencies and frontier regions that comprise the FATA. 
appointees. 
Article 247 prescribes the manner and method of administering 6
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The recent renaming of the NWFP to ‘Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’ (Mojib) so that they remain loyal to Political Agents. Political 
(KP) corrects two historical perspectives: 1) the North West Agents grant Maliki or Lungi status with the consent of the 
Frontier perspective was based on the British Colonial view Governor and can withdraw, suspend or cancel the same status 
from central India as to the relative location of the area, and 2) when he deems the individual is not serving his purpose. 
the perspective that relegated or only recognized the Pakhtun 
The PAs, through the Maliks, have at their disposal the 
as the people living in the region. When the Pakistani National 
Khasadars as local police-like agents from tribal tradition and 28
Assembly approved this name change,  they recognized the 
they also can convoke Lakhkars, another tribal tradition by 
extent of the culture area and implicitly the link between the 
which tribal members can be called together as a posse to 
rural and urban areas of the Pakhtun.
defend the community or to apprehend criminals. 
The structure of FATA administration
Social and legal justice under the FCR in FATA
To implement the Constitutional provisions described above, 
The Constitution in Article 247(7) states that the jurisdiction of 
the President, through PA, must be linked to local, tribal 
the higher judiciary, that is, the provincial High Courts and the 
structures.  In most Colonial structures where pre-existing tribal 
Supreme Court, does not extend to the FATA. Nevertheless, 
societies existed, the external structure takes control of, or 
based on the FCR, the Political Agent is a judge in addition to his 
coöps, the local leadership and hence annexes the tribal 
other executive functions. The FCR also provides for a system of 
structure. A leading legal scholar summarizes the 
collective territorial responsibility and collective punishment.  
administrative situation of the last hundred years in this way. 
‘The region has a peculiar system of administration. The people Importantly, a PA who has acted without regard to local justice 
are governed through their local chieftains called Maliks, and also without due process undermines the credibility of 
through financial compensation controlled by Federal governance as well as justice.  This poor governance system has 
29
impacted the local life very dearly where the concepts of proper Government and exercised by a Political Agent.’  It is this 
and timely justice, and the insurance of human security.  structure that has made the transition from Colonial to 
Ironically, this lack of justice has created a huge gap that has Constitutional times intact.  
been filled by Islamist militants and law as imposed by the 
The local administration in each Agency is managed by the 
Taliban. 
Political Agent, who is a federal civil servant. Each sub-division 
The situation is not that simple because the administration of (Tehsil) is headed by his Assistant Political Agent. The PA 
justice in FATA drew upon the Pakhtun traditional processes for performs several functions at the same time. He acts an 
justice and the resolution of local conflict in the form of a executive, a judge and revenue collector. He also heads the 
modified ‘jirga’ that will be described below.Agency Council and overseas development projects and all line 
departments come under his authority. 
In many parts of the world, traditional ways of justice or locally 
integrated conflict transformation/resolution institutions are The link between the PA and the tribal structure is through local 
being used to resolve conflicts in order to ensure peace and leaders holding the titles of Maliki and Lungi.  They play a vital 
stability within local communities or tribes. Such institutions role in maintaining the status quo in the tribal areas, which was 
are often useful and suitable under the circumstances in which introduced in the Colonial period of Indian sub-continent. 
they operate because they satisfy the local cultural and religious These Maliks and Lungi holders are paid with allowances 
sentiments. 
7
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inheritance, alleged violation of 'honour killings’, and intra-The Qoomi and Sarkari Jirgas
tribal disputes.  In cases of murder, a traditional or Qoomi jirga 
30The ‘Jirga’ is a traditional justice system that is practiced by the may recommend direct vengeance or badal, or swara.  
Pakhtun in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The concept or According to the 2001 annual report by the Human Rights 
format of the Qoomi jirga goes back to centuries old traditions. Commission of Pakistan, ‘The speed with which the jirga system 
Basically, the Qoomi Jirga is convoked by a jirgamaar after the is expanding makes the need for strengthening the justice 
disputing parties agree that a jirga be held to resolve their system all the more pressing.’ On the international front, 
conflict. Usually the weaker of the two disputing parties goes to Amnesty International has recommended that Pakistan ‘take all 
the jirgamaar who is an elder and wise person to explain the possible measures to ensure that tribal councils do not take the 
complaint. The jirgamaar then goes to the other party to gain law into their own hands and assume quasi-judicial functions.’ 
their agreement to be a party to a jirga. If there is agreement, Although decisions are considered objective because the 
then both parties agree to submit to the consensus of the elders facilitator, the Jirgamaar, is nominated by both sides, the 
who will listen to the dispute and then decide the resolution. decisions made by the elders convoked by the jirgamaar are 
Note that the cultural goal is to resolve the dispute or conflict so based on culture and religion plus previous decisions that make 
that the parties, families, tribes and so forth will return to a up the oral tradition or jurisprudence of the culture.  Critics of 
harmonious relationship. Conflict is as dysfunctional to tribal jirgas charge this cultural basis, many times, includes a bias 
life as it is in non-tribal societies.  Hence, culturally, the against women and minorities. 
traditional 'Qoomi jirga' is still a preferred form of 
Under international human rights law however, Pakistan is 
justice/dispute resolution mechanism in many Pakhtun 
obligated to ensure the enjoyment of rights to everyone living in 
dominated areas of Pakistan.
its jurisdiction. Both the Qoomi and the Sarkari jirga, as 
A modified form of jirga (Sarkari) was adopted for use by the PAs practiced in the FATA, infringe upon these rights. In order to 
as a formal mechanism for dispensing justice and resolving fulfil its obligations to all its citizens, the Government of 
conflicts in the FATA under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).  Pakistan must ensure that if the jirga system is allowed to 
The State in this case plays a very distinct role. The aggrieved function as they do today, then they must comply with the 
person goes to the PA, or, if the PA suspects a crime, the PA human rights standards in the Constitution of Pakistan and 
charges a person.  The PA then can call a few elders or adults of international human rights treaties that Pakistan has ratified. 
his choice to investigate and make a recommendation. Note 
that the person charging the defendant, in this case the PA, may Participation in democratic governance
select the ‘jirga’ and then act as the judge.  The lack of fairness 
The dated political and governance system in FATA does not 
in this process is not lost upon the Pakhtun and the Sarkari Jirga 
allow the popular participation of local communities in the 
is considered another of the injustices imposed by the FCR.
political and governance process. The political vacuum paves 
the way for obscurantist elements to fill the gap and exercise the The limitations of traditional or common law 
authority that, otherwise, belongs to the state. This is exactly 
based on culture
what has happened in FATA. Decades of seclusion from the 
mainstream socio-political and economic development have In the FATA region, ensuring social justice is quite a daunting 
alienated the people of FATA. task. The traditional Qoomi jirga deals with varying issues in the 
tribal areas including conflicts on land and property, 8
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As we can see, the impact of revived ancient tribal codes, 
compounded with a Taliban-like interpretation of Islam, has 
been so forceful that it forms the core of local collective psyche.  
Religious, political and social dissent is unacceptable; a total 
disregard for others' rights (especially when the victim is a 
woman) and a general tendency to resist change have become 
the defining characteristics. 
On the other hand, both parties ]Pakistan People's Party and 
Pakistan Muslim League (N)] have lost their credibility in the 
eyes of Taliban and Al Qaeda. In Pakistani domestic politics both 
parties have been highly pragmatic, even opportunistic, 
forming formal or informal alliances with all major political 
players, no matter military, civilian, or secular. None of them has 
ever used the path of violence in their political struggle, but 
they have supported Jihad and militant Islam politically. 
The constitutionally provided representation of FATA in the 
Upper and Lower Houses has not been developed so that not 
only meaningful representation is gained, it remains a hollow 
status because the houses cannot pass legislation that is not 
intervened by the executive structure described above. The 
extension of the Political Parties Act passed in 2002 is one of the 
ways to strengthen the Pakistani political system into FATA, but 
the fact that it is awaiting Presidential orders for 
implementation belays the non-participatory structure of 
governance.   
Conclusion
This historical background provides the context for the 
following chapters as we examine the survey opinion data with 
regard to the FCR, FATA Secretariat, confidence in life in FATA, 
the prospects for the future and so forth.  
In the second half of the book, there will be an extensive 
chapter entitled, ‘FATA in the Context of International Conflict.’  
That chapter is related to this historical material and is 
accompanied by specific surveyed opinion regarding military 
tactics, esteem of neighbors and other nations and security. 9
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(2010) of the population does not know or have an opinion as to Introduction
what should be done. What is also clear is that only 7.9% do not 
The previous historical chapter ended with a description of how wish for change. The responses regarding the future status of 
the Colonial judicial and administrative structures of FATA were FATA offered the following options:  Reform the FCR (13.8%); 
transferred into the present constitution of Pakistan. We now full integration into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [former NWFP] 
turn to the survey results of the opinions of the people of FATA (30.7%) and one quarter (24.9%) believe that it should be 
with regard to the themes outlined above under the general established as a separate province of Pakistan. 
heading of the Constitutional Status of FATA.  
For some of the options there is data from the 2007 survey, as 
well as the intervening years, so these responses can be Mainstreaming FATA - Future status of FATA
examined for trends or stability. The table 1 shows the results 
The first, general question posed, with seven options, was, 
from all four years with one exception. During the last four 
‘Should Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas?’ The 
years, CAMP has been interacting extensively with the elite, 
responses are shown in the figure 1.
well informed and local leadership of FATA who constantly 
In spite of long debate on the subject of FATA's status, 19.4% demanded a separate FATA Council.  Therefore, this option (the 
CHAPTER - 2
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF FATA
34.0
23.4
0.2
19.8
22.3
0.3
19.0
21.8
0.0
16.7
18.7
23.9
30.7
7.9
13.8
24.9
2.9
0.5
19.4
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
Be fully integrated
 into the Khyber
Pukhtunkhwa
(former NWFP)
Keep its current 
governing 
arrangements
Bring more 
amendment in the FCR
Be established as
a separate province
of Pakistan
Be established as a 
FATA Council
Other (Specify) Don’t know
2008
2009
2010
Fig 1. Future status of FATA
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There is one recent political caveat that may explain the 
increased support for FCR amendments between 2009 and 
2010. The results from the 2008 and 2009 surveys suggested 
that amending FCR was not the best choice for the respondents; 
however, the demand went up in 2010 survey when 13.8% 
respondents selected the option. The August 2009 (after the 
2009 survey) announcement of the first, major amendment 
since 1901 by President Asif Ali Zardari was welcomed 
overwhelmingly by the FATA tribes. The amendment 
announced in August 2009 has yet to be implemented, and 
during the 2010 survey the respondents believed that at least 
these amendments should be implemented without further 
delay.  The popularity of this act is measured in the next two 
sections.exception) was introduced in the 2010 survey. However, just 
2.9% of the people, who may have been by chance members of 
Support for the Government of Pakistan on FCR 
the elite class of FATA, believed that FATA should be given a 
status of FATA Council with an elected assembly that can decide reform 
the future of FATA gradually and, in the meanwhile, the 
The 2010 survey attempted to measure the support of the 
President of Pakistan would retain his Article 247 powers under 
respondents for the Presidential decree of August 2009 in 
the constitution.
Consistently 35% to 55% of the people are seeking substantial 
change, that is, either the full integration into the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa or the separate province options would imply the 
end of the FATA Secretariat and Presidential decrees. In the 
latter case FATA then would be directly under Constitutional 
rights and guarantees.  
The inverse of substantial change, that is, keeping the current 
arrangement or simply amending the FCR, has also been 
consistently held by 21.8% to 23.4% of the people. However, the 
sole question of keeping the current arrangement has declined 
immensely from 23.4% in 2008 to just 7.9% in 2010. In the 
broadest sense, these responses indicate majority popular 
2007  2008  2009 2010
Be fully integrated into the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(former NWFP)
20.8  34  19 30.7
Keep its current governing 
arrangements  23.4  21.8 7.9
Bring more amendments in 
the FCR  0.2  0 13.8
Be established as a separate 
Province of Pakistan 34.3  19.8  16.7 24.9
Be established as a FATA Council NA NA  NA 2.9
Other (Specify)   0.5
Don’t know   19.4
Total 55.1  77.4  57.5 100.1
NA = Not Asked in that year   
Future status of FATA
Table 1. Future status of FATA
17.1
26.7
15.6
6.9
11.1
22.6
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
Fully support Partly support Fully oppose Partly oppose No opinion Don’t know
2010
Fig 2. Support for the Government of Pakistan on FCR reform
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general.   The enthusiasm in general (42.8%) did not match the though the exact nature of the change has to be decided and, if 
59.7% support for the political parties. Some 17.1% there is to be a vote, there will have to be a public education 
respondents 'fully supported' and 26.7% partly supported the programme explaining the options so that the approximate one 
 
notion. However, 15.6% and 6.9% respondents 'fully' and third without an opinion will become engaged. 
'partly' opposed the idea, respectively. Again, approximately a 
Extending the Political Parties Act of 2002 to 
third of the respondents are undecided or do not know the 
FATAanswer. 
The 2010 survey attempted to gauge the level of agreement Future of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 
with President Asif Ali Zardari's decision of August 2009 
In 2010 the question of the future for the FCR was asked directly.  
extending the Political Parties Act 2002 to FATA. An 
As indicated in the figure 3, the support for the FCR is only 3.4%.  
overwhelming 59.7% of the respondents agreed that the Act 
A sizable majority (69.1%) desires either abolition (45.4%) or 
should be extended to FATA while 9.6% respondents oppose 
fundamental reform (23.7%). Partially reforming the FCR 
this decision. There remained a sizable percentage of 
remained low with just 8.4% of the responses. Again, a sizable 
respondents, 30.8%, undecided or did not know the answer.  
number of respondents, 16.3%, still do not know the answer or 
Clearly the popularity of this act may have influenced people 
undecided. 
and favoured reform rather than substantial change. 
The opinion of the people of FATA on the two key governance Nevertheless, by introducing the practice of political parties 
aspects of FATA, The FCR and the Administrative Structure, is and membership, the way can be prepared for more local 
similar. There is an overwhelming desire for change even 
45.4
23.7
8.4
3.4
16.3
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
It should be 
abolished
Fundamentally 
reformed
Partly reformed Retain in its 
present form
No opinion Don’t know
2.9
2010
Fig 3. Future of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)
59.7
9.6
30.8
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Yes No Don’t know
2010
Fig 4. Extending the Political Parties Act of 2002 to FATA
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participation and perhaps, substantial change.  At this time the 
people of FATA have elected officials in both houses. Party 
affiliation may help them to leverage the party agendas for 
change and development, and that would advance the needs 
identified by the people of FATA.
Admiring a living national politician
As shown above, although the Political Parties Act has not been 
extended to FATA, the people of FATA support the extension of 
the act and the political parties have established their local, 
FATA Agency chapters with a low profile. In order to gauge the 
interest and awareness of the people in the political life of 
Pakistan, the 2010 survey attempted to identify the politician 
most admired by the respondents.
The most dramatic finding was that the majority (54%) either 
did not know of a national politician or declared ‘None.’ As 
shown in the table 2, this finding holds for the last three years 
which began with the 2008 elections. Clearly there is a great 
deal of work to be done to draw the people of FATA into the 
political process and, conversely, draw the political leaders to 
FATA. 
It is not that there aren't known politicians, for example, Imran 
Khan, the former cricketer and Chairman of Tehrek e Insaaf 
party (TI) is admired by 13.1% respondents and that makes him 
the most popular of the politicians.  The actual President and 
the co-chair of Pakistan People's Party, Asif Ali Zardari, received 
4.4%.  Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, chief of his own faction 
of Pakistan Muslim League, was named by 3.9% of the 
respondents, but, clearly, the majority of the people polled 
main politicians. Mian Nawaz Sharif remained the most were not impressed by them. 
admired politician in 2008 and 2009 surveys, with support from 
Looking at the past two surveys of 2008 and 2009, we see a 
10.3% and 14.9% of the respondents, respectively. However, 
dramatic change in the respondents' perception about these 
admiration for him dropped to just 3.9% by 2010. There are 
Responses Percent 2008 Percent 2009 Percent 2010
Imran Khan 4.1 12.9 13.1
Asif Ali Zardari
 
9.9
 
8.4
 
4.4
Nawaz Sharif
 
10.3
 
14.9
 
3.9
Fazal ur Rehman
 
1.6
 
3.1
 
3.1
Qazi Hussain Ahmad
 
1.8
 
2.9
 
2.6
Yousaf Raza Gillani
 
1.2
 
1.3
 
2.1
Asfandiyar Wali Khan
 
4.9
 
1.6
 
1.4
Bashir Ahmad Bilour
  
0.2
 
1.3
Mian Iftikhar Hussain Shah
   
1.2
Parviz Musharaf
 
1.1
 
1.6
 
1.2
Hameed ullah Jan
  
0.2
 
0.9
Altaf Hussain
  
0.1
 
0.8
Akram Khan Durani
   
0.7
Faisal Karim Kundi
   
0.6
Sheikh Rashid
   
0.6
Shahbaz Sharif
   
0.5
Kashmala Tariq
   
0.5
Amin Faheem
  
0.2
 
0.3
Chudhry Nisar Ali
   
0.3
Mahmood Khan Achakzai
  
0.4
 
0.3
Mufti Muhammad Ijaz
   
0.3
Syed Munawar Hassan
   
0.3
Afrasyab Khattak
   
0.3
Farooq Lughari
   
0.3
Fehmeeda Mirza
   
0.3
Other (Specify)
 
8.6
 
1.2
 
5.0
None  42.3  38.8  43.8
Don't know  14.4  12.3  10.2
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Table 2. Admiring a living national politician
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On the other hand, the religious leadership is gaining popularity allegations coming in the media that Nawaz Sharif is playing the 
gradually but with a slow pace. Fazal ur Rehman who received role of friendly opposition therefore, people counted on him to 
just 1.6% respondent’s support in 2008 survey has gradually oppose the government's decisions that the people don't 
gone up to 3.1% in 2009 and then remained with the same consider in their interest. Similarly, the support for President 
support in 2010.  Similarly, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, former Amir of Asif Ali Zardari has gone down from 9.9% in 2008 to 8.4% and 
Jumaat e Islami (JI), received 1.8% votes of respondents, and then to just 4.4% in 2010. The decline in admiration is obvious 
then up to 2.9%, but then he dropped down a little to 2.6% in because the government, under Asif Ali Zardari, could not yet 
2010. It is doubtful that there are significant statistical address the issues of inflation, energy, security and foreign 
differences from year to year for this sample methodology. policy, etc. 
As pointed out initially, those who believed ‘none’ of the listed Interestingly, Imran Khan, Chairman TI, seems to be more 
politicians are worth admiration or voted ‘Do not know’ admired by the respondents gradually with every passing year. 
represent the majority year after year.  This suggests that the Being out of the parliament, Imran Khan still is able raise his 
majority does not like any of Pakistani politicians and shows that voice on several national and international issues. Admiration 
the local tribal people have little trust in the polity of Pakistan. of respondents for Imran Khan gradually increased from 4.1% in 
Of course, these statistics also show that the political parties 2008 to 12.9% in 2009 and, in 2010, he became most admired 
need to reach out to the people of FATA and show that their politician for 13.1% of the respondents.  
needs are relevant to the national debate.
Respondents' admiration for Asfandyar Wali Khan, head of 
Awami National Party, who leads the coalition government in Participation in the decision making process
 
KP, has dramatically declined. He was the second admired 
In spite the fact that the people of FATA have been excluded politician in 2008 survey but his statistics dropped down to just 
from the decision making process throughout the history of 1.6% in 2009 and then 1.4% in 2010. 
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16.8 15.8
40.1
9.6
21.2
0.9
18.6 19.2
27.7
8.7
6.5
3.9
15.1
0.4
4.5
5.8
21.1
2.1
5.9
32.8
13.6
1.4
12.8
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
Activities of 
political parties
Elections Citizen forums to 
discuss local issues
Agency councils Monitoring of 
government 
service delivery
Process of 
development
None Other
(Specify)
Don’t know
2008
2009
2010
Fig 5. Participation in the decision making process
Pakistan, the local people still express a desire to  be involved in 
different democratic decision making processes. Since 2008 the 
survey focused on the perception of the respondents of various 
political and developmental decision-making processes. The 
results are shown in the figure 5 of responses to the question. 
‘What would you be willing to participate in?’
Because there is a great need for development based on 
participation, one third (32.8%) of the people feel that they 
should be involved in the development process by the 
government as well as the civil society sector.  Why this was the 
only category of response to jump up dramatically in 2010 at the 
expense of other types of participation, remains to be seen.  
Since before 2008 there has been constant talk and events 
stressing participatory development, but even the participation 
in the 'citizen forums to discuss their local issues' declined.  
Perhaps the people have become tired of discussion and 
express the desire for the action of development.
Conclusion
The survey data shows the extent of the desire for change from 
the long established Administrative model (Executive non-
representative) and the regulatory system (FCR) to another 
system more in keeping, but not yet defined, with the 
governance enjoyed by other Pakistanis.  The lack of definition, 
as well as the lack of knowledge of the political actors, indicates 
that well defined options must be derived and presented to the 
people so that they can move from being an ‘Administered 
people’ to a people who make their own decisions and chose 
their representatives.
The next section explores the opinion of the respondents with 
regard to the administrative institutions, specifically, the FATA 
Secretariat, its functionaries and the FATA Development 
Authority. 
18
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Both agencies, in very few years, have had to overcome the Introduction
perceptions formed during the last sixty years of neglect by 
successive governments in Pakistan in addition to the legacy of 
the Colonial period.  Both eras left FATA one of the most under-
developed areas of Pakistan. However, the unique insurgency in 
FATA after 9/11 and the expulsion of the Taliban from the 
governance of Afghanistan has compelled the government of 
Pakistan to attempt dramatic and massive development 
ariat and Development schemes in the region.
Authority For the 2003-04 fiscal year the government, through the FATA 
Secretariat, had allocated Rs. 3256 million to the development 
The FATA Secretariat (FS) and the FATA Development Authority 
sector in FATA. That effort was more than doubled in the 2008-
(FDA) are two different government entities engaged in 
09 budget when it was increased to Rs. 8662 million, an annual 
development programmes in the region. The FS was established 
increase of 266%. For the fiscal year 2010-11 the budget has 
in 2002, first under the Planning and Development Department 
gone up to Rs. 15 billion, almost double the previous year's 
of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, and then, in 2006, an 
budget. 
independent Secretariat was established. The FS has 
administrative authority for health, education, security and the The international community, especially the United States, 
general well-being of the people. United Kingdom, Germany, United Nations and the 
The FDA was established as a specialised development 
organisation in 2006 through a Presidential Ordinance. The goal 
.
was to promote a more innovative, fast moving and 
However, the question of the capacity to implement such mega 
participatory approach to replace the conventional straight 
projects remains unanswered. 
jacket development system that they perceived the Secretariat 
32 
to be. The goals of the FATA Development Authority, as Unfortunately, accompanying the increase in development 
enshrined in its Statutory Regulations, are to plan and execute funding is the potential for corruption and diversion of state and 
sustainable development projects in minerals, industries, skills donor resources by government agents and Maliks. The survey 
development, small dams, township development and tourism. results presented below show the standing of these two 
administrative structures in the opinion of the people.
Performance of FATA Secretariat (FS)
 
As described above, the FATA Secretariat was established in 
many people in FATA are aware of the existence of either 
2002 to provide the people of FATA with health and education 
organisation or the work that they do in FATA. 
The chapter 1 described the carry over of the structure and style 
of administration from the Colonial era to the Constitutional 
era. This chapter focuses on the governance or administrative 
system of FATA just as the previous chapter 2 focused on the 
judicial system and FCR.
The FATA Secret
World Bank, 
have shown their interest investing in FATA development and 
some of them followed-up humanitarian assistance to the 
refugee camps by initiating development projects in FATA
The aim was to harness the abundant human resources, exploit 
and add value to equally abundant natural resources of the area 
so as to create more economic and employment opportunities 
33 
in FATA.  However, as will be shown from the survey data, not
 
CHAPTER - 3
ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
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Performance of FATA Development Authority 
(FDA)
As shown in the figure 7, the responses for FDA are not so 
different from the FS. Again, approximately a third of the 
respondents (35.8%) were not able to assess the performance.  
The conclusions are the same as for the FS: more contact and 
response to the people's needs are needed.  It could be that the 
same structure of management isolates the knowledge of what 
the FS or FDA really do.
services. The results of the 2010 survey summarize the people's 
assessment of the performance of the FS. See accompanying 
figure 6.
The most dramatic finding is that a third (34.4%) of the 
respondents could not appraise the performance of the FS.  
One must ask, why hasn't the FS, with its resources and direct 
links to local, traditional leadership, become well known among 
the citizens? The interpretation of ‘fair’ is difficult to interpret, 
but one has to assume that it does not connote appreciation.  
We can conclude that 21.6% (3.1% plus 19.5%) approve and 
22.2% (14.6% plus 7.6%) do not approve, but the 34.4% who do 
Closest interaction with leadership
not know should be of concern. 
In all three years the survey offered a multiple-choice question What is clear is that there is a need for the FS to reach out to and 
to measure the level of interaction of the respondents with respond to the people of FATA.  It is probable that both the style 
 34
different leadership figures in FATA. As shown in the table 3  of management could be improved by more wide spread use of 
below, two important trends evolved: 1) A decline in regular participatory planning, implementation and monitoring of 
contact with the Political Agent, and 2) A decline in contact with development efforts, and the structure (appointed personnel 
the Mullahs. The first finding is probably the result of the and privileged local elites) need to be reformed.
opinion on the effectiveness and presence of the FATA 
Secretariat as described above.  The second finding reflects the 
decline in the prestige of the local religious leaders who 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
Excellent Good Fair Poor Very poor Don’t know
3.1
19.5
20.8
14.6
7.6
34.42010
Fig 6. Performance of FATA Secretariat (FS)
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
Excellent Good Fair Poor Very poor Don’t 
know
2010
2.6
16.2
22.9
12.7
9.9
35.8
Fig 7. Performance of FATA Development Authority (FDA)
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population significantly and ‘Mullah’ is seen to be someone 
who did not openly criticise terrorist attacks of TTP and Al 
Qaeda. The 2010 survey results may indicate a widening gulf 
between the local masses and 'Mullah' community.
We note, however, that ‘tribal elders’ did not figure in the past, 
but now they do. Teachers command respect in most studies 
and here a respectable number of community members consult 
with them at 19.1% to 17.4%.  
The decline in NGOs mentioned probably reflects the 
withdrawal of NGOs as the security situation deteriorated. 
The multi-year surveys measured the level of trust of the 
respondents through a single choice rather than multiple 
response form used in the previous question. The data in the 
figure 8 below confirm the information obtained in the previous 
question.
In the case of the FATA Secretariat (Political Agent), the trust was 
previously were important locally for advice and guidance.  
low to begin with in 2008 and it declined further.  The decline in 
Events in FATA have influenced the thinking of the local 
contact noted above with the Mullahs is even more substantial. 
Most trusted in institution/leader in FATA
Responses Percent 2008  Percent 2009  Percent 2010
Political Agent 28.3 15.2 13.5
Military 4.0 1.3 4.8
Frontier Corps 3.5 1.6 4.6
MNAs 8.6 0.6
Teachers 19.1 17.4
Doctors
 
5.7 4.1
Senators
  
1.5
 
0.1
Tribal elders
   
14.7
Mullahs
 
35.2
 
37.2
 
10.9
NGOs
 
6.3 4.0
 
1.6
Government officials
 
3.1
 
3.0
None 9.4 22.4
 
14.5
Others (specify)
 
4.4
 
4.1
 
3.0
Don’t know 5.9 7.4
Table 3. Closest interaction in FATA
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
Political 
Agent
Military Frontier 
Corps
MNA Teachers Doctors Senator Tribal elders Mullah NGOs Government 
officials
None Other
(Specify)
Don’t know
13.9
7.1
3.6
1.0
47.8
5.1
14.4
7.3
8.0
0.8 0.4
6.6
13.3
2.9
0.6
1.5
34.8
1.8 0.8
23.0
5.6
7.2
20.3
7.9
0.8
11.8
2.8
0.2
10.2
14.5
1.4 1.3
15.5
0.2
6.2
2008
2009
2010
Fig 8.Most trusted in institution/leader in FATA
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The people expressed increased trust in both the Military and 
the Frontier Corps. Polls show an increased trust in tribal elders.  
Disturbingly, the level of distrust (’none’ or ‘don’t know’) 
remains between 14% and 20%.  This is not healthy for societal 
solidarity. This level of distrust is manifest in other indicators 
through out the survey as will be pointed out.  A segment of the 
society this large can support insurgency and extremism by 
simply not supporting the leadership and the institutions of 
state.
Conclusion
This chapter brings to close the examination of the opinion of 
the people with regard to the administrative system of FATA.  It 
also shows, from various perspectives, the overall displeasure 
of the people of FATA with the main systems under the 
constitution for governance that we have seen throughout the 
surveys. Although some of the trends in who is trusted are 
encouraging, the dispersion of trust among so many authority 
figures shows a lack of trust in governance as institutionalized. 
The increasing trust in military leaders will be explored in a later 
chapter.
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with the population, the majority of the population depends on Introduction
 
other, non agricultural activities for survival such as: transport, 
arms manufacturing and trade, drug trafficking, cross border The previous chapter closed with the opinion of the people 
 
trade (or the so called smuggling), shop keeping, etc. toward the administrative system that has been charged with 
Employment opportunities are so limited that entire families providing for the well-being of the people.  In this chapter the 
36
depend mostly on a single person's income.  In the case of economic, health, education and physical infrastructure will be 
extended familes living in compounds more than one described. Then the survey data on these needs, willingness to 
generation may have these types of income. The absence of stay or migrate and areas of attraction for work in Pakistan will 
employment opportunities results in many youth becoming be presented.
involved in non-productive activities leading to crimes and 
Rough topography, limited arable land, arid areas, poor 37
domestic violence.   Indeed, as will be shown in the section on 
education and health facilities and scant public infrastructure 
security, the people of FATA believe that unemployment is a 
define a mammoth gap between the people of FATA and the rest 
source of people involved in extremism. 
of Pakistan as summarized with the following statistics: 1) 60% 
34
Private employment is scarce and government or public service of the population lives below the national poverty line,  2) Per 
employment opportunities are limited. The lack of employment capita income is 50% of the national per capita income and 3) 
opportunities compels many young adults to migrate to other per capita development expenditure is approximately 33% of 
35
cities of Pakistan, or abroad, in search of work.  People in some the national average.  
of the areas relatively close to major towns and cities outside of 
Agriculture FATA commute daily at great expense and time. As described 
earlier, FATA is the rural part of the Pakhtun cities. The ever 
According to the 1998 Census, the majority of the largely rural 
expanding urban areas slowly have included parts of the 
population in FATA depends heavily on forestry, livestock and 
Agencies and are now called ‘Settled areas.’
subsistence crops (maize, wheat, rice and vegetables) and some 
orchard crops. Less than 10% of the land is arable; an Infrastructure 
exacerbating factor is that out of approximately 450,792 arable 
According to the Pakistan Census Report of 1998, the hectares only 184,825 hectares are under irrigation (1998 
communication inventory of FATA consisted of 2499.70 km of Census eport). The most common sources of irrigation are the 
‘High Type’ or improved roads; 1927.60 km is of ‘Low Type’ or canals, tube wells, wells, rivers, streams and lift irrigation 
farm to market roads; 6 telegraph offices and 46 telephone schemes; the proper marketing of farm produce is limited by 
exchanges in all of FATA. the lack of roads and cold storage. 
EducationUnderemployment
According to the FATA Census Report 1998, there are 2567 Because the natural resources have not been properly 
primary schools, 278 middle schools, 201 high schools and 9 exploited, and because the agricultural land is small compared 
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CHAPTER - 4
SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN FATA
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colleges (inter and degree). The nine colleges are for males only. members of the family. She cannot make key decisions for her 
These infrastructural limitations result in low rates of life; she cannot use her right to vote during general elections; 
educational achievement and literacy: overall 17.42% of the she has no say in the family matters; she is never asked her 
population is literate, but among females the rate is less than choice for marriage; in some areas of FATA, she is sold to her 
3%. The differential between males and females is explored in husband in the name of Walwar; to resolve conflicts her hand is 
detail using the survey statistics. given in marriage to the victim's son or brother or relative in the 
name of 'Swara'; and women are killed in the name of honour. 
Health services On the other hand, women are utilized in the field; to fetch 
water and fire wood from distant places; she takes care of her 
The health sector includes 41 hospitals; 190 dispensaries, 5 
children and cooks and cleans for the family. 
Rural Health Clinics (RHC) 6 T.B Clinics; 16 MCH centres; 167 
 
Basic Health Units (BHU); 5 Leprosy Centres and 3 Sub Health Having briefly described the socio-economic context, we will 
Centres. Private doctors also practice in the area and provide turn to the opinion of the people of FATA to describe their 
additional medical facilities. In the absence of road assessment of the services. The chapter will close with the 
communication people resort to traditional treatments or are reasons for preferring to live in FATA and then, given the 
38
at the mercy of quacks. hypothetical chance to live outside of FATA, we explore where 
they would go to live and work.
Gender issues
Most important services needed in FATA
In the education section it was pointed out that women have 
not been included in the effort for literacy. The gap between the This question elicited a mixture, from security and justice to 
opportunities for women and men in FATA is as great as the health and educational services that are needed.  In general the 
development gap between FATA and the rest of Pakistan, but, interest of the people of FATA is a secure environment with 
from a policy perspective, the gap is exacerbated by the health and educational services. The survey results from 2008, 
internal, FATA culture. 2009 and 2010 as shown in the table 4:  
The internal culture is that of traditional Pakhtun and Muslim ‘Education' and 'health' have been consistently identified as the 
beliefs where the male is dominant. Women are generally basis for resolving many problems faced with the people of 
restricted to their homes and agricultural work in the fields FATA. Year after year these services are at the top of the list of 
except when guided by family males.  Not only is the women the needs on a par with or above justice, security and dealing with 
unfortunate member of the conservative Pakhtun society who terrorism. 
is not given her due status under the Pakhtun code of honour, 
In 2009 'security' and 'tackling terrorism' peaked as top 
but her limited education and skill development deprives her 
priorities and then dropped. There were military operations 
children and family of well being such as health, education and 
underway in various parts of FATA and Swat simultaneously. In 
improved family business management. 
addition, that was the year when Talibanisation or militancy was 
Women in FATA are vulnerable to economic, social and spilling over from South and North Waziristan Agencies to other 
psychological poverty. Economic poverty is due to a lack of tribal Agencies/FRs influencing the respondents' opinion. 
assets and the low educational endowment of human capital. 
Because the woman in FATA is kept under-educated or 
uneducated, she is economically dependent on the male 
28
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The tables require reflection, but they show major differences 
between what is expected of males and females in the culture.  
The information also shows the differences in aspiration 
between mothers and fathers.  For example, both mothers and 
fathers put more emphasis on education for boys (61.6% and 
50.4%) than for girls (18.7% and 25.4%).  However, it is notable 
that mothers (25.4%) put more emphasis on girls' education 
Essential services for children
than fathers do (18.7%).
The 2010 survey delved into what essential services the people 
When one looks over the comparison line by line one sees that 
of FATA want for their children. The question was asked 
marriage and religion (Pardah included) are much more desired 
separately for male and female children. The responses reveal a 
for girls than for boys by both mothers and fathers. This is in 
great deal of the often discussed issues of gender. That is, 
keeping with the protective nature of the Pakhtun (and most 
differences in what mothers and fathers wish for their children 
cultures) toward the women as keepers of virtue and faith. 
and hence their differential support for policies such as 
Employment opportunities are the second most important education and work opportunities.
desire for boys by both mothers and fathers, but mothers 
The table 5 compares male and female children by what their 
(35.2%) more so than fathers (26.4%). The role of girls in the 
mothers and fathers considered to be the most important 
work place is seen to be very low by both fathers (2.1%) and 
essential service for their child.
mothers (3.3 %) as priorities.
Responses  
Percent 
2008  
Percent 
2009  
Percent 
2010
Security 37.0  62.9  51.7
Justice 73.3  46.3  46.5
Policing 0.0  11.0  3.8
Education/schools  64.6  52.1  56.0
Health services/hospitals  52.1  42.5  50.7
Water and sanitation  42.4  33.2  19.4
Roads 35.5  32.2  12.4
Tackling terrorism  48.0  53.6  26.9
Food supply  28.0  32.8  8.7
Electricity supply  48.9  56.2  21.0
Political education of the 
masses   4.0
Good governance    9.4
Don’t know   1.0
Other (specify) 3.0  0.3  0.4
Table 4. Most important services needed in FATA
Note:  The question allowed multiple choice, the percents are
of the % of respondents and not % of responses.
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Wanted for
male children  
Wanted for 
female children
Desired essential service
 
Gender of 
respondents    
Gender of 
respondents
Male
 
Female
  
Male Female
More education 61.6  50.4   18.7 25.4
More security 6.8  6.3   16.5 16.0
Employment opportunities  26.4  35.2   2.1  3.3
Marriage 1.2  1.8   13.6 18.0
Religious education 3.7  5.4   23.8 17.7
Pardah (veil) n/a  n/a   24.4 17.9
Other (specify) 0.0  0.1   0.0  0.1
Don’t know 0.2  0.9   0.7 1.7
Total (Percent) 100  100   100 100
Table 5. Essential services for children (male, female)
Responses
In summary, there is definitely a difference between the male Females: Following the presentation above, using the results of 
and female desire for their daughters and sons. The mothers the last three survey’s, we again, find that the priority of 'more 
wish for more education and employment opportunities, plus education' declined from 2008 to 2010 (36.9% to 22.1%) for 
marriage, than the fathers. The fathers seem to opt for the female children. This is quite discouraging, not only because the 
conservative religious and cultural traditions for their daughters rate is 1/3 the rate for male children, but also because, as 
than the mothers. These are significant differences that have opposed to males, there is not a corresponding increase in 
implications for education in the community and for the support for more employment opportunities or other 
opportunities offered to and expected by future generations. opportunities. 
Opportunities over time
Males: Analysing the last three years survey data (shown in the 
figure 9), ‘more education’ remained the top priority of the 
respondents for their male children, but the decline is of 
concern. It appears that a more urgent need at this time has 
moved toward ‘employment opportunities.’ That wish moved 
nd
from approximately 20% to 30.7% making it the 2  highest 
priority for the respondents. 
The rumoured trend toward earlier marriage is not seen in the 
data on girls.  Although about 13% of the respondents favoured 
marriage over education for female children, this has not 
increased or declined. These figures show the difference in 
cultural expectations between males and females. 
Interestingly, there has been a systematic and dramatic drop in 
the percent of the parents who felt that more security was 
needed (from 53.0% to 16.3%). Why this drop? It is hard to 
explain why this level became on a par with what was wanted 
for male children. That being said, religious education and 
pardah (separation of genders) increased from insignificant to 
In Pakistan it is believed, generally, that there is an early 
one-fifth of the respondents. Why pardah, one of the important 
marriage trend in conservative tribal society, discouraging 
Pakhtun cultural traditions became the third most important 
education. However, the last three years' surveys show no such 
desire is not clear. It could be that the latest events in FATA and 
trend, with just a small percentage of people indicating that 
the Taliban militancy have influenced the mind-set of the local 
they want their male children to get married. A plurality in all 
people, but, at the same time, as will be explained in the chapter 
three years surveys identified 'more education', which is quite 
on security, the people indicated a feeling of greater security.
encouraging and eye opening evidence for the rest of Pakistan.     
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Fig 9. Opportunities over time-males
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However, 8.3% respondents believe that no assistance is Development priorities in FATA through 
needed from US and UK and 3.5% believe that no international 
international assistance 
assistance is needed for developing FATA. 
Various foreign countries, including the US and the UK, have 
Human Rights issues in FATA
expressed their interest in providing development assistance 
for FATA. The 2010 survey asked the respondents to identify One of the governance themes can be in the area of human 
areas for developing FATA through international assistance or rights.  Recall that because of the structure of governance the 
whether any international assistance is needed. Keeping in protection of human rights is a responsibility of the FATA 
39
mind that the current humanitarian crisis  in FATA arises out of Secretariat and the FCR. The situation of violence today is so 
military operations, it is not surprising that 15.0% respondents grave and due to outside influences that the Central 
identified 'humanitarian assistance' as the main need in FATA.  If Government has both the authority and the responsibility for 
considered as one and the same, then the combination of safeguarding the people.  
‘Livelihoods’ and ‘Supporting Employment’ total 22.2%. 
Throughout all of the ‘Understanding FATA’ surveys the issue of Infrastructure (’Roads’ and ‘Electricity’) is, again, with 17.6%, a 
 human rights has been a constant area of inquiry. The figure 12 key area of need. Health and Education, the key FS 
shows the evolution of this subject over the last three years.responsibilities, total 15.3%. Looking at the development 
situation in FATA, the respondents have rightly identified the In the 2010 survey the main (38.4%) human rights issue was 
above-mentioned services needed for the people of FATA. ‘The State's inability to provide the basic amenities of life.’ Why 
5.4
12.2 12.1
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Fig 11. Development priorities in FATA through international assistance
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or how this response evolved, and why it was not mentioned in issue. In the first context (FATA) the desire for restructuring has 
previous surveys, is difficult to explain, but its appearance may been amply noted elsewhere. In the second context (national), 
be due to a major policy or program that used that term. Its the issue is being worked through the new government for 
meaning is not clear, but it sounds like basic services for living. If reincorporating the judges who had been excluded from the 
that is correct, then it would fall under the FS's responsibility for Supreme Court. It is a national issue and not a FATA specific 
development in general.   problem.
The theme of the Independence of the judiciary can be seen in Freedom of Expression and Democracy were noted, in total, by 
two contexts: 1) the situation in FATA where the Political Agents a third of the respondents. These are, again, grievances about 
also have the authority to judge crimes as per the FCR, and 2) the system of governance of FATA and expression of the desire 
the struggle of the Supreme Court to be independent of for more participation in decision making. It is important to 
Executive Branch of the government of Pakistan.  In either case, point out that the press does not have free access to FATA. Their 
between 23.6% and 18.6% of the respondents considered the movements are controlled by the PAs and also the military.
‘Independence of the Judiciary’ to be a major human rights 
‘Freedom of Movement’ appeared as a concern this year and is 
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Fig 12. Human Rights issues in FATA
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probably a reflection of the complaint of 2009 ‘Violence by the 
Military.’ These two complaints may be limited to very specific 
areas of FATA.
More specific concerns are seen when approximately a quarter 
of the respondents believe that Pakistani is faced with 
'women's, or children's or minority rights' issues. As we saw in 
the section on the desires that parents have for their children, 
there is a distinct gender rights issue and some of the desires 
could be seen by some as limiting the rights of the children.   
The minority rights issue may be specific to Kurram and Orakzai 
Agencies where there has been internal strife between Sunnis 
and Shia, but that remains to be analyzed.
Some of these main human rights issues are linked to culture (as 
was described in the different desires of the parents) and the 
perception of some of the respondents that the way of life 
think that 'they have been living in FATA for a long time' and 
needs to change. Development and changes by the central 
22.3% 'like to live the way they live in their tribal culture and 
government or the FS could provide the opportunity for these 
tradition'. Only 7.0% 'feel more secure in FATA' however the 
changes.  Forcing changes by law would be antagonistic and be 
2010 results show that more people (11.5%) felt more secure in 
seen as outside imposition. Moreover, changing laws would be 
FATA. In 2009 more people were undecided and did not know 
meaningless if the opportunity were not provided. For example, 
the answer (7.7%). 
the desire for more education for boys and girls is considered a 
Trends of the respondents' behaviour for both years show basic human right. A law could be passed requiring all youth to 
conventional reasons preferring to live in FATA. Respondents study up to a given grade, but if those schools and teachers are 
feel more at ease in their villages and communities with their not provided, then the opportunity to change would be hollow. 
several centuries old culture and the way life in FATA that is quite 
acceptable to them. 
The 58.1% of the respondents who responded that they wanted Living outside FATA, if given a chance
to remain in FATA were asked a follow-on question as to why 
The lack of economic incentives also forced a major portion of they prefer to live in FATA. 
the FATA population to migrate to other cities in Pakistan and to 
55.1% believe that 'they like to live within their own village and 
foreign countries, especially Middle East. The migration has 
community' while 41.5% thought that 'they like the way they 
contributed significantly to the local economy and prosperity 
live in their tribal culture and tradition'. 11.5% 'felt more secure 
from the remittances sent from abroad. This brings us to the 
living in FATA' however, 1.1% did not know the answer. 
subject of living outside of FATA.
The results of 2009 survey show identical trends but the 
As pointed out above, despite the needs expressed 58.1% of the 
frequency was low. The majority (26.3%) of the respondents 
respondents still want to continue living in FATA, but 38.0% of 
'like to live within their own village and community' while 2.6% 
the respondents would leave if given the opportunity. 
Preference for living in FATA
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Fig 13. Preference for living in FATA
If we analyse the trend from 2009 to 2010 shown in the figure Living outside of FATA by age group
14, the people seem to be more decisive (less do not know 
The responses to the question of living outside of FATA were compared with the previous year), but that undecided group 
examined by age group.  The flight of youth versus established, from the previous year seemed to split evenly between staying 
middle aged people is clear.  What is unusual is to see the older and leaving. FATA, however, should not be assumed to be a 
homogeneous area of opinion. The table 6, by Agency, shows 
the great variation around the average of 38% willing to leave 
should the opportunity present itself. In the Agencies where 
more than half of the people would leave they are the poorest 
and also areas of conflict, but, then again, S. Waziristan would fit 
the description of poor and conflict, but only 35% of the people 
would leave. In the case of Kurram with its internal sectarian 
strife, the second lowest percent (28.8%) of all is found. The 
conclusion is that FATA is an area of many people willing to leave 
when the opportunity presents itself. This is a characteristic of 
rural areas in developing societies and is part of the rural to 
urban migration to be expected because of the factors that have 
been identified in this survey. The conflicts only exacerbate the 
situation.
34
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Fig 14. Living outside FATA, if given a chance
Percent who would live outside of FATA  
Name of Agency/FR
 
Age group of respondent
18 – 29 
years 
30 –  49 
years  
50 – 65+ 
years
Orakzai 50.5 25.5  34.1
Bajaur 58.1 45.1  47.9
FR Bannu 84.6 31.3  44.7
FR D.I. Khan 20.0 0.0  18.4
FR Kohat 41.5 36.8  44.1
FR Lakki Marwat 21.2 0.0  23.8
FR Peshawar 26.3 27.3  40.4
FR Tank 63.6 21.4  46.3
Khyber 46.9 19.4  33.3
Kurram 26.2 14.2  25.2
Mohmand 63.9 43.1  50.2
North Waziristan 39.1 12.5  11.9
South Waziristan 38.2 23.8  41.4
Table 7. Living outside of FATA (cross tabulation by Agency/FR)
Age of respondent 
Live outside the FATA?  
TotalYes No  
Don’t 
know
18 – 29 years 45.7 50.7  3.7  100
30 – 49 years 25.8 69.1  5.1  100
50 – 65  years 36.3 60.0  3.7  100
38.0 58.1  3.9  10065 +  years
Table 6. Living outside of FATA by age group
generation much more willing to leave than the middle hypothesis is that those FRs are more urban than rural and, 
generation. This anomaly may be explained by the sampling, hence, offer opportunities. For example, commuting from FR 
that is, the middle age group was a smaller proportion than Peshawar to the city of Peshawar is relatively easy, so remaining 
expected. It could be that they were the ones who had stayed at a home residence may make living ‘Outside’ of FATA not 
behind. We did not have the data to test that hypothesis. necessary or convenient.
The livelihoods programs aimed at employment generation Most preferred city/country to emigrate to if 
have identified a segment of the population with the greatest 
given a chancepropensity to leave. Cross tabulation of propensity to leave by 
age and then by Agency helps to pin point which Agencies have 
Those who wanted to leave FATA were asked which city/country 
the most probable youth-flight. As shown in the table above, 
they would prefer to migrate. Trends from one year to the next 
some Agencies are places from which all generations would 
are noted.  First, as found throughout the survey, the undecided 
leave if the opportunity arose, e.g., Bajaur and Mohmand. One 
become decisive going from 13.6% undecided in 2009 to only 
of the conflicted Agencies, Kurram, presents what seem to be 
0.5% in 2010.
positive opportunities in spite of the internal strife because all 
Approximately one third (29.3%) of the respondents replied generations show a low percentage interested in leaving. Other, 
that they would like to migrate to Peshawar, the provincial Frontier Regions show very positive opportunities. One 
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Fig 15. Most preferred city/country to emigrate to if given a chance
capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Peshawar is a central 
commercial and cultural point for the FATA people; they 
frequently visit Peshawar for many reasons. Other cities of 
Pakistan were identified by nearly another third, (29.2%).  (Note 
that more than one destination was permitted, but the percent 
shown is in reference to the number of respondents and not the 
number of responses thus they sum to more than 100%.
Favoured overseas destinations were Saudi Arabia (22.8%) and 
Dubai (22.7%). The remainder, as shown in the figure 15 were 
scattered around the Western World. 
Conclusion
Many internationally known development issues were 
reviewed in this chapter and although findings are not unique to 
Pakistan and FATA, the data is useful for signalling or flagging 
warnings and also for prioritizing development efforts. On the 
one hand the priorities for education services are clear. And the 
demand is high for security and human rights. On the other 
hand, the potential for migration from the rural to the urban 
areas signals that the urban areas adjacent to the FATA Agencies 
and Frontier Regions, should alert the nation to the theme of 
rural urban migration and just what level of impact that is 
having on urban areas. The indicated desire to work overseas 
may be a cheerful note to a government wanting and needing 
remittances from abroad, but then again, some of those 
destinations are the seat of religious fundamentalism that could 
change the political direction of Pakistan. Clearly, half of the 
people of FATA, as content as more than half of them are to live 
in their home culture, are a population restless for life and work 
elsewhere.
The next chapter of this research places FATA in the context of 
international conflict. One of the issues, security, noted in this 
chapter will be explored in greater depth. The context is as 
important as the historical chapter with which the book was 
begun.
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major subject in this volume, and as a first glimpse it is pointed Introduction
out that in some FATA Agencies 20% of the families indicated that 
they have members living in countries outside of South Asia and The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), on the Durand 
most families have members living in the Pakhtun cities Line in Pakistan, lies at the top of the global security agenda. 
mentioned along the old silk road on the Pakistani side of the Pakistan and the international community are actively debating 
border. They are not an isolated people; they are, or have to be, policy options to deal with the FATA's development, governance 
interested in global affairs.and security issues. Poverty, difficult terrain, a contested system 
of administration, cross-border tribal and ethnic connections 
The present attention to the people of FATA is because of 
with Afghanistan, Pakhtun traditions, and the presence of Jihadi 
conflicts unleashed during the last thirty years. Those conflicts 
militants have all created a set of overlapping challenges for the 
have yet to be resolved. Unfortunately for the people of FATA, 
governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as for the US 
the conflicts form the context of violence in which they live, work 
and the international community. 
and govern their personal affairs. Other unresolved issues 
lending themselves to violence are internal conflicts at the Indeed, the people of FATA, the Pakhtun, have been on global 
community level as well as at the level of tribal leadership.  agendas involving the East and ‘West since’ the ‘Silk Road’ days. 
As shown in Map I, and amply described in the first chapter, the 
‘Understanding FATA’ is a challenge that CAMP and the BHC have 
main trade routes, through Peshawar to Quetta and Kabul to 
taken up with the goal that all interested parties and 
Qandahar, plus the cross links between those main routes are 
stakeholders might comprehend the complexity of the situation 
the infrastructure reflecting the cultural ties between the rural 
from the perspective and considered opinion of the people of 
and urban Pakhtun in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
FATA.  They are involved at both the local and international levels 
on a daily basis, and they have opinions that need to be Because of those links and their unique global location, the 
understood so that the conflicts may be resolved peacefully.people of FATA have been exposed to the cross currents of 
history from before the empire of Genghis Khan, through ‘The 
Qualitative and descriptive material Great Game’ and, more recently, but not yet present, the cold 
war conflict between Russian and other western ideologies. 
The following paragraphs come from qualitative sources. They 
Presently FATA is one of the refuges and a battlefield for the 
provide specific examples of events framing the context where 
international Jihadist movement as well as the more locally 
the surveys have been conducted, and, hence the context for the 
focused Taliban. The cross currents have been cultural, 
opinions and responses to the questions posed during the last 
commercial, ideological and religious. Another historical issue is 
three surveys. 
the structure and style of governance between FATA and the 
In most parts of FATA, Pakistani civilian and armed forces are government of Pakistan. This was inherited from the British 
busy trying to force out Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters, Colonial era and then continued by post-independence Pakistan.
foreign militants and Al Qaeda operatives. Although the ongoing 
The global interest and awareness of the people of FATA is a 
politically-supported military offensive in FATA and adjacent 
CHAPTER - 5
FATA IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
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to be rid of the threats.areas of Pakistan has achieved some targets, it has yet to achieve 
the level of success gained in the Swat valley. The offensive has, 
Initially, civil society in Pakistan and the major opposition 
however, caused similar dislocations and IDPs from some of the 
political parties have not been supportive of the military 
Agencies. 
operation against the Jihadi groups in Pakistan. However, the 
terrorist attacks against the civilian population have turned the Although there is a high level of anti-US feeling among the 
tide against the militants. Media and other civil society general public who generally oppose policies favouring the 'War 
organisations have started to believe that it's high time the on Terror,' the constant suicide attacks on innocent civilians, 
Maliks military should deal with the militants. Importantly, as will be target killings of elders and , kidnapping for ransom, etc. 
shown, there was a trust deficit on Pakistan army's ability to deal have turned public opinion against extremist groups so that they 
this insurgency, but the successful Swat military operation directly or indirectly support the military option. In this same pro 
served as an 'eye opener' which significantly changed the and con questioning of the US-Pakistan military relation is a 
general public perception in favour of military. This change came recent development that has brought some credibility to the US-
about in spite of the human rights violations that have been Pakistan relationship.  Pakistani law enforcement agencies, with 
Mullah reported where civilians have been caught in the cross-fire, the the help of CIA, arrested a senior Afghan Taliban leader,  
  use of heavy artillery, the un-necessary use of gunship Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's military chief and second in
helicopters bombardments, as well as extra-judicial killings of command. 
alleged militants.   
During the election campaign of 2008, almost all major political 
The shifting site of conflict from one Agency to another in FATA is parties in Pakistan expressed their concerns over the military 
part of the context of violence of the people. For example, after option against the militant groups as well as Pakistan's role in the 
several humiliating defeats of Pakistani security agencies by the 'War on Terror'. However, after taking oath, the new government 
TTP in Waziristan Agencies, the recently launched military of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) understood the new dynamics 
operation ‘Rah e Rast’ in South Waziristan Agency seems to have and international commitment and finally had to continue its 
achieved some results in terms of capturing the area. When commitment for the 'War on Terror' by adopting it as 'Pakistan's 
Baitullah Mehsud, Amir of TTP, was killed in a drone attack, most war' and not the 'US war.' This ‘debate’ whether the context of 
of the Taliban left South Waziristan Agency and took refuge in violence is Pakistan's war or the war of the US over simplifies the 
other tribal Agencies of FATA such as North Waziristan, Orakzai issues at hand in FATA.  
and Khyber. 
The military offensive against the TTP militants has forced 
When the Pakistan military operation was confined only to South hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to the adjacent 
Waziristan and against Hakimullah Mehsud, three other Taliban districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) of Pakistan.  
militant groups headed by Molvi Nazir, Gul Bahadar and Haqqani Those offences have created one of the largest humanitarian 
40
crises in Pakistan's history.  In response to this humanitarian continued operations in other Agencies. These Taliban and Jihadi 
crisis, the government of Pakistan and international agencies groups are operating from Pakistan and specific Agencies against 
haves failed to provide comprehensive services for the well- the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. 
41
being of these Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  
Suicide bombing is one of the subjects of the survey. The TTP is 
Furthermore, the mass exodus of people from FATA also shows generally credited with responsibility for these attacks, but, as 
that they do not want TTP style of Sharia and, as the survey will be shown, substantial segments of the people believe that 
indicates, the people want the military to target these militants western nations are the source. Recent operations in South 
40
Understanding FATA  2010
F
A
T
A
 I
N
 T
H
E
 C
O
N
T
E
X
T
 O
F
 I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 C
O
N
F
L
IC
T
Waziristan and sporadic targeted operation in Orakzai, Bajaur, These various security forces are a concern to the people of FATA 
Khyber and Mohmand Agencies has, apparently, weakened the because they are now supposed to provide security against 
TTP. Fewer suicide attacks and bomb blasts have occurred during international extremists as well as common criminals. The 
43
government encouraged raising Lakhkars  against the militants, the last few months, compared with 2009 in Peshawar and 
however, they were not very successful because of their lack of elsewhere in Pakistan. With few exceptions these attacks have 
training and the duration of commitment. Lakhkars are usually not been in the FATA, but they have been in the cities where the 
raised for a special purpose of a specific, temporary duration. families of FATA have relatives and where they frequently travel 
Nevertheless, their formation and willingness to fight extremists for work and business. Hence the subject is of concern to the 
removed the misperception that all the tribesmen are terrorists. people as will be shown. 
They also show there is discontent among the people against the 
Unmanned American drone strikes in FATA areas bordering 
TTP, Al Qaeda, and other militant groups that aim to usurp 
Afghanistan are a debated issue in Pakistan, but sometimes it is 
leadership and to bring their own type of Sharia law. The 
an effective tactic against Al Qaeda and local extremist militants. 
formation of Lakhkars helped raise the morale of the army. 
However, it has generally increased the hostility of the people of 
In 2009, the government also announced arming the members FATA as well as Pakistanis in general toward the US. During the 
of Lakhkars with Chinese AK-47s. Such acts on the part of the focus group discussions with FATA youth, elders and women, it 
government were criticised because the increased availability of was revealed that the majority dislikes this tactic of US and its 
arms would exacerbate the capacity for civil war. A Khasadar foot ally, Pakistan. We heard few voices supporting this among the 
soldier is paid 3200 Pakistani Rupees (US $ 40) per month, and he youth from the North and South Waziristan Agencies.
has to bring his own weapon and ammunition. 
Undoubtedly, drone strikes have been very successful in 
Because the Lakhkars are not well organised, their lack of ability targeting some high profile Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban 
makes members, especially the leadership, are very vulnerable. militants. Nevertheless, these strikes have also killed more 
There are many instances when several Maliks/elders or leaders civilians than militants, including women and children adding to 
of the Lakhkars were kidnapped and beheaded or humiliated, the insecurity of the people. This subject is also explored in the 
making lessons of them for the rest of the population. When the quantitative section with important findings.
TTP begins fighting against their tribesmen it can become a civil 
Security apparatus of FATA war. The concept of Badal/revenge will continue haunting the 
people for a generation to come because of the split in and 
It is believed that the current security crisis, both of an 
among families and tribes. When local leadership is killed in this 
international nature and also for local law and order issues in the 
way, then the formation of jirgas as a traditional conflict 
FATA region, arises out of the century old Colonial system of 
resolution process becomes difficult because it requires ever 
‘Frontier Crimes Regulations’ (FCR). That system recognized the 
higher cultural authority to convoke and lead a jirga when the 
tribal autonomy to form Lakhkars to deal with local crime and 
conflict goes from individual and family level to tribal level and 
also established the position of Khasadar who are local people 
beyond.
paid by the central government to act as policemen.  In addition, 
The Frontier Corps (FC) has come from a long military tradition the FCR provided for the formation of a Frontier Corps consisting 
since the 1800s when the British formed ‘scout’ and ‘rifle’ units of local men forming the ranks to guard the borders under the 
to both patrol the borders and help when local law and order direction of Pakistani Army officers who may or may not be of 
Pakhtun issues arose. In the early 1900s the Frontier Corps was formally  ethnicity. 
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named and consolidated from the previous, and many, militia, these statements, they, nevertheless, are part of the context of 
rifles, and scout units. Although the FC is led and trained by the surveys dating from the years that Parvez Musharraf was 
officers of the Pakistani Army, it is under the Ministry of the President of Pakistan and Army Chief of Staff.
Interior. Both the British and the Government of Pakistan 
During Parvez Musharraf's period (October 1999-2008), several 
considered the FC troops to be ideal for the area because they 
incongruous strategies were pursued. Sometimes they opted for 
are from the same tribal and linguistic groups and thus know the 
military might and other times the sought negotiations to reach 
culture and the topography. These characteristics have also been 
accords that would reduce the violence.  
judged by the US military mission to Pakistan to be ideal for 
Furthermore, these accords and agreements with militants and fighting local and international extremists. Accordingly, after the 
local tribes were perceived by US and other Western countries as Pakistani decision in 2007 to expand the FC from less than 80 
Pakistan's lack of capacity to tackle the ongoing insurgency in the thousand to about 100 thousand troops, the US committed 
FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Concerns have been more funding to support that effort which included a new centre 
expressed over the lack of a coherent counter insurgency for training the FC in counter insurgency tactics. From 2002 to 
strategy on the part of Pakistan's military establishment, lack of a 2007 US military assistance to Pakistan was also focused on the 
proper framework and a lack of coordination at provincial/ FC, but, as described below, reverses on the ground led to the 
federal/ international level vis-à-vis peace agreements. new joint effort in 2007.
During the exercise of some military operations, the Pakistani Traditions and code of honour in the absence of 
security agencies have sustained substantial losses as well as 
state security  embarrassments. For example, in the 2007 case about 250 
soldiers, mostly FC, surrendered to the militants; they were 
In the context of this state of security the local communities are 
released in exchange for 25 militants. On other occasions the FC 
left with no option but to try to defend themselves with their 
has proven itself for poppy eradication, rounding up and driving 
own weapons and their code of honour.
out militants, and also civic activities such as building schools. 
The code of honour and in the absence of a security apparatus Nevertheless, large losses have raised serious concerns over the 
compels the Pakhtun to carry a gun to protect his honour and Pakistani military and Frontier Corps's capacity, capability and 
life. The possession of weapons has been a common cultural will to conduct effective operations in FATA against larger and 
symbol of the people of FATA for centuries. This is the reason that better prepared militant groups. This issue is explored in the 
it is said that a household stove may be allowed to go cold but the survey and also reveals surprises.
barrel of a gun is kept warm. A sophisticated weapon is also 
At the same time, the Pakistani media and opposition parties 
considered a status of symbol, and it conveys a message of 
view the claims of success in the FATA with scepticism. The claims 
power to the opponents. The absence of the judicial system, 
of killing of hundreds of militants have faced criticism because 
faulty administration, weak writ of government, proximity of the 
independent media organizations have not been given 
opened border and the Afghan conflict are factors that 
permission to cover the military operations in FATA. This has 
contribute to the proliferation of small arms in the region.
created doubts about the success of the operations. Then too, 
The proliferation of firearms gained momentum during the there are rumours, believed by some political leaders, to the 
Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89), when the mujahideen were effect that the military has reached secret understandings with 
generously supplied by the US and other weapons were the militants and that this has caused the significant decrease in 
captured from the Soviets. That conflict was followed by a long the terrorist attacks. Although there isn't evidence to support 
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and brutal civil war and then battles against the Taliban. The The cost of conflict
diverted weapons from all of these phases of strife were sold on 
Jihadi groups turned against the government of Pakistan in the black market and ultimately found their way into the hands 
reaction to its involvement in the 'War on Terror' and its policy of civilians and militant groups. In general, these arms and the 
shift against the Jihadi organizations. Jihadi militants started conflicts defined and contributed to creating the current 
attacking Pakistani security forces and government officials deteriorating law and order situation in the region. The survey 
through various methods such as the use of victim or command explores these issues extensively. 
detonated explosive devices (the use of IEDs and landmine, etc), 
The manufacture of replica weapons in FATA is another 
attacks on Pakistani military convoys and check-posts, and 
contributing factor in fuelling and sustaining the extremists in 
kidnapping of security force personnel and government officials. 
FATA. There aren't reliable figures related to either illicit or 
They also attacked local leadership, Maliks, and targeted girls 
legally held weapons in the country. However, rough estimates 
schools and state institutions. The militant groups have 
are in the multi-millions based on the two million licensed 
successfully used media propaganda for recruitment, 
firearms recorded by the 1998 Census. It has been estimated 
established training camps for new recruits, developing 
44
that at least 18 million more are being held illegally.  FATA has its 
international linkages for funding, and attacking the local culture 
fair share of those millions. 
by suicide attacks on Jirgas, funerals, and mosques. Such tactics 
were never used during in the entire history of the Pakhtun. This local production is a significant factor in the arming of tribal 
society. Because the Pakistan Arms Ordnance of 1965 does not 
The terrorists have used suicide attacks as a useful tool against 
extend to FATA, the production of arms is neither legal nor illegal. 
both law enforcement agencies as well as the civilian population. 
FATA is a 'Grey Market'. For example, Dara Adem Khel, the main 
Such attacks by the militants aim to take hostage the entire 
town of Frontier Region Kohat with an estimated population of 
society and to generate public pressure against military 
100,000 souls, is an area with worldwide notoriety, producing 
operations in the troubled tribal areas. At times, such attacks 
every kind of weapon through reverse engineering. There are 
have been very useful in generating a discourse within the civil 
45
five major tribes  that inhabit the area and run the business.  
society, especially media, compelling the government to initiate 
46
Over 90%  of the arms are conflict orientated, i.e., not 
talks with the militants. 
 
manufactured for collectors or sports use. There are an 
47 During the years 2006-2009, there has been a significant, 48%, estimated 2,657 arms-related shops,  80% serve as small arms 
increase in casualties from terrorist attacks in Pakistan. A total of manufacturing units and 20% function as arms retailing shops. 
3,816 terrorist attacks occurred during this period resulting in The most common firearms produced are the 0.44 bore rifle, the 
12,632 deaths and 12,815 injured people, including Pakistan 0.30 bore pistol, the 0.12 bore rifle, the 0.222 bore rifle, the AK- 
48
security forces, police, women and children.  Of them, 217 were 47 assault rifle and the Mekarov pistol. During the Afghan jihad 
inter-tribal clashes which attest to the way that violence is against the Soviets the business of Dara Adam Khel flourished. 
destroying the networks that are an important part of Pakhtun Notably, the Dara bazaar once again appears to have been 
culture.  A significant rise in suicide attacks has been seen during reinvigorated by the current crises in FATA and the war in 
the last few years. A total of 87 incidents of suicide attacks were Afghanistan.
carried out across Pakistan during 2009 killing 1,299 people and 
49
wounding 3,633.  Notably, the majority (59 of 87) took place in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. The opinions of the people of 
FATA with regard to suicide and other terrorist attacks will be 
Understanding FATA  2010
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described in the next section of this chapter. understood and the process of conflict resolution may begin.
Returning to the theme of internal FATA conflicts, they also have Survey findings 
a cost to the stability of FATA.  The situation in Kurram Agency is 
This section of the chapter is organized into five themes: 1) the totally different from the rest of FATA. In Kurram there have been 
Sunni overall direction of the country and FATA specific issues; 2) severe sectarian conflicts between Shiites and  during the 
Sunni Shia Security in general; 3) Perceived major threats to individuals; 4) last two years. The Agency is 58%  and 42% . The 
Opinion about the security apparatus; and 5) Support for the majority of the Shiites lives in Upper Kurram, and the majority of 
Sunni Turi, Bangash, military and the tactics employed. The statistical findings are the  lives in Lower and Central Kurram. The 
Parachamkani, Massozai, Alisherzai, Zaimusht, Mangal, based on random, stratified samples taken in the FATA Agencies 
Kharotai, Ghalgi  Hazara using the methodology described in the Methodology Appendix. and  are the major tribes of the Agency. 
Sikh  Where comparable data from 2008, 2009 and 2010 are available, A sizable  minority left the area due to the clashes between
Sunni it is used to show changes in opinion. Otherwise single year data  and Shiites. Kurram Agency is on one of the main cross 
is used and described. links between the highways that go from Kabul to Qandahar and 
from Peshawar to Quetta. Accordingly, the Afghan conflict is also 
one of the main sources of trouble. According to media reports, 
during the first months of 2010 more than 1000 people were 
killed. Roads remained blocked since 16 November 2007, and 
this has created a humanitarian crisis in the Agency because the 
Direction of the country - optimism and supply of food and medicines remained blocked. The route via 
Afghanistan, which is extremely expensive, hectic and pessimism 
dangerous, has been used for shipment of food and medicines. 
During both the 2009 and 2010 surveys we sought to determine 
During the sectarian conflict, the health directorate of FATA 
how the People of FATA assess the country's overall situation. 
would deliver 3000 kg medicine every week by helicopter, which 
The question was, ‘Do you believe that the country is going in the 
cost them PKR 300,000 per trip. There are still IDPs from this 
right or wrong direction?’
conflict and also from the more recent movement of people and 
militants from North Waziristan into Kurram. The first impression is the substantial reduction in the 
proportion of the people who do not respond or did not have an 
In summary, the qualitative analysis presented above 
opinion. In 2010 the people seem more engaged, and in that 
demonstrates that the people of FATA have been in the cross 
shift we note that the proportion indicating that the country is 
currents of a violent international and local history for many 
going in the wrong direction has decreased and the proportion 
generations.  In the next section of this chapter, based on the 
saying that the country is going in the ‘right’ direction has 
representative quantitative surveys done from 2008 to 2010, we 
increased. Although the statistics are showing some optimism 
will be reporting and commenting on the people's impressions, 
they are still worrisome because almost half of the people still 
reflections, opinions, hopes and exasperations with regard to all 
feel that the country is going in the wrong direction. The results 
of the themes mentioned in this context.  Usually, when in these 
show a mixed impact by the events of the past year. 
desperate straits, people aspire to survive with their families, 
communities, tribes and culture intact.  We plan to present the 
facts as expressed by the people of FATA so that they may be 
The overall direction of the country and 
FATA specific issues
44
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Pakistan's and FATA's biggest problem 
The survey attempted to record the people's opinion regarding 
the biggest problems facing Pakistan as well as their opinion 
regarding the problems facing the people in FATA itself. We have 
combined the results of the two questions from 2009 and 2010 
in the table 8. Logically, some of the problems identified are 
FATA specific, but some are FATA and Pakistan-wide.
First we note that in 2009, 45% of the respondents offered a 
diversity of unclassifiable problems at the national level. In one 
year we find it hard to believe how focused the respondents 
became. 
The main finding, the problem of ‘law and order,’ is what one 
would expect given the context. The local people are now 
becoming more aware of their issues because the world is 
focused on FATA and involved in their development and conflict. 
The outside debate and involvement does not escape them, and 
it is helping them to form their opinions and also to speak out. 
With every passing year there are dramatic things, positively 
and negatively.
increased dramatically to 32.2% in the 2010 survey. This is quite 
In the 2009 survey, only 2.6% of the respondents chose ‘law and understandable, as law and order has been deteriorating with 
order’ as the biggest problem facing Pakistan. However, this has 
16.7
55.3
14.0 14.0
38.4
48.5
13.1
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Right Wrong Don’t know No response
2009
2010
Fig 16. Direction of the country - optimism and pessimism
PAKISTAN FATA 
Responses
 
Percent 
2009
 
Percent 
2010
 
Percent 
2009
 
Percent 
2010
 
Law and order
 
2.6
 
39.2
 
1.6
 
32.2
 
Bad governance
 
6.1
 
12
 
1.2
 
4.5
 
Social justice
    
3.1
Human rights violation
  
2.5
  
2.9
 Corruption
 
2.5
 
2.4
 
0.2
 
0.9
 Political instability
 
1.4
 
2.7
   Talibanisation
   
14.1
 
15.8
 Extremism
   
0.5
 
1.3
 
Presence of foreigners
    
2.3
 
Lack of development
    
3.9
Lack of education and 
health services
   
21.6
 
2.5
 
Unemployment
   
27.6
 
6.6
 
Bad economy
 
5.6
 
3.2
   
Poverty
 
7.2
 
5.5
 
8
 
6.6
Inflation
 
16.7
 
10.3
   
Energy crisis
 
8.7
 
1.2
   
American influence
 
0.3
 
4.7
   
Bomb blasts
 
2.1
 
14.6
 
1.5
 
5
 
Drone attacks
   
6.2
 
6
 
Military operation
   
7.4
 
3
 
Frontier Crimes 
Regulation 
    
0.7
 
Other
 
(specify)
 
45.1
 
0.1
  
0.4
Don’t know 1.7
 
1.7
 
0.5
 
1.1
 
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 8. Pakistan's and FATA's biggest problem 
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every passing day and people's concerns for this problem are employment were clearly the top issues in 2009, but there was a 
valid. Related are the responses about 'bomb blasts', they have radical shift to concern about law and order between 2009 and 
risen from 2009 to 2010.  In the 2009 survey only 2.1% of the 2010. Clearly the health, education and employment 
respondents view that 'bomb blasts' are the biggest problem in opportunities did not change so much as did the climate of 
Pakistan. However, due to rapid increase in the bomb blasts insecurity. The issue of unemployment and the lack of education 
from 2009 to 2010, more people (14.6%) are considering 'bomb will come up again in the section on suicide bombing.
blasts' as the biggest problem Pakistan is faced with. Although it 
In order to focus more on the specific needs of the people of 
did not appear to be a serious concern the previous year (2.1%), 
FATA the following question was asked, ‘What are the most 
it is now a main concern (14.6%). It is indicative of the 
important services that the GoP should provide to your district?’ 
intensification and the spread of conflict in FATA. Nevertheless, 
(Multiple responses were allowed so the percent response is in 
given the years of violence and the intensification in FATA, it is 
reference to the number of interviewees and not to the total 
surprising that it is perceived as a greater problem outside of 
number of responses.) The results are shown in the figure 17.
FATA. 
Once again, similar issues are identified, but notice that 
The pattern of response to ‘Bad Governance’ is quite interesting 
Education tops the list at 56.0% and that need is followed by 
because in spite of all of the tradition and complaint about 
Security (51.7%), Health (50.7%) and Justice (46.5%) as desired 
unjust government and the Frontier Crimes Regulations 
services.  Again, governance is low (9.4%) on the list of concerns.  
described in the first half of this report, it is perceived more as a 
Perhaps all of the effort and concern about governing structures 
Pakistan national problem than a FATA problem and of small 
is mis-weighted and that resources and effort into 
consequence. The issue of Corruption follows a similar pattern.
development, as well as the reduction of violence, would bring 
For the people of FATA Educational and Health services, plus about the integration of the people of FATA with support and 
46
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48.9
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32.2
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32.8
56.2
46.5
3.8
56.0
50.7
19.4
12.4
26.9
8.7
21.0
4.0
9.4
1.0
Justice Policing Education/schools Health 
services/hospitals
Water and 
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Roads Tackling terrorism Food supply Electricity supply Political
education
of the masses
Good
governance
Don’t
know
3.0
0.3 0.4
Other
(specify)
2008
2009
2010
42.5
Fig 17. What are the most important services that the GoP should provide to your district?
37.0
62.9
51.7
Security
respect for the government as well as lay the grounds for future situation. 
opportunities. Tackling Terrorism at 26.9% is unexpectedly low, 
Surprisingly, over 60% of the respondents (6.2% 'very secure' 
and, as will be analyzed in the next section, the perception of 
and 55.2%, 'somewhat Secure), the majority, express a sense of 
threat and danger to the people of FATA terrorism is not as great 
security rather than insecurity. The refugee camps that are the 
as outsiders might expect. 
alternative to remaining in one's community, expose the people 
to many other risks and challenges (22.3% of the sample said Feelings of security
that they had been forced to flee from their homes in the recent 
As noted above, ’law and order’ is the major concern along with past). CAMP personnel saw this in the case of Bajaur Agency 
development services. The development issues will be reviewed IDPs who left IDP camps quite early for their homelands when 
in another chapter, but, for the time being we will delve into the military operation was on. 
further into the security concern.
 Improvement in security situation
Security in general
The survey attempted to seek the respondents’ perception 
FATA is known as a ‘no go area’ for non-FATA residents. about changing security conditions in their respective areas. As 
Nevertheless 4 million people call FATA communities their shown in the figure 19, over 51% of the respondents replied that 
home. The brutalities of TTP and other militant groups against the situation is better (10.5% ‘much better’, 40.5% 'somewhat 
the local tribes and number of military operations in FATA have better'). 
driven an important proportion of the local population out of 
This observation, combined with the previous question implies 
FATA making it appear to be an insecure area. However, as 
a ‘sense of security’ in spite of the violence described previously.  
shown in the figure 18, the survey results for 2010 show that the 
It is difficult to interpret the meaning for 32.2% stating ‘no 
people of FATA have a somewhat different opinion of the 
47
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Fig 18. Security in general
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Fig 19. Improvement in security situation
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change’ because it would have different meanings for people in table 9 has been reduced to ‘Better,’ ‘No Change,’ and ‘Worse.’
peaceful areas or areas of conflict. Only 5.9% think that the 
As a word of caution, it is important to keep in mind what is 
security is 'somewhat worse' while 7.5% believe that it is 'much 
stated in the Methodology Appendix. That is, that only villages 
worse' now. The overall results indicate high level of confidence 
and towns that were accessible from a security perspective 
and optimism about the change in the current security 
were included in the sample. The responses herein may 
environment for at least half of the people of FATA.
represent that perspective and err on a more optimistic side 
In order to delve into the sense of security by Agency the data when compared people who might have been interviewed in 
was tabulated by Agency, and to make visualization easier the the insecure areas of the Agencies.
During the last three years South Waziristan, Bajaur and 
Mohmand Agencies have been the sites of large conflicts and 
the source of IDPs, yet we find that from 48.1% to 65.6% of their 
populations note better conditions. They must conclude that 
the worst is over. 
The three Agencies that stand out with the approximately 25% 
declaring ‘Worse’ are Orakzai and North Waziristan. They are 
known to be areas experiencing the fleeing militants from South 
Waziristan. Mohmand and Orakzai are anomalies in the sense 
that such substantial proportions of their people declare that 
the conditions are ‘Better.’
The most surprising finding was in Kurram Agency.  It has been 
one of the most violent areas of FATA due to sectarian conflict 
and revenge taking. Sunnis left Shia dominated areas and visa 
versa during the past few years and that violence created an IDP 
problem. Since November 2007, roads are blocked in Kurram 
and people are faced with several challenges. In spite of this 
recent history we now find that 80% of the people believe that 
they are more secure.  The only interpretation of the data is that 
there has been a substantial reduction in violence in Kurram of a 
sectarian nature even though the sectarian problems have not 
been the focus of a process of conflict resolution.
FR Lakki Marwat was the site of a major suicide bombing in early 
2010 in which children at a volley ball match were targeted.  
That event does not seem to have impacted their sense of 
security.  85% of the population now feels secure.
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TotalBetter
No 
difference Worse
No 
opinion
Don’t 
know
49.3 23.9 24.3 0.4 2.1 100 
48.1
 
38.2
 
9.9
 
0.9
 
2.9 100
41.3
 
37.5
 
7.5
 
1.3
 
12.5 100
51.3
 
41.3
 
7.5
 
0.0
 
0.0 100
55.0
 
15.0
 
3.1
 
1.3
 
25.6 100
 
85.0
 
5.0
 
5.0
 
0.0
 
5.0 100
25.0  62.5  7.5  1.3  3.8 100
21.3  70.0  8.8  0.0  0.0 100
 
52.8
 
31.2
 
15.8
 
0.1
 
0.1 100
 
80.1
 
14.1
 
2.4
 
0.3
 
3.1 100
65.6  8.9  24.2  0.8  0.6 100
1.1
 
73.9
 
25.0
 
0.0
 
0.0 100
54.6 26.4 12.1 3.9 2.9 100
51.0 32.2 13.4 0.7 2.9 100Total
Orakzai  Agency
Bajaur Agency
FR Bannu
FR D.I. Khan
FR Kohat
FR Lakki Marwat
FR Peshawar
FR Tank
Khyber Agency
Kurram Agency
Mohmand
Agency
North Waziristan
Agency
Agency/FR
 
South Waziristan
Agency
Table 9.  Improvement in security situation in FATA
(cross tabulation by Agency/FR)
Perceived major threats to individuals weight of the war is felt as a personal threat to 56.1% of the 
population.
This area of inquiry is new to the ‘Understanding Fata’ series, 
Interestingly, 5.8% of the respondents identified ‘Army activity’ 
hence changes from previous years cannot be analysed.
as a threat to individual security in FATA. This may indicate that 
there is local support for Pakistani Army. As pointed out above, Threats to individual's security in FATA
the Army is gaining more support from the people in FATA. 
In the previous question the inquiry was at a general level 
‘Drone attacks’ are identified by only 9.1% of the respondents. 
related to law and order.  In the following question the focus the 
The use of drones has been concentrated on North and South 
threat level posed to individual security in FATA. The initial 
Waziristan Agencies and the respondents identified ‘drone 
threat of ‘Conflict’ is non-specific and only 14.7% respondents 
attacks’ as something which threatens individual security. The 
identified 'conflict' posing threats to individual security. In fact 
opinions on drone attacks as a tactic will be explored in more 
the region is familiar with the tribal and family feuds that are as 
detail at the end of this chapter. 
old as the Pakhtun culture. Related to the culture are the area, 
14.4% identified 'sectarianism' as the sole threat to individual High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan who is 
security. It should be noted that 14.4 % of the respondents, are 
responsible?from Kurram and Orakzai Agencies where Shia and Sunni sects 
have been at odds for many years. Terrorist attacks are cited as 
One of the tactics used in terrorist attacks is suicide bombing.  
the main threat by 41.2% of the respondents, and if drone 
The respondents were asked, “Who do you think is responsible 
attacks (9.1%) and Army activity (5.8%) are added, then the 
for the high rates of suicide bombing?” The responses are 
shown in the figure 21.
The most frequent response (25.8%) was that the United States 
of America was behind the suicide bombings.  India, the historic 
rival was indicated by 13.5% and Israel (11.5%) was the third 
choice. Since 9/11 and ISAF military operation in Afghanistan 
the anti-American feelings have risen extremely high, while 
India is perceived as long time enemy since Pakistan's 
Independence. Because of solidarity with Palestine on political 
and religious basis, Israel is despised. That being said, we do not 
know the logic for ascribing the responsibility to nations that 
have not been providing support for suicide bombers. 
Nevertheless, it is a perception that must be taken into 
consideration.
In spite of the TTP's claim of responsibility for many of these 
terrorist attacks, it is surprisingly that only 8.7% of the 
respondents believed that TTP is behind suicide bombings in 
parts of Pakistan, including FATA. A large percentage of the 
respondents, 22.7, do not know the answer.    
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Fig 20. Threats to individual's security in FATA
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In the 2008 and 2009 surveys ‘Western influence’ was identified militant groups, may have changed this perception. 
by the majority of the respondents (50.9% and 33.7%, 
It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia received a very low 
respectively) as being responsible for high rates of suicide 
response in terms of its involvement in suicide bombing 
bombing in Pakistan. In 2010 there was a greater diversity of 
because Saudi Arabia is known as a centre of religious piety even 
nations that could be classified as ‘Western,’ and if the USA, 
though the Western media blames it for its role in Talibanising 
Western and Israel are added the total is 39.7% for 2010. The 
the tribal society since the time of Soviet-Afghan War. 
response for Al Qaeda also gradually reduced to 3.1% in 2010 
from 7.7% in 2009 and 13.3% in 2008. The general perception These responses are one of the indications of the impact of the 
about Al Qaeda being responsible for suicide attacks is quite low, political and also the conspiracies circulating in Pakistan and 
and it is believed that Al Qaeda is more targeted towards West, FATA. One group (TTP) claims responsibility for suicide 
especially US rather than Pakistan. bombings, but the political promotion and conspiracy theorists 
prevail with India and Western nations.
The Pakistan Army was identified as responsible for suicide 
bombing by 13.1% in 2008 but it was, reduced to 5.1% in 2009 
and just 0.5% in 2010. The recent successful military operations 
against militant groups, especially TTP and its associated 
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Fig 21. High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan who is responsible?
as the cause of suicide bombing. This is a contrast with the Causes of high rates of suicide bombing in 
previous perspective that external actors were predominantly 
Pakistan
the ‘responsible’ parties. To this question, however, only 8.7% 
indicated that the ‘West’ was the cause. The survey attempted to gauge the perception of the 
factors/actors contributing to the rates of suicide bombing in 
A second factor, a factor of prevention, was indicated by 21.5% 
Pakistan. To explore the opinions of the people the questioning 
of the respondents (failure of 'intelligence agencies' to intercept 
was changed to the ‘causes’ of the rates of suicide bombing 
- 9.8%; Army incapacity - 7.3%, and Police lack 3.4%). 15.5% of 
instead of 'responsibility.' The survey then revealed mixed 
the sample do not know or could not identify any cause for the 
responses, that is, external and internal causes, as shown in the 
high rates of suicide bombing. 
figure 22:
Both of these factors reflect a set of internal and changeable 
The two main causes identified ('unemployment' 17.5% and the 
causes for suicide bombings rather than a fatalistic, blame-it-on-
‘Lack of Education’ 14.8%) bring us back to the tables in the first 
the-outsiders, perspective. This is useful for a programmatic 
half of the report, where the needs expressed included 
approach to changing the climate of conflict, specifically 
Education and Employment. Poverty was also mentioned by 
encouraging the citizens to help root out the ‘miscreants.’
another 7% of the respondents. In brief, the factor of 
underdevelopment was attributed by 40% of the respondents 
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Fig 22. Causes of high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan
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 Source of suicide bombers Reasons for conflicts in FATA
The respondents were asked to identify the source, that is, the For a more in depth understanding, the survey focused on the 
geographic origin, of the suicide bombers. Interestingly, over reasons that cause conflicts in FATA. As we know, in FATA there 
the last three surveys the respondents have become more 
certain of their answers. The percent of respondents who did 
not know declined from 63% in 2008 to 31.5% in 2010. The 
increased certainty was shifted toward India (7.4% in 2008 to 
28.7% in 2010) and Afghanistan (16% to 21.2%). The ‘West’ and 
the other nations where the 'responsibility' had been attributed 
now drop to less than 6% as the geographic origin of suicide 
bombers. 
Because India has invested hugely in Afghanistan, some 
Pakistani politicians, from the government party as well as 
opposition parties, blame India for using Afghanistan soil 
against Pakistan; these political expressions have moulded the 
opinion of the general public against India and Afghanistan as 
we saw in the responses to the questions on security. Over time 
these beliefs are becoming stronger and they represent a future 
challenge for diplomacy with these neighbours.  
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Fig 23. Source of suicide bombers
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Fig 24. Reasons for conflicts in FATA
been described in the ethnographies, that is, the constant 
tension between families and tribes.
Conflict over land is an old phenomenon and local tribesmen are 
well aware and are accustomed to this. However, extremism is 
something that has only a 30 year history and has been the most 
severe form of conflict because it has destroyed the very fabric 
of the tribal and Pakhtun culture. It has affected well respected 
and well guarded institutions like jirga, hujra, nanawati, and 
milmastya, etc. that are the social mechanisms for resolving 
issues. A probable reason for the destruction of these 
institutions is that traditionally the disputing parties would 
submit to the opinion of jirgas, but with outside leaders and 
troops who are not willing to join the culture and submit to a 
are numerous forms of conflicts and the survey in 2010 sought 
jirga, the conflict cannot be resolved.  Moreover, some outside 
to identify them through the sample. Again, the respondents 
forces wish to destroy the very institutions that have brought 
turned inward toward their personal experience and 
stability to the Pakhtun. Some try this in the name of 
approximately three quarters of the respondents indicated that 
modernization and others in the name of idealized or radical 
local issues rather than ‘extremism’ were the reasons for 
orthodoxy. 
conflict. The most common response (28.9%) was 'conflict over 
We will end this section on threats with the question “How land,' while 25.9% opined that 'extremism' is the biggest reason 
much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan for conflict in FATA. These reasons for conflict reflect what has 
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Fig 25. How much of a threat, if any,
does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?
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Fig 26. Opinion about the security providers
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these days?”  
As shown in the figure 25, two third (69.8%) of the respondents 
believe that Islamic extremism poses a threat to Pakistan. As we 
noted above, extremism is perceived to be a threat to the 
institutions of Pakhtun culture. The majority of the people 
recognize this threat.  Nevertheless, 11.1% do not view Islamic 
extremism as a threat. This small portion of a culture can 
threaten that culture. It is not to be overlooked.
In this section we explore the opinions of the people of FATA 
toward the Security Providers. One of the introductory 
questions about trust showed that the components of the 
military (Army 20.3% and the Frontier Corps 7.9%) are the most 
Each Agency has a force of 2000- 3000 Khasadars and Levies and 
and increasingly trusted institutions or leaders in FATA. The 
5 to 9 wings of Frontier Corps for maintaining law and order 
figure 26 also shows that although traditional local leadership 
inside each Agency, to provide border security, and to control 
consisting of the Teachers, Political Agents, and Mullahs is 
cross-border smuggling. There are approximately 35,000 Maliks 
appreciated those leaders are declining in stature in contrast to 
and Lungi allowance holders, representing their respective 
the tribal elders who seem to be gaining.    
tribes, clans, sub-clans, etc who facilitate, as per the 
administrative system of FATA, the implementation of Security providers in FATA
government policies and the maintenance of  law and order in 
The first question posed to the people was, ‘Which of the their respective areas. 
following institutions do you believe should be primarily 
Khasadar and Levies forces consist of local tribesmen and have 
responsible for security in FATA?’ 
been operational since the time of British Raj. The local tribes 
Recall that the question is in the context of the presence of are accustomed to them and have never raised any objection.  
several militant groups and past Pakistani military offensives in However, Army presence is quite new, especially after 9/11, and 
FATA. The context influenced the perception of Pakistani society has not been welcomed by the local people and tribal leaders. 
in general, and FATA in particular. The finding is that trust is in the 
military institution made up of local men. The respondents Frontier Corps (FC) and security in FATA
p r e f e r r e d  ' F r o n t i e r  C o r p s ’  ( 3 0 . 7 % ) ,  ‘ t r i b a l  
Answers to the question, ‘Do you think that the FC plays a 
communities/Lakhkars' (23.9%) and 'Khasadar and levies' 
valuable role in providing security in FATA?’ reinforce the 
(23.0%) over the 'military' (15.0%). This finding validates both 
responses to the previous question. The majority of the 
the Pakistani Army and the US military basis or conclusion to 
respondents (68.9%) say that FC can play a vital role in providing 
expand and strengthen the Frontier Corps because of cultural 
security in FATA. Only 14.1% have doubts on its capacity or role. 
strength. This would fit a strategy of decentralized governance 
and security.
Opinion about the security providers
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Fig 27. Security providers in FATA
In summary, the people of FATA appreciate the role of the Army 
and the FC forces formed of local men. They also recognize the 
need to strengthen them so that they can provide greater 
Training FC with international assistance
protection against the militants. The presence of outsiders for 
training is also seen more favourably than one would expect Insurgent groups in FATA, when compared with the FC, have 
from reading the media and commentary.better training and are better armed, making it difficult for the 
FC, as well as other security agencies, to face the challenge. This 
problem has been identified by experts. From this came the 
issue of what should be the role that outsiders can play in 
strengthening or participating in Pakistani security providers. As 
described in the qualitative section, since 2007 the US has In the previous section it was demonstrated that, generally, the 
funded and played a training role for the expansion of the FC. people of FATA support the various military institutions that 
have been with them traditionally. Now the survey shifts focus 
As pointed out above, the public has also observed that the FC 
slightly using specific cases of military intervention in both FATA 
has not been able to win battles, all of the time, against the 
and non-FATA areas to elicit the opinion of FATA residents about 
militants. A more highly trained FC using more sophisticated 
those actions and tactics. It is necessary to carefully partition 
weapons and tactical skills is needed. Therefore, the survey also 
the data by Agency to see if having been involved changes the 
included the following question, ‘If trained by international 
opinion about the actions and also tactics.
assistance, would you have more or less confidence in their 
ability to do their job?’ This measures the people's perception of One of the impacts of the conflicts has been forced migration.  
the role of international assistance. The majority, 52.4%, feel Those people who suffered forced migration would be one sub-
more confident, while 24.8% feel less confident. However, set to compare with others who had not been forced to leave.  
22.8% were undecided.   This is an important intervening variable in public opinion.
Support for the military and the tactics 
employed
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Fig 29. Training FC with international assistance
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adjacent to Orakzai Agency where a targeted military operation Forced migration from FATA
was underway at the time of the survey. Some respondents 
Due to ongoing militancy and military operations in parts of identified Karachi, Balochistan, and cities of Punjab. 
FATA people have been forced to flee their homes and settle in 
The degree of dislocation varies by FR and Agency. The table 10 the IDP camps; host communities in the adjacent districts; or 
shows these statistics.major cities of Pakistan. The survey measured the percentage of 
population that had been affected in this way. Out of total 
sample, 22.3% of the respondents said that they were forced to 
leave their home towns while 77.7% said they never were forced 
to leave their homes. 
Those who said 'yes' were subsequently asked where they went. 
The 22.3% of the respondents who were forced to leave their 
homes identified 32 cities/towns where they were either 
The table 10 above shows that only in FR D.I. Khan, FR Lakki, and 
housed in IDP camps or within host communities. Out of 22.3% 
North Waziristan Agency have people not been displaced or 
percent, 41% respondents identified Peshawar where the major 
forced to migrate. In some areas where major conflict and 
Kacha Garhi IDP camp was established for the people of Bajaur 
battles have been fought, more than a third of the population 
and, later on, Mohmand Agencies. 8.5% identified Charsadda 
has been displaced. 
district which has a major urban area adjacent to Mohmand 
To judge the overall scale of the population dislocated and the Agency. 5.5% of the respondents identified D.I. Khan where 
impact on host communities we can use both the latest official refugees of South Waziristan operation are settled in host 
population estimates for FATA (4 million) and the estimate communities. 5.3% respondents identified Kohat, which is 
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Fig 30. Forced migration from FATA
Table 10. Forced migration from FATA
(cross tabulation by Agency/FR)
TotalYes No
Orakzai  Agency 27.9 72.1
 100
Bajaur Agency
 
37.5 62.5
 
100
FR Bannu
 
38.8 61.3 100
FR D.I. Khan
 
0.0 100.0
 
100
FR Kohat
 
36.9 63.1
 
100
FR Lakki Marwat 0.0 100.0
 
100
FR Peshawar 10.0 90.0 100
FR Tank
 
22.5 77.5
 
100
Khyber Agency 30.8 69.2
 
100
Kurram Agency 3.4 96.6
 
100
Mohmand Agency 24.2 75.8
 
100
North Waziristan Agency 0.0 100.0
 
100
South Waziristan Agency 35.7 64.3
 
100
Total 22.3 77.7
 
100
Agency
provided by local leadership (6 million) Using the respondents' 
responses the lower and upper estimates are 847,400 and 
1,338,000 people were forced to leave their home and became 
IDPs because of the militancy and military operation. These 
figures suggest that the people of FATA have been exposed to 
gigantic challenges and that they are paying a high cost of the 
militancy. Just what that means in terms of the following types 
of military operations is important.
Military offensive in Swat/Malakand
Outside (but adjacent) of FATA a major offensive took place in Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan. 
2008-09. This question measured the support for the Pakistani 
Note that the people who remained behind overwhelmingly 
military operation in the Swat/Malakand division. Overall, a 
support the operations while the support by the displaced 
majority (70.1%) supported the operation (39.7% 'fully support' 
population is much lower.   
plus 30.4% 'partly support' it). 16.2% of the respondents 
opposed the operation (10.4% ‘fully Opposed’ plus 5.8% 'partly In the next section on a military operation inside of FATA the data 
opposed). is parsed by Agency and also between displaced and people who 
remain behind. The specific findings are different as the variable 
However, when the intervening condition of having been a 
of ‘closer to home’ is taken into consideration.
displaced person is brought into consideration, then a 
differential impact is revealed. This is shown in the summary in 
Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, 
figure 31 comparing the opinion of displaced people with non-
FATAdisplaced in the cases of the military offensives in 
In 2009 the Pakistani military initiated an offensive in South 
Waziristan Agency against Tehrek e Taliban Pakistan. There was 
perception that the people of Pakistan, in general, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, in particular, were against this military 
57
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Fig 31. Military offensive in Swat/Malakand
 Military offensive in Swat/Malakand
Displaced?
 
%
Support
 
%  
Oppose  
No opinion 
Do not know Total
Yes 52.0 30.6 17.5 100
No
 
75.3 11.9
 
12.8 100
 
 
%
Support
 
%  
Oppose
 
No opinion 
Do not know Total
Yes
 
46.7 33.7
 
19.6 100
No
 
72.6 14.2
 
13.2 100
Displaced?
Military offensive in South Waziristan
Table 11. Military offensive in Swat/Malakand
(Cross tabulation)
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Table 12. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA
(Cross tabulation)
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operation. Religious parties such as Jamaat e Islamai (JI) and 
Jamiat e Ulema e Islam (JUI) were holding the view that the 
government should initiate a dialogue with the militants. Even 
Imran Khan, Chairman of Tehrek e Insaaf was very vocal in 
opposing this operation. 
The survey documents the views of the men and women of FATA 
in the above figure 32: 
This is the overall impression with very similar proportions to 
the case of the Military offensive in Swat/Malakand; two-thirds 
of the people of FATA (37.5%”fully supported' plus 29.4% 'partly 
supported') supported the operation. Opposition was 
expressed by 17.6% (11.7% 'fully opposed' plus 6.9% 'partly 
opposed').
Again we have collapsed the categories of response to make it 
The military used heavy force to hunt down the militants. easier to visualize. If the heavy force cited were severe, then it 
Reports from the battle field show that due to the heavy force would be expected that the people in South Waziristan would be 
used by the army innocent people were killed, scarce in overwhelming opposition, but the data show that it is an 
infrastructure destroyed, and local economies shattered. But, approximate 50/50 split between support (43%) and opposition 
even then, the local people have supported the military (46%).  In neighbouring North Waziristan there is overwhelming 
operation and wanted to get rid of Taliban style of governance support for the operation (93.9%).
that has tried to hijack Pakhtun society. 
Using the same information, the question can be examined 
The following table 13 showing the support or opposition to the within Agencies such as Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand where 
operation in South Waziristan, by Agency is quite revealing.  
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Fig 32. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA
Name of Agency/FR
 
Percent Support
 
Oppose
No 
opinion
 
Don’t 
know Total
Orakzai Agency
 
73.2
 
23.6 2.9
 
0.4
 
100
Bajaur Agency
 
56.8
 
19.6 10.6
 
13.1
 
100
FR Bannu 42.5 53.8 2.5 1.3 100
FR D.I. Khan 72.5
 
23.8 3.8
 
0.0
 
100
FR Kohat 27.5 17.5 44.4 10.6 100
FR Lakki Marwat 7.5 22.5 37.5 32.5 100
FR Peshawar 52.5 12.5 31.3  3.8  100
FR Tank 77.5 20.0 0.0  2.5  100
Khyber Agency 55.7 26.7 7.2 10.4 100
Kurram Agency 97.2 0.6 0.1 2.1 100
Mohmand Agency 60.8 15.0 4.2  20.0  100
North Waziristan Agency 93.9 6.1  0.0  0.0  100
South Waziristan Agency 43.6 46.8 5.4  4.3  100
Total 66.8 18.6 7.1  7.6  100
Table 13. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA
(Cross tabulation by Agency/FR)
the operation in these Agencies.     
Another way to understand the impact of the conflict is to 
separate the opinion of those who were forced to leave from the 
people who remained behind while these operations were 
taking place.  It is a large table, but going directly to the overall 
comparison of displaced vs. the people who had not been 
forced to leave there homes there is an inverse opinion with 
people forced to leave providing less support (46.7%) than 
people who remained behind (72.6%).
That being said, and turning directly to the case of South 
Waziristan, the people who had been displaced supported the 
operation by 52% to 39%. This is the inverse of general 
population polled.  Again, inversely, the people who remained 
in South Waziristan opposed by 51.1% to 38.9%. Although both 
groups were impacted by the war, the people who remained 
behind suffered the most and, perhaps, lost more family 
members. The themes of collateral damage and the treatment 
of the people by outside forces are crucial both from a 
humanitarian and a military-political perspective.
US drone attacks in FATA
We close this chapter on the subject of a tactic used in the 
international conflict against militants who may or may not be 
native to FATA. There is a debate on the legitimacy of the use of 
there has been heavy conflict. What are notable are the low 
levels of opposition and some of the highest level of support for 
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Name of Agency/FR TotalSupport  Oppose
No 
opinion
Don’t 
know
Yes %
Orakzai Agency  64.1  32.1  3.8 0.0 100
Bajaur Agency  52.5  22.7  12.9 11.8 100
FR  Bannu  22.6  74.2  0.0 3.2 100
FR  Kohat 37.3 23.7 27.1 11.9 100
FR  Peshawar  0.0 75.0 12.5 12.5 100
FR  Tank
 83.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 100
Khyber Agency
 32.1 51.7 11.1 5.1 100
Kurram Agency
 87.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 100
Mohmand Agency 48.3 12.6 3.4 35.6 100
South Waziristan 52.0 39.0 6.0 3.0 100
Total
 46.7 33.7 10.0 9.6 100
No %
Orakzai A gency  76.7 20.3 2.5 0.5 100
Bajaur Agency
 59.3 17.6 9.2 13.9 100
F R
 
B annu 55.1 40.8 4.1 0.0 100
F R
 
D.I.
 
Khan 72.5 23.8
 
3.8 0.0 100
F R
 
K ohat
 21.8 13.9
 
54.5 9.9 100
F R
 
L akki Marwat
 
7.5 22.5
 
37.5 32.5 100
F R
 
P eshawar
 
58.3 5.6
 
33.3 2.8 100
F R
 
Tank
 
75.8 21.0
 
0.0 3.2 100
Khyber Agency
 
66.2 15.6
 
5.5 12.7 100
Kurram A gency
 
97.6 0.5
 
0.0 2.0 100
Mohmand Agency 64.8 15.8
 
4.4 15.0 100
North Waziristan
 
93.9 6.1
 
0.0 0.0 100
South W aziristan
 
38.9 51.1
 
5.0 5.0 100
Total
 
72.6 14.2
 
6.2 7.0 100
Table 14. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA
(Cross tabulation by Agency/FR and whether displaced)
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Fig 33. US drone attacks in FATA
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As noted in the section on perceived personal threats (in figure 
20), 9.1% of the people felt that drone attacks were their major 
threat. In that regard, the survey was used to gauge the 
perception of how the men and women of FATA feel about these 
drone attacks in relation to other perceived threats. 
The data in figure 33 showed that 58.8% of the respondents 
believe that such attacks are 'never justified'. 24.5% of the 
respondents opined in a qualified manner that sometimes these 
attacks are justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian 
casualties are avoided. Only 4.4% believe that such drone 
attacks are 'always justified'.
Now the presentation focuses on that same threat, but it is from 
the perspective of the respondents by Agency. This follows the 
underlying theme of proximity to the conflict having a 
differential impact on the opinion of the respondent. The 
Agencies where the drone attacks have been constant and 
increasing during the past two years are South and North 
Waziristan. A few years ago there were a few drone attacks in 
Bajaur. Nevertheless, other Agencies without drone attacks 
have as high or higher rates of ‘never justified’; though it is 
notable that in South Waziristan and North Waziristan Agencies 
all respondents said that drone strikes were 'never justified'.
The findings from D.I. Khan and Kurram show pragmatism, that 
is, ‘if targeted and civilian casualties are avoided.’ This 
perspective must come from their experience or their perceived 
threat from extremists, or, perhaps, because they have not 
experienced drone attacks. Kurram, as we have pointed out 
before, is different because their conflicts have been sectarian 
between their own people.
Nuclear possession and national security
US drone attacks in FATA areas, especially in North and South 
Waziristan, for targeting foreign fighters, Al Qaeda and Taliban Pakistan, as a nation, is quite emotional about possessing 
leadership as well as local warlords associated with extremists. nuclear weapons. The survey sought to explore how secure the 
Drone attacks are criticised because they violate international respondents feel about possessing these weapons. Considering 
humanitarian laws are seen as extra judicial killings, violation of the history of conflict and rivalry with India the response is not 
Pakistan's sovereignty, and cause collateral damage killing surprising. Three quarters of the respondents (76.9%) believe 
innocent people, including women and children. that possessing a nuclear weapon is vital for national security. 
Always 
justified
 
Sometimes 
justified, if properly 
targeted and 
excessive civilian 
casualties are 
avoided
Never 
justified
No 
opinion 
OR 
Don’t 
know
Total
Orakzai Agency  5.0  38.9  45.0 11.1 100
Bajaur Agency  
0.9  26.8  60.0 12.4 100
FR  Bannu  
2.5  42.5  45.0 10.0 100
FR  D.I.  Khan  
0.0  60.0  36.3 3.8 100
FR
 
Kohat
 
3.1
 
7.5
 
37.5 51.9 100
FR
 
Lakki Marwat
 
0.0
 
17.5
 
32.5 50.0 100
FR
 
Peshawar
 
1.3
 
7.5
 
60.0 31.3 100
FR
 
Tank
 
0.0
 
7.5
 
92.5 0.0 100
Khyber Agency
 
2.9
 
11.1
 
74.5 11.6 100
Kurram Agency
 
16.9
 
63.2
 
12.9 6.9 100
Mohmand Agency 3.1
 
7.8
 
71.4 17.8 100
North Waziristan Agency
 
0.0
 
0.2
 
99.3 0.5 100
South Waziristan Agency
 
0.4
 
11.1
 
75.4 13.2 100
Total
 
4.4
 
24.5
 
58.8 12.3 100
Agency/FR
Table 15. US drone attacks in FATA
(cross tabulation by Agency/FR)
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and health services should all inform policy and strategies for 
improving the lives and livelihoods of the people while striving 
for the resolution of the conflict.   
Because of the context of conflict the first finding was that half 
of the people polled believe that the country is going in the 
wrong direction and the issues of law and order and 
‘Talibanisation’ are the most bothersome. Terrorist attacks are 
identified as the major threat to individual security.
We have also found differences of opinion on the impact of 
military operations between having been an IDP or not. These 
preliminary findings should be the basis for more, in depth 
inquiry and also the subject of policy and post-conflict 
strategies. 
We found a level of pragmatism in the support of the people of 
FATA for government military operations. The section on drones 
also presents important findings for policy and military-civilian 
This majority level of support for nuclear weapons has, 
relations. 
however, declined slightly since the 2008 survey (86.4%); 2009 
(78.9%) and now, in 2010 (76.9%). Whether or not this trend will One of the most important findings across a series of questions 
continue remains to be seen.  was that the opinions of the people reflect politically motivated 
propaganda and conspiracy theories that hinder strategies for 
Conclusion counterinsurgency. An example is that, consistently over the last 
three surveys between 40% and 50% of the people believe that 
The overall subject of this chapter was to make explicit the fact 
the Western nations are the origins of suicide bombers, and 
that the people of FATA have been living in a context of 
then there are the 15% of the population who believe that India 
international conflict for the last thirty years and that they have 
is behind them. Unless images such as these can be turned 
been in the cross currents of history from time immemorial.  
around, the effort for the people's support will be thwarted.  
The long exposure to a diversity of cultures and the linkages of However, once the projection of fault to the outside is passed, 
modern commerce and war makes the Pakhtun a connected the people focus on the characteristics of underdevelopment as 
and very aware population in spite of the common error or factors contributing to extremist behaviour. 
perception that they are an isolated and remote people. This 
As will be described in the next chapter, the dislike for the 
background presents a unique challenge to the researcher who 
Western nations is very high (as high as the dislike of Al Qaeda), 
must inquire, systematically, about their opinion and 
yet in the chapter on media, the Western news media has a 
perceptions so that other people of the world involved in and 
following that rivals national Radio and TV. As we have seen in 
causing the international context of conflict will understand the 
previous chapters, there is support for international 
people of FATA. The specifics such as the standing of the local 
development assistance, but what has been received has not 
military, the hierarchy of development needs, and the 
been recognized. An example that shows a positive recognition 
comparative importance of security to governance, education, 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
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Fig 34. Nuclear possession and national security
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toward Western nations was the question that revealed that the 
people favoured the strengthening of the Frontier Corps by 
foreigners. In this case, the training centre was a known entity 
and the Frontier Corps are local men benefiting and knowing the 
source of the effort.  Perhaps the anonymous flow of assistance 
through the government of Pakistan has been a mistake when it 
comes to winning the war of perceptions, because, as was 
shown in the first part of the book, the opinion of the people 
towards the FATA Secretariat and the FATA Development 
Authority was one of mistrust.
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Many of the problems of an unstable state stemmed from the Introduction
fact that there was no proper Disarmament, Demobilisation 
52
and Reconstruction (DDR) carried out in the country.Religion and militancy have an entwined history in both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.  We begin this chapter by reminding 
This resulted in a violent reaction by the Jihadi militant groups 
the reader of the use of Islam by political leaders to rally the 
to the Government of Pakistan's decision, under Pervez 
people to calls as diverse as the founding of the state of Pakistan 
Musharraf's era, to become a front line ally of the US War of 
to the use of Islam to wage a proxy war between world powers 
Terror in the wake of 9/11 attacks in US. The North Western part 
in Afghanistan. In between those uses are the rallying of 
of Pakistan once again became the focus of the Global War on 
political parties and the followers of warlords on both sides of 
Terror just as it had during the war against the Russians twenty 
the Durand Line. In keeping with the theme of the Pakhtun in 
years earlier.
the cross currents of history and climate of conflict we focus on 
Here, in the remote and mountainous terrain which has a review of religion and militancy. Then, in the quantitative 
frustrated invading armies for centuries, it is presumed that the section of the chapter, we provide the opinions of the 
core leadership of Al Qaeda, including Bin Laden and Al respondents.   
Zawahiri, has been hiding with tacit cooperation of certain local 
53Policy of Islamisation tribes.
The sweeping victory in the 2002 election by the religious Historical evidence suggests that the ongoing insurgency is the 
parties under the banner of Mutahida Majlis e Amal in Khyber by-product of Pakistan's official policy towards Afghanistan. 
Pakhtunkhwa was a clear indication of the public discontent on During the Afghan War of the 1980s (the ‘American Jihad’) the 
Pakistan's role as the key state in 'War against Terrorism'. The Pakistani, United States and Saudi Arabian governments 
alliance was mainly headed by Jamiat Ullema e Islam (Fazlur organized, armed and financed the Afghan groups fighting the 
50
Rehman group) and Jumat e Islami (JI).  Both parties represent a Soviet Union's occupation forces.  Rampant warlordism, gun 
radical theological of Islam. They supported Afghan Jihad as running, failure of the successor Afghan government to gain 
51
well as the Kashmiri Jihad against India. Their policies have anti-control on the post conflict problems  in a mine-infested terrain 
US and anti-Indian orientations that have, indirectly, supported with nothing in the way of effective and comprehensive post 
those who take part in Jihad against US and NATO forces in conflict rehabilitation were but a few of Afghanistan's problems 
Afghanistan. Their speeches and statements also helped to when the Soviet force withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. This 
mould public opinion against Pakistan's government, that had acute failure of a centralised power gave rise to a new version of 
lost public support because it hunted the Taliban and Al Qaeda post-Soviet Jihadis in the shape of the Taliban who, in their 
in FATA and KP. attempt to establish their own version of Islamic Sharia with the 
collusion of the Al Qaeda, proved to be disastrous not only for 
On the other hand, both parties have lost their credibility in the 
the country but the entire world in general and Pakistan 
eyes of Taliban and Al Qaeda because, in Pakistani domestic 
specifically.
politics, both parties have been highly pragmatic, even 
CHAPTER - 6
ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGION AND MILITANCY
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57
Alama Iqbal its architects.  Indeed history suggests that since opportunistic, forming formal or informal alliances with all 
54
major political players, no matter military, civilian, or secular.  Pakistan's inception, the country's leaders have played upon 
None of them has ever used the path of violence in their religious sentiments as an instrument for strengthening 
58
.Jihad Pakistan's identitypolitical struggle, while always politically supporting  and 
56
militant Islam.
Pakistan did not get into this terrible state because of 9/11. The 
During their government from 2002-2007, the militancy in FATA seeds were sown on March 1949. We not only encouraged 
and KP flourished. There is a debate as to why the government Jihadism but by changing the laws and school syllabus, we 
of KP did not do anything to stop Maulana Fazlullah of TNSM in opted to become an Islamic orthodox state. We ended up 
59
creating an Islamic generation.Swat who was running his own FM radio and gathering support 
for his Jihad against the government of Pakistan and for 
Islamic groups were sponsored and supported by the state 
demanding Sharia law in the Malakand division. FATA is 
machinery at different times in order to influence politics or 
adjacent to the KP and the KP provincial government has no 
support the military's political dominance. The threats to 
jurisdiction in these areas. However, due to its proximity and 
national solidarity in Pakistan's formative years led her to adopt 
homogeneity, one can not deny the fact that MMA could have 
certain policies of survival  that made the country's reliance on 
used its influence in stemming militancy in Swat and FATA from 60
Islam and Jihad essential.  In the absence of a broad based 
the very beginning. 
movement like the one developed by the Congress party in 
The stunning defeat of religious political parties in the February India, the organizing principles of religion were used in Pakistan 
2008 elections should have been an eye opener for the world and the state was constructed based on this principle for much 
61
and Pakistan political observers as a whole. It became clear that of its existence.  General Zia ul Haq went further than other 
the perspective of the people of Pakistan and KP along with leaders in ‘Islamising’ Pakistan's legal and educational system.  
FATA had shifted away from radical parties toward parties Thus, this policy of Islamisation was the extension of a more 
62
promising an alternative to the conflicts that they had been consistent state ideology, not an aberration.  
experiencing for over 20 years. As a result, the Islamist parties 
Since 1977, when Zia ul Haq took power, Pakistan underwent a 
were only able to hold onto 1.8% of the seats in the parliament 
rapid transformation of identity, and amongst other 
compared with 11.3% popular votes and 63 National Assembly 
questionable decisions his government undertook was the one 
seats that they held before in the 2002 election. According to 
to join the Jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union on 
some analysts, these parties may never be able to regain the 
63
behalf of the US.  To fight the Soviets, locals and Afghan 
level of support that they received in the 2002 election. 
Mujahideen were recruited and foreign elements brought to 
However, they still possess a level of public support and could 
64
join the Jihad. Hundreds of Madrassas  and training camps 
play a significant role in the opposition.
were established in the FATA, and tribesmen were motivated 
The element of Jihad has also existed since the time of and recruited for Jihad in Afghanistan against Soviets. 
independence when Pakistan was created on the basis of 
The historical role the people of the FATA region played in 
Muslim nationhood. There is a debate in the media as to why 
Kashmir against the Indian Army in the 1948 War is further 
and how Pakistan was created and over what was the vision of 
evidence that supports the thesis that General Zia utilised the 
Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinah, the founder and father of the 
ignorant and less-educated tribal people against the Soviets. 
Pakistani nation. However, the establishment of a religious state 
They tried to strengthen the motivation and mobilization of the 
in the region was neither in the minds of the Quaid e Azam nor 
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fighters by transforming them from national, regional and tribal still in use by the Taliban and are in use today by extremist 
66
groups.  Until 1989, the number of Jihad publications in resistance groups into a religiously inspired ‘Holy war’ against 
65
the Soviet Union, a Jihad.  It is important to highlight this Pakistan had reached 150. Most of them were published in 
change of the Jihadi focus. The traditional religious use of the Peshawar and Quetta. The circulation of these monthlies and 
concept is the individual's constant ‘struggle’ against the weekly magazines was in thousands, and most of these Jihad 
temptations of life or against personal sin. This is a theme that is publications project and glorify Jihadi activities all over the 
67 
world, especially in Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and FATA.  found in many religions. The ‘struggle’ against others who 
would change or challenge one's family, tribe and culture is 
Pakhtuns, due to their geography, history, and culture have 
another level of Jihad and fits the culture of the Pakhtun 
been caught both in the crossfire of the 'War against Terrorism' 
(Pakhtunwali) and the defence of honour. This in, pragmatic 68
and the complex web of regional and international politics.  
terms, is what is the justification for forming a Lakhkar. It is also 
The tribes would be consulted through their elders to support a 
the purpose of a jirga to resolve conflicts.  Note that this second 
certain initiative and there has never been anything more 
form of struggle is defensive in nature, i.e. protecting one's 
popular than relying on the name of Islam. The name of Islam 
immediate culture against outsiders. The third type of struggle 
and the culture of the Pakhtun were exploited from the 
is the ‘International Jihad.’ It comes from a political economy 
beginning of the Afghan War in 1979 when the tribes supported 
perspective of what is wrong with the world and the plight of 69
Jihad and housed the foreigners and Afghan refugees.  
underdevelopment. It is what some have referred to as the ‘far 
war.’ This third conceptualization explains how the basis for the The Jihad against the Russians was justified and built upon the 
international cold war recruitment of Jihadis to fight against the sense of Jihad as defence of family, community and culture so 
Russians in Afghanistan (in addition to the defence by the ingrained in the Pakhtun culture.  Unfortunately, as the radical 
Pakhtun) led to the formation of Al Qaeda and, presently, the international Jihadis were coupled with the Wahhabi-based 
basis for international Jihadi movement under the umbrella political economy, the movement became detrimental to 
name or as ‘branches’ of Al Qaeda.  The international Al Qaeda traditional tribal structure and culture.  
movement has the agenda of removing corrupt heads of Islamic 
The housing of religiously motivated forces from around the 
states and also taking the struggle to the non-Islamic states that 
70
world in the 1980s eroded the traditional system and society.  
support the corrupt leadership. The final objective is the 
Today the people of FATA are dealing with a generation of 30 
establishment of a Caliphate.  
year-old tribesmen and battle hardened foreigners who have 
Returning to the period of history of the struggle against the married into Pakhtun tribes who form a complete generation of 
Russians, let us not forget that the Russian presence in people born and brought up in war and struggle that has 
71
Afghanistan was not only a version of the ‘Great Game’ of become their way of life.  
centuries ago; it was a battle in the cold war between capitalism 
Following the withdrawal of Soviets troops from Afghanistan in 
and communism. As such the internationalization of the 
1989, all foreign assistance terminated and the Mujahideen 
struggle was a by-product.  Print and electronic communication 
were left to their own campaign to find new causes to fight. The 
was used during that Jihad. Several monthly journals; 
9/11 incident and subsequent American intervention in 
magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, etc were published to 
Afghanistan, followed by stationing of ISAF and NATO forces in 
attract the general masses towards Jihad. The US development 
that land, became the new cause for the Al Qaeda types as well 
agency USAID spent 50 million US dollars for producing 
as their hosts and collaborators i.e. the Mujahideen turned 
textbooks for children promoting religious war. Those books are 
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Taliban [TTP] in the Pakhtun tribal belt on both sides of the 
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Durand line.  Moreover, they have the political economy and 
international Jihadi perspective that includes supporting the 
‘far war.’ The presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, in 
Pakhtun culture areas, reinforces the political economy 
perspective as well as the sense of local defence of culture.  
The synergy between the revived ancient tribal codes and the 
Wahhabi-like interpretation of Islam by the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda movements has been so forceful that currently it forms 
an important core of the local collective mindset.  Now that a 
new and radical ideology has become implanted in the FATA 
(and also in Afghanistan) religious, political and social dissent is 
unacceptable. Traditionally historians and anthropologists have 
described the Pakhtun as resistant to change, but, as we have 
people need to understand the options. A small minority of 
seen in the radicalization process, some Pakhtun have changed 
committed radicals can make life impossible for the majority. 
both their world view and also their vision of how religion and 
tradition should be enforced.  
Describing the Pakistani Taliban 
In the quantitative half of this chapter we shall see to what 
From the question, somewhat ‘loaded’ with the word 
extent the people support the radical narrative described 
‘extremists,’ the survey then focused on two known groups of 
above. Previously we saw that approximately 20% of the people 
militants  the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  When asked ‘What do you 
of FATA described ‘Talibanisation, Extremism and Foreigners’ as 
think of Pakistani Taliban groups?’ Immediately, in the figure 36 
the main problems facing FATA (After the lack of law and order).
below we see similar figures to the responses on extremists.  
15% are 'favourable' toward the Taliban, and 14.3% 'do not Islamic extremism as a threat to Pakistan
know'. Yes, 64.3% view the Taliban as unfavourable, but it can 
The survey question that goes directly to the subject of this be seen that a minority could easily support this movement.  
chapter was, ‘How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic After all, social movements are not an electoral process that a 
Extremism pose to Pakistan these days?’ majority can cancel out by vote. Social movements have 
‘complaints’ that need to be addressed if they are to be 
As can be seen in the figure 35, 69.8% of the people believe that 
defused.  
Islamic extremism is a very great or fairly great threat to 
Pakistan.  That being said, 11.1% think Islamic extremism is 'not To explore the opinion of the Taliban the respondents were 
a threat at all' and 10.9% 'do not know'. The survey findings asked how they would describe or characterize the Taliban. 
suggest that people living in FATA have concerns for the stability 27.4% respondents think that Taliban are terrorists, and 24.2% 
of Pakistan. But caution is required because although it is a believe that Taliban are 'uneducated youth.' (As oppose to the 
small minority, the 11.1% who do not see Islamic extremism as a word 'Taliban' that means ‘student.’)  As shown in the figure 36, 
threat, and another  10.9% who do not know, plus 8.2% who did 18.2% respondents believe Taliban are foreign fighters. 
not respond, all add up to almost a third of the population who Similarly, just 1.4% respondents believe that Taliban are 
might harbour extremism.  It is clear that almost a third of the 
44.8
25.0
11.1 10.9
8.2
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
Very great Fairly great Not a threat at all Don’t know No response
2010
Fig 3 . 5 Islamic extremism as a threat to Pakistan
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freedom fighters, 5.4% think that Taliban are defenders of Islam contrasting opinion of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani 
and 4.5% as defenders of tribal customs. Overall, the survey Taliban, they put the presence of the Afghani Taliban in FATA 
results suggest that although the majority of respondents do into a new perspective. If there is a significant population that 
not have positive feelings for Taliban, there is a minority with a sees them as different and presenting positive rather than 
positive view and a worrisome 14.3% who do not know.   
Describing the Afghan Taliban
A similar question was asked about the Afghan Taliban. The 
results of that question are, in table 16:
Again 19.3% of the respondents do not know. A third of the 
respondents classify the Afghan Taliban as terrorists (36.6%). 
More so than in reference to the Pakistani Taliban. They are 
seen as ignorant but less so than the Pakistani Taliban (14.6% vs. 
24.2%). Finally, there is the positive perception of the Afghan 
Taliban as freedom fighters (20.2%). This is the image that was 
projected in the written material described above during the 
struggle against the Russians. These findings present a 69
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Don’t know
Fig 36. Describing the Pakistani Taliban
Table 1 . 6 Describing the Afghan Taliban
Response
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation
Ignorant of Islamic values/ teaching
A terrorist group
A political group
An anti-women group
Other (specify)
Don’t know
Total
Frequency Percent
808
585
1449
173
177
37
771
4000
20.2
14.6
36.6
4.3
4.4
.9
19.3
100.0
negative consequences, then there would be ample support for Taliban, the chances of them returning to power is limited. The 
providing shelter and, as guests, protection according to the substantial drop (from about half to only one third in 'Do not 
culture of the Pakhtun on both sides of the border. know’ swung toward the 'No' vote. This reflects the decline in 
support for the Taliban noted above and is a favourable trend 
Likelihood of an Afghan Taliban return to power for future peace. It is also another example of the increased 
engagement of the respondents in the subject of these in Afghanistan
opinions.
Whether or not the Taliban will return to power in Afghanistan 
is an important perception especially if the population will Describing Al Qaeda
move with those perceptions providing support or resisting 
The survey 2010 attempted to know whether respondents 
such a movement. The responses in the 2010 survey are mixed. 
know about Al Qaeda. The survey findings reveal that 39.5% 
As shown in the accompanying figure 37: 37.2% of the 
respondents know about Al Qaeda, however, surprisingly, 
respondents believe that Afghan Taliban will not return to 
overwhelming majority (60.5%) professed to not know about Al 
power in Afghanistan; 28.2% said 'yes' and  34.6%, did not know 
Qaeda  or did not respond. Al Qaeda is so often mentioned in 
the answer or they were undecided.  
the media and discussed at hujra gatherings it may be that the 
Looking at the data from the last three years, we see some expression of ignorance is in reaction to widespread fear among 
the local population about the intelligence agencies, Taliban 
informers, etc. 
consistency, and also some fluctuation, in the respondents' 
beliefs regarding the possibility of an Afghan Taliban return to 
power. The slight decline of the 'Yes' votes is probably not 
statistically significant, but the increase of the 'No' votes in 2009 
is probably attributable to the international perspective in the 
news this past year that in spite of the military surge of Afghan 70
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Fig 37. Likelihood of an Afghan Taliban return to power in Afghanistan
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Fig 38. Describing Al Qaeda
Those who said 'Yes' that they knew about Al Qaeda, were 
subsequently asked their views about Al Qaeda. A quarter 
(24.4%) had a favourable view of Al Qaeda and 73% 
unfavourable views about Al Qaeda. Again there is a substantial 
minority of support for the militants.  
asked what should become of them. Overwhelmingly 68% felt 
that the foreign fighters should leave either by being expelled 
by the Pakistani Army (42.7%) or by having their hosts ask them 
to leave (25.3%). The second ‘being asked by their hosts’ 
reflects the hospitality and also the protection patterns of the 
culture. That pattern is probably reflected in the 11.4% 
Foreign Jihadi fighters living in FATA respondents who believed that they should be allowed to stay 
but only if they cease violence and the 2.7% who believed that 
As described above, Foreign Jihadi fighters were brought in to 
they should be allowed to stay in FATA. Some 6.8% believe that 
FATA during the Soviet-Afghan War in early 1980s, and after the 
that there are no such people in FATA. 
war local tribes extended their hospitality and gave them 
asylum and shelter under the code of Pakhtunwali. Apparently, Role of religion in the lives and beliefs
these foreign fighters were not active after the Soviet 
Because religion has played such an important role in the daily withdrawal of Afghanistan. Exactly what their role was in the 
lives of the people of FATA, as well as in the political dynamics of Taliban and the Taliban struggle against the warlords remains to 
Pakistan, plus it has played an important role in the various be studied. However, some probably became active when US 
stages of Jihadi movements, the people were asked to indicate led forces ousted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the 
what role, if any, religion should play.  Various alternatives were 9/11 incidents in New York. It is known that with the US led 
offered, but they were to choose the most important role as far invasion of Afghanistan the international Jihadi call went out 
as they were concerned.again and more internationals came to Afghanistan.  
The majority (55.3%) believes that religion should provide a In order to understand the opinion of the people of FATA with 
moral code that everyone should follow, while a small regard to the foreign fighters or Jihadis the respondents were 
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Fig 39. Views about Al Qaeda
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Fig 40. Foreign Jihadi fighters living in FATA
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proportion of respondents, 10.8%, are of the view that religion in this time.
should define how governments are chosen. Some 8.8% 
What is clear is the fact that the people firmly believe that 
respondents think that religion should dictate women's rights 
religion should play a major role in their daily lives and in the 
while 3.8% believe that religion should play no role at all. A 
code of civil conduct. 
sizable number, 17.8% respondents don't know the answer or 
Another way to examine the trends is through specific and they were undecided. 
important symbolic aspects of the belief that religion is the 
The data from the last three years shows some interesting shifts 
moral code for living one's culture.  Two aspects were chosen: 
as shown in the figure 41. The provision of a moral code showed 
1) ‘Honour killings’ is related to one of the fundamental pillars 
ever increasing percentages as the primary role of religion in 
of Pakhtun culture and 2) ‘Suicide Bombings’ is a controversial 
society.
aspect that is related to extremist Islam.   
Analysing the last three years data, it is revealing that there has 
Honour killingbeen a decline in ‘others’ indicating greater focus, but, then 
again, the category ‘Do not know’ increased four fold. The belief 
From the last three surveys, shown in the figure 42 below, it is 
that religion should provide a moral code of conduct doubled 
revealed that respondents' reaction in favour of the practice is 
from less than a quarter to over half of the respondents in three 
increasing. In 2008 survey, only 18.9% favoured the custom. 
years. The dictation of women's rights steadily declined from 
This rose to 25.5% in 2009 survey, and in 2010 had risen to an 
14.5% to 4.6%. Apparently this specific issue has become less so 
0.0
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20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Provide a moral 
code that everyone 
should follow
Play no role Dictate women's 
rights
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civil laws
Define how 
governments are 
chosen
Don't know Other
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Fig 4 . 1 Role of religion in the lives and beliefs
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alarming 44.0% in 2010. Inversely, the reaction of respondents 
opposing the notion is declining. 
However, this difference may be partly because in the 2008 and realise and understand the issue of suicide bombing and 
2009 surveys, 'sometime' was an option which was not wanted to speak and share their opinion. Fortunately 'never 
repeated in the 2010 survey. If those who believe that honour justified' increased from one year to another to over 57.1% of 
killing is justified 'sometime' are added to the previous years'  the respondents.
'Yes' then the trend disappears. Nevertheless, it is still a 50/50 
proposition of support for the practice. Religious authority trusted the most
The 2010 survey attempted to find out which religious authority Justification of suicide bombing in Islam
respondents trusted the most. Nearly half of the respondents, 
This question was not asked in 2008.  Accordingly there are only 45.1%, did not know or were undecided, while Tahir ul Qadri 
two data points. Small changes from year to year are to be and Dr. Israr Ahmed, identified by 15.6% each, as trusted the 
expected, but substantial changes should be examined. From most by respondents. Professor Anees was identified by just 
the figure 43 we note that 'justified' suicide bombing went 4.4% respondents and Amir Liaqat Ali by 2.4%. Javed Ghamdi 
down considerably from 17.0% in 2009 to 10.2% in 2010 survey.  identified by 1.8% respondents, as the most trusted religious 
But, considering that only a small part of a population has to authority.  
support such activities for them to happen, this is an alarming 
Analysing the last years' surveys, Dr. Israr Ahmed continues to proportion. Going with that concern is the steady 14.4% saying 
be trusted the most by more, i.e. 11.3% in 2008 and 14.0% in 'rarely' because should extreme cases come about, then this 
2009 surveys. Tahir ul Qadri received gradual response, which segment might also support a suicide bombing effort.
increases from 6.4% in 2008 survey to 6.8% in 2009 survey and 
A significant number of respondents, 25.5%, were undecided or ultimately reached to 15.6% in 2010 survey. The level of trust of 
did not know the answer in 2009, but that category went down respondents gradually dropped significantly for Jamaat ud 
to just 6.2% in 2010, suggesting that respondents started to Dawa, which was recently banned by United Nations. The trust 
0.0
10.0
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30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Justified Rarely justified Never justified Other (specify) Don’t know
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Fig 43 Justification of suicide bombing in Islam
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Fig 42. Honour killing 
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level for Jamaat ud Dawa dropped from 10.5% in 2008 to 9.0% in respondents and the trust level goes up every year. In 2008 
2009 and ultimately reached to just 1.9% in 2010. This also survey he was trusted by 10.1% respondents which was rose to 
shows respondents realisation of the sensitivities of the day to 15.7% and finally reached to 16.0% in 2010 survey. 
day situation after 9/11. 
Religious authority outside of Pakistan trusted 
the most
With this question the focus shifted to trusted religious 
authority outside of Pakistan.
The majority, 54.7%, of the respondents trusted Imam Kaba 
Sudes ur Rehman, while 16.6% identified Dr. Zakir Naik of India, 
as the 2nd most trusted religious authority living outside 
Pakistan. Imam Khamenae received 10.6% responses, and 
14.8% do not trust any of the mentioned names. 
Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman continues to be trusted the most 
in the last three years surveys. In 2008 survey he received three 
quarters (75.4%) of respondents trust while in 2009 survey he 
was trusted by 59.3% of respondents. 
In spite of the absence of coverage of private TV channels in 
FATA, Dr. Zakir Naik is trusted by a considerable number of 
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Fig 44. Religious authority trusted the most
74
Understanding FATA  2010
A
T
T
IT
U
D
E
 T
O
W
A
R
D
S
 R
E
L
IG
IO
N
 A
N
D
 M
IL
IT
A
N
C
Y
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
Imam Kaba
Sudes ur
Rehman 
Hamza Yousaf Dr. Zakir Naik Imam Khamenae Other
(specify)
None
75.4
1.0
10.1
1.4
4.4
7.7
59.3
2.9
15.7
18.5
3.7
54.7
2.0
16.0
10.6
1.9
14.8
2008
2009
2010
Fig 45. Religious authority outside of Pakistan trusted the most.
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authority were identified both nationally and internationally. Conclusion 
The significance of these leaders will have to be analyzed by 
The narrative of this chapter began with the reminder that scholars who can explain the importance of the schools of 
militancy, politics and religion have an entwined history for the thought.
Pakhtun. As the statistics were presented, it was clear that the 
people of FATA are devote believers in Islam and over the last 
three surveys they have become more so to the extent that 
great proportions believe that Islam should be the moral code 
for living. Unfortunately, the percentage of respondents who 
believe in honour killings has also gone up to the extent that the 
population is evenly split on this custom.
All of these values and cultural attributes were shown to have an 
important impact on the perception of the people when it 
comes to militancy. For example, the perceived difference 
between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban is important for policy and 
counter insurgency. Also the proportion of the population 
having a favourable attitude or no opinion about the Taliban 
(from either side of the border) shows that the information and 
media impact has not been as complete as it needs to be if the 
tide is going to be turned against militancy in FATA.
It was also shown that two thirds of the people believe that 
Islamic extremism is a threat to Pakistan. This level of 
consciousness is important for linking the people in FATA to the 
population of Pakistan in general so that they will support the 
effort to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict and expel 
the miscreants. That being said, it was puzzling that the majority 
of the people did not know about Al Qaeda. 
In that context, it is understandable that most of the people 
believe that foreign, Jihadi fighters should leave FATA, but 
almost half of the interviewees believe that it is the 
government's role to make them leave. In other words, it is not 
the responsibility of the hosts to break their culture of hosting 
and to force the Jihadi fighters to leave. In reality a small 
minority believe that they should be allowed to stay if they 
cease violence. Again, in this diverse set of opinions there are 
alternatives for solutions.
In the final section of this chapter the sources of Religious 
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economy and were allowed to work, start businesses, and some Introduction
even 'bought' national identity cards and passports. As is the 
case with all protracted crises, assistance began to diminish in After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the native 
the early nineties and the pressure on Afghan refugees to return Afghans fled their country seeking asylum in neighbouring 
 
to a slowly stabilizing Afghanistan also grew. The presence of Pakistan. Without being a signatory to the UN Refugee 
Afghan refugees had put an enormous burden on Pakistan's Convention or having a specific national law to protect refugees, 
economy, health and education infrastructure. Nonetheless, Pakistan became a host based on the historic and cultural ties it 
Afghan refugees contributed significantly in the local economy. has shared with neighbouring Afghanistan. In late 1988, a total of 
approximately 3.3 million Afghan refugees were housed in 
As a result of that, and with conditions in Afghanistan stabilizing, 
Pakistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had over 2 million Afghans. 
the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the UNHCR 
Although no formal census of Afghans living in Pakistan was 
signed the Tripartite Agreement in 2002 on the safe and dignified 
done until 2005, the refugee population was estimated to be 
repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Since then, 3.5 
over 5 million at the peak of the crisis. In 2010, there are still 1.7 
million Afghans have returned home with UNHCR's repatriation 
73
million registered Afghans residing in Pakistan.  Out of this 
assistance package. 
number, the largest population of over one million is residing in 
74 Recently, the Pakistani Cabinet approved the Management and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.  The Islamic spirit of brotherhood, and 
Repatriation Strategy for Afghan refugees in Pakistan for the the Pakhtun traditions, played an important role in ensuring that 
years 2010-2012. The Government of Pakistan has pledged to Afghan refugees were housed in camps and received basic 
continue supporting the UNHCR and the Government of assistance including food, health, water, primary education and 
Afghanistan to find durable solutions for the Afghan refugees in a range of other services.
Pakistan. The government has also reaffirmed its commitment 
In the late 1980s, Afghan refugees were allowed to settle in 
to addressing the issue of undocumented population movement 
major cities of Pakistan where they were able to establish 
in Pakistan. 
themselves in the informal economic sector. Jalozai camp in 
Tensions among the Afghan population, the host government Nowshehra district was one of the largest refugee camps in 
and local communities have been common. The Afghans have Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Afghan could have returned to their 
been considered a burden on the economy, blamed for homeland after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
spreading terrorism and 'social evils', as well as fueling political Afghanistan in 1989, and some did, but then a long and brutal 
tension that has been high between the two countries due to the civil war began between the Taliban and the warlords. The 
'War on Terror'. consequent takeover by the Taliban established yet another 
wave of refugees. In 2002, as a result of 9/11 incidents in US, the 
It is also perceived that Afghan refugees have impacted the 
US and NATO armed forces engaged in Operation Enduring 
Pakistani economy and its society and have been found guilty of 
Freedom, that also forced yet other Afghans to flee to Pakistan. 
creating law and order situations. This issue will be explored with 
the survey data. Afghan refugees quickly became a part of the Pakistan's 
CHAPTER - 7
IMPACT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES 
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Weapons worth billions of US dollars were transferred to Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's 
Afghanistan through Pakistan and during shipment, a significant 
economy
quantity was diverted and sold to the arms dealers, which 
ultimately found their ways into the hands of Pakistani civilians. The 2010 survey repeated the same question asked during the 
We find a general perception within Pakistani society that previous surveys. The goal is to assess whether respondents 
Afghan crisis is responsible for the colossal amount of weapons 'agree' or 'disagree' with the notion that 'Afghan refugees living 
in the Pakistani society. These weapons are being used in in Pakistan damage Pakistan's economy'. 
sectarian, inter-tribal, intra-tribal, political and religious 
Overall, the results suggest that majority of respondents support violence. In addition to weapons proliferation, the Afghan crisis 
the notion, but looking back over the previous years' results also brought the menace of drugs, smuggling of illegal goods 
there seems to be a shifting away from strong agreement toward across the border, deteriorating law and order situation in 
a weaker agreement that there is a damage done to the Pakistan in general. Trafficking of women and children are other 
economy. When both 'agree' and 'strongly agree' are summed, issues for which the Pakistani society blames the Afghan. 
then the total is approximately at the same level (70%) as in the 
New trends of internal and external conflicts are presenting previous question about the repatriation of refugees. 
numerous challenges to the people of Pakistan, who have 
started to believe that the internal security dynamics in Pakistan Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's 
are directly linked to the Afghan crisis and presence of Afghan 
security
refugees in Pakistan. The sheltering of Afghan Taliban in 
Pakistan's tribal region is blamed for the 'talibanisation' in The 2010 survey attempted to assess whether respondents 
Pakistan's tribal region. 'agree' or 'disagree' with the notion 'Afghan refugees living in 
Pakistan undermine Pakistan's security.'
In the survey findings presented in the next section we examine 
how the FATA people percieved Afghan refugees 30 years Nearly three quarter of respondents, 73.9%, 'agree', including 
presence in Pakistan on the themes described above (economy, 40.6% who 'strongly agreed' with the notion. Only 7.1% 
instability, repatriation, talibanisation) in the qualitative section. respondents 'disagree' with the notion, including just 1.4% who 
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Fig 46. The impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's economy
'strongly disagrees'. notion that Afghan refugees have undermined security in 
Pakistan. Obviously, this, plus the question of economic damage 
Looking at the past three years surveys nothing significant has 
contributes to the majority supporting repatriation.
been noticed however, there has been some fluctuation in 
statistics, favouring the notion. But overall, findings support the Afghan refugees creating tension with 
Pakistani population
Another was to assess the refugee crisis was to ask if the 'Afghan 
refugees living in Pakistan create tension with the local Pakistani 
population'.
Again, over three quarters (82.9%) of the respondents agree 
with the notion. Only 5.0% respondents 'disagree' with the 
notion, including just 1.6% who 'strongly disagree'.
Repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan
In each of the three surveys the respondents were asked if they 
thought that the Afghan refugees should be repatriated. As 
shown in the figure 49, a substantial majority of the respondents 
believe Afghan refugees should return to their homeland. 
Those who opposed the notion remained very small in number, 
therefore, suggesting the Afghan refugees should be returned to 81
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Fig 47. The Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's security
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Fig 48. Afghan refugees creating tension with Pakistani population
economic corridors to stimulate economic activity on both sides 
of the border. That approach would make the return of the 
refugees more plausible if on the Afghan side similar strategies 
such as decentralization were also carried out as part of the 
strategy to end the insurgency. 
Afghanistan. Again, we note that the number of unsure or 'do 
not know' responses has declined.
Conclusion
All of the survey questions concerning Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan lead to the same conclusion by three quarters of the 
population surveyed, and that is, the refugees should be 
repatriated. Furthermore, issues such as the economy and 
insecurity are related to tension in FATA, and these issues are 
related by the interviewees to Afghan refugees. From the 
previous section on development and the conditions in FATA we 
know that refugees are one issue of many, but their presence 
exacerbates the situation. 
We also are aware that the expulsion or return of the refugees to 
Afghanistan will not solve the main problems on either side of 
the border. Moreover, the refugee problem cannot be solved 
unless the civil war in Afghanistan ends and the effort for 
development made. In the last chapter of this report, 'The Way 
Forward,' one of the recommendations is the development of 82
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Generally, more people of FATA have access to Pakistan radio, Introduction
press and TV than identified in previous years. According to 
which, the media trends are quite different and variation from Since 2008, the surveys have explored how the people of FATA 
year to year is also substantial.access and receive information. Once again, this year, the 
survey examined readership of newspapers, listenership of 
In the 2008 survey, 42.0% of the respondents had access to the 
radio, viewership of television, how they value the media and 
Pakistan press, but in 2009 it dropped considerably to 23.6% 
the way they use the media. The survey also assessed what 
and then went up again to 33.7% in 2010. Radio listenership was 
sources of information the people of FATA use and rely upon. 
just 29.6% in 2008 and dropped to 22.1% in 2009 before going 
up astonishingly to 55.0% in 2010. 
Sources of information
Because the people of FATA are faced with internal and 
During the last three years' surveys, through a multiple 
external conflicts, the increase in radio listenership could be 
response question, we documented the male and female FATA 
their curiosity to have knowledge of the ongoing militancy as 
respondents' sources of, or their access to, information. The 
well as national and international news on the topic. Another 
multiple responses in the figure 50 show the comparative 
factor could be that with the passage of time, more people of 
popularity of the various media. They are not mutually exclusive 
FATA have access to cell phones with radio facilities built in. 
responses because multiple responses were permitted.
That would make it possible for the people of FATA to have 
CHAPTER - 8
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access to radio. closer ties with both relatives and neighbours. The increase in 
communication links between the people of FATA may be the 
TV is another source of information for the people of FATA and, 
result of becoming IDPs or to keep track of relatives and friends 
there too, we see an increase in the responses of the people of 
who became IDPs. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the rapid 
FATA.
gain in the use of the media. This is a good sign for social 
Another surprising revelation is the increase in mention of solidarity in the communities.
friends and family members and neighbours. We see that in 
Most valued sources of information2008 just 11.0% respondents have 'Family and Neighbours' as 
source of information and that remained almost the same in 
Through a subsequent single choice question, the respondents 
2009. However, ‘Friends and Neighbours’ as sources went up to 
were asked which source of information they value the most. 
nearly half of the sample size (49.5% and 41.8%, respectively) in 
Reading from left to right in the figure 51, it is easily seen that 
2010. This is a strange development and it seems that there is 
the value is in the formal media for close to three-quarters of 
no justification for this increase. However, one reason could be 
the population, as opposed to the sources identified in the 
forced migration of hundreds of thousands of people from FATA 
previous question. The Pakistani Press, Radio and TV at 19.1%, 
to other adjacent districts/areas of KP where some of them 
27% and 26% respectively, led the other sources as the most 
were hosted by the local communities and relatives while 
valued. Literacy probably plays an important role in the type of 
others took shelter in the IDP camps where they developed 
media valued. 
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Fig 51. Most valued sources of information
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Among foreign sources more people of FATA have identified Urdu language daily newspaper, is identified by 24.6% 
British radio (as opposed to press or TV) as the most valued respondents giving it the highest readership for all three years.  
source of information. However, the identification for British 'Mashriq' is followed by daily 'Aaj', another Urdu newspaper 
radio is comparatively low against the BBC listenership. Low with 20.6% of the respondents in 2008.  However, the figure 
response for British TV is mainly because of absence of any went down to just 11.4%, almost half, in 2009. While in 2010, 
cable network service in FATA. Only a very few people have daily 'Aaj' is identified by 20.3% respondents, receiving the 
installed dish satellite antennas in their Hujras and homes. second highest readership in FATA for all three years. The 
British press readership is also extremely low, which is English-language newspapers are probably limited by low 
understandable. English language literacy rates.  
The data also reveals that American press, TV and radio have The daily Ausaf (Urdu) is the 3rd most highly read Urdu 
very small audiences in FATA. newspaper identified by the respondents in FATA for all three 
years' surveys.
'Neighbours and family' are valued sources, and the increase in 
that value over previous years reflects the increase seen in them In the 2008 survey, 12.1% identified Ausaf as the most read 
as sources, for example, 2010 (14.7%), as compared to 2008 newspaper, while it went down in 2009 when only 8.0% FATA 
(0.0%) and 2009 (1.1%). 'Neighbours' receive again a very good respondents identified it, and in 2010 it dropped to just 6.7%. 
response from the FATA respondents. In 2009, some 5.7% 
The main drawback to the findings was that in 2010, 45.3% of 
respondents identified 'Neighbours' as the most valued source 
the FATA respondents did not identify a paper. This reflects the 
of information, which has gone up to 9.7% in 2010. 
fact that over half of the respondents are illiterate, and some 
who could just hardly read a few words identified different Newspaper readership 
newspapers. Respondents identified other options. However, 
The survey intended to identify which newspaper is widely read the frequency or percentage of responses are not of statistical 
by the respondents from FATA. The figure 52 makes the analysis importance. 
straight forward. From the last three years statistics, 'Mashriq' 
12.1
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Fig 52. Newspaper readership
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moved to 55.3% of the viewers after falling to 25.9%  the TV viewers
previous year. 
There are no cable network facilities available to the people in 
ATV is another government run channel that is watched by FATA. However, all channels of Pakistan TV are available to FATA 
11.3% of the respondents in 2010. viewers through direct transmission. The survey asked about 
preference of TV channels. For all three surveys Khyber AVT, a Respondents identified scores of other private and Western TV 
private Pakhtu channel with coverage inside FATA, was channels from satellite dishes and other sources. However, 
identified as the 2nd most watched channel (13.7%) after the those responses are not numerous enough for further analysis 
public PTV channel.  PTV has been in first place and this year it here.  
Aaj ARY AVT Khyber ATV Pakistan 
Television 
(PTV)
Hum Dunya Samma Express 
News
Din Dawn News Waqt Bolan CNBC Star Century TV Al Jazeera BBC CNN Sky News Other 
(specify)
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Fig 53. TV Viewers
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Fig 54. Radio listenership
Radio listenership
According to various statistics mentioned above in this chapter, 
radio is more popular than the TV and press as a source of 
information. 
Judging by the programming source, BBC is the most popular 
radio source. Between its Urdu and Pakhtu language versions, 
46.8% of the respondents refer to it compared with 41.9% for 
Radio Pakistan. The third most popular program content came 
from the Pakhtu language Dewa, the Voice of America (23.4%) 
in 2010. 
Over time Pakistani radio was consistently in second place, BBC 
in first place and Dewa as third place sources of programming.
The other radio stations mentioned are, for the most part, local 
stations serving specific market areas or Agencies. One would 
not expect them to register high over all in a sample beyond 
their reach or reason.
Conclusion
One of the findings, the radio audience, reinforces one of the 
themes of this report and that is that the Pakhtun are not 
isolated and are interested in world events to the extent that 
they listen to international broadcast stations as much or more 
than the Pakistan national broadcast.
Another set of findings, increased reliance on family, friends 
and neighbours, is an indication of increased community 
solidarity or bonding. We have identified the problem of the 
Talibanisation as destructive of tribal customs and traditions, 
but here we see the resilience of ties within the community.
It is difficult to reconcile the attachment to British and US 
broadcasts with the negative image of both the UK and the US 
documented in the previous chapter. Clearly these stations 
should do a better job so that actions (both military and 
reconstruction) on the ground in both Pakistan and Afghanistan 
can be comprehended and appreciated. 89
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Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) Pact. Introduction
Pakistan has sought security through outside alliances. During 
Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947 and became an 
the Cold War era, and especially during the time of the Soviet 
independent and sovereign state. From that time on Pakistan, 
occupation in Afghanistan, Pakistan remained a close friend of 
as an active member of the United Nations, has searched for its 
United States and China. It maintains these ties to this day. 
place in the world order and aspired to leadership roles beyond 
During the Cold War era, Pakistan was also a member of 
the Sub-continent.
important regional military alliances: CENTO (Central Treaty 
In May 1998 Pakistan became the only Muslim state to have Organization) and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation). 
gained the status of a nuclear state. When it became the 6th 
The 9/11 incident in US redefined Pakistan's role in the region. 
declared nuclear power, Pakistan began to play an important 
After extreme pressure from the US, Pakistan became the front 
role in this small community. With 175 million souls, it is the 
line state in the 'War on Terror'. Being an important and 
second largest Muslim country after Indonesia. Accordingly, 
frontline state in the 'War on Terror', Pakistan formed a 'Friends 
Pakistan is an important and active member of the Organisation 
of Democratic Pakistan' group which includes important 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
countries such as Australia, Britain, and Canada. 
The Kashmir dispute and fear of Indian aggression has been the 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a sense of the 
cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy because it is felt that 
perception of FATA respondents on Asian, Middle Eastern and 
India has not reconciled herself to the emergence of Pakistan. 
Western relations and also with the Muslim world in particular. 
From the time of its independence, Pakistan faced India as its 
adversary and this view predominates till this day. Both Emigration from Pakistan
countries fought four wars of different intensities, in 1948, 
1965, 1971 and then 1999. The war in 1971 caused the creation As described before, and illustrated in the accompanying figure 
of still another new sovereign state, Bangladesh. The main bone 55, the proportion of people in FATA who have wanted to 
of contention between Pakistan and India is Kashmir, where 
Muslims are in the majority and Pakistan has had claims since 
the time of its partition from India. Pakistan's feud with India 
has guided its foreign policy, distorted local politics, and has 
moulded popular perception against India as was seen in the 
data presented in the previous chapters. 
Pakistan has long-standing relations with its other neighbours - 
Afghanistan, Iran and China. It has extensive security and 
environmental interests in the Persian Gulf and a wide-ranging 
bi-lateral relationship with the United States, United Kingdom 
and other Western countries. In 1986 Pakistan signed the 
CHAPTER - 9
WORLD AFFAIRS:
THE OPINION ON PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
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Fig 55. Emigration from Pakistan
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emigrate has declined during the last three years. Nevertheless, motive for travel abroad was almost as strong as job seeking 
36.6% would still emigrate if given the chance. (28.8%). 1% indicated that they wanted to visit relatives. As 
pointed out in the general description of the people of FATA, 
For those who responded that they would emigrate, their 
they have an awareness and links to other countries for various 
choice of destination was asked. Of the 36.6% respondents, 
reasons.
who wanted to emigrate from Pakistan, one third of the 
respondents, 34.9%, identified Saudi Arabia; 17.8% Which country should Pakistan aspire to be 
respondents choose the United Arab Emirates; 11.7% 
more like? respondents chose the United Kingdom; and Iran was identified 
by 7.5% . 
The survey attempted to document the affinity of the people for 
other countries images. They were asked to identify a country A subsequent question asked 'why,' if given the opportunity, did 
that Pakistan should aspire to be more like. A quarter of the they want to emigrate to other countries. The results are shown 
sample (25.8%) identified with Saudi Arabia; China (16.9%), in the above figure 56. Note that there was some 
Iran, UK and Japan identified by 9.7%, 5.1% and 4.6% misunderstanding of the term ‘emigrate’ because many of the 
respectively.reasons did not indicate a permanent status, for example, Haj, 
visit, education, visit holy places, etc. Only 35.7% (Job and 
When asked the reason why they would chose to go to these 
Business) indicated permanency. That is 35.7% of the 36.6% 
countries, 29.8% respondents feel that these are Islamic 
(one-sixth of all respondents) were job seekers. The religious 
countries, 29.5% feel that these are developed countries, while 
33.4
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Fig 56. Reason for imigration
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8.9% believe that these are peaceful countries. countries such as the UK and USA for the military build-up. 
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents, 61.9%, said 'yes' while 
Military aid from UK and US nearly quarter of respondents, 24.0%, said 'no'. A sizable 
portion of respondents, 14.1%, do not know the answer. Note 
As pointed out in the chapter on security, there is public debate 
that the percent in favour doubled over the past year while the 
on whether or not Pakistan should accept money from Western 
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Fig 57. Choice of destination
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Fig 58. Which country should Pakistan aspire to be more like?
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answer. 
As in the case of military assistance the acceptance of funding 
increased from 2009 to 2010 while those in opposition declined 
by approximately 50%. 
We will return to these positive impressions of US and UK 
military and development assistance in sharp contrast to the 
opinions in general toward both the UK and the US, but, before 
that, the opinions toward neighbouring, other Islamic, and 
Western nations will be reviewed.  
One of the themes throughout this report has been that 
opposition was halved.
because the people of FATA have been in the cross currents of 
history for so long, and because the people of FATA travel and Development aid from UK and US
have relatives aboard, they have formed opinions about other 
The survey also asked a similar question but focused on nations, not only as destinations for emigrants, but also as to 
development funding.  The response was more favourable with the quality of the relationship of those nations with Pakistan.  
close to three-quarters believing that Pakistan should accept Rather than review the opinions nation by nation, we have 
money from Western countries for development while just grouped the nations into: Neighbours, Other Islamic Nations, 
17.8% said 'no'. Only 11.2% are undecided or don't know the and then Western Nations. For the most part these nations have 
sizable Pakistani populations, but we do not know if or what 
portions of the respondents have actual contact with those 
countries and populations.  
Because of their historical relation with the people of FATA, a 
series of specific questions was designed with regard to both 
the UK and the US. The colonial relation (Durand Line, FCR, the 
inherited colonial administrative structure) with the UK; the 
role of the US in support of the Mujahideen; and then the role of 
both the US and the UK in the present conflict, may influence 
the understandings.  It is probable that the general impressions 
of the people cannot be explained by them either, but in the 
previous sections we have pointed out their support or 
opposition to all of these factors from the FATA Secretariat, the 
FCR, the military offences, the use of drones and the acceptance 
of military aid and training assistance.    
Opinion of the people of FATA about other 
nations 
31.3
47.8
61.9
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Yes No
4.4
24.0
14.1
16.5
Don't know No response
2009
2010
Fig 59. Whether or not Pakistan should
accept military aid from UK and US
47.0
33.8
4.8
14.4
71.0
11.2
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Yes No Don't know No response
2009
2010
80.0
17.8
Fig 60. Whether or not Pakistan should
accept development aid from UK and US
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Opinion about neighbouring countries
The 2010 survey asked the respondents to classify nations on a 
four-point scale from 'very favourable'  to 'very unfavourable'. 
The results for the neighbouring countries are presented in the 
following table 17:
Interestingly, both China and Iran hold similar levels of 
favourable (79.4% and 76.7% respectively) esteem. One is an 
Islamic country and the other is not. From the emigration 
question we know that small proportions of the respondents 
said that they would go to those two countries. Neither 
countries are contiguous with FATA and neither has been 
directly involved with development or the past military 
conflicts.  
Country
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Afghanistan  18.7  26.2  20.4  29.4 1.5 3.8 100
China  49.9  29.5  6.5  3.2 3.9 7.1 100
India  1.6  4.5  13.1  74.4 1.8 4.7 100
Iran  44.4  32.3  8.5  6.3 2.8 5.7 100
Table 1 . 7 Opinion about neighbouring countries
33.8 33.5
14.2
4.0
10.0
4.6
36.1
31.7
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4.6
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Very favourable Somewhat favourable Somewhat 
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Very unfavourable No response Don’t know
2008
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2010
Fig 61. Opinion about neighbouring countries
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The opinions toward Afghanistan and India show completely 
different perspectives when compared with China and Iran.  
Again, one is an Islamic nation and the other is not and the 
histories are completely different.  The low level of esteem for 
India is quite understandable from the history and civil war and 
the constant use of India as a threat in the internal political 
dialogue of Pakistan.  Afghanistan probably receives a 44.9% vs. 
49.8% split between favourable and unfavourable votes 
because of the perceived underdevelopment and history of 
conflict, but it does not show the overly negative stance shown 
toward India or the overly positive stance shown toward China 
and Iran.   
most Islamic nations for the construction of Mosques.  
In the cases of Afghanistan and India, there is data for the last 
three years showing that the figures cited have been fairly Malaysia was chosen to compare Saudi Arabia with another 
stable and not a changing trend. Muslim nation. Although Malaysia is one of the largest Muslim 
nations with high rates of literacy and good governance it has 
In the case of Iran there is a slight trend away from the 
not been a destination for Pakistanis seeking work.  
unfavourable end of the scale toward the favourable end, but, 
as shown in the above table 17, it is slight and may just be an As shown in the above table 18, there is a marked difference 
artefact of the sampling. between the two on a scale of favourability.  The rather high rate 
of non-response and 'do not know' in Malaysia's case reflect the 
The Chinese case shows the same stability over time noted with 
lack of contact or ways to form an opinion. Nevertheless, the 
regard to Afghanistan and India.
50% favourability rating is good compared with the nations 
above who received low 'favourability' and high 'unfavourable' Opinion about major Islamic countries, Saudi 
ratings.
Arabia and Malaysia
The data from the previous surveys regarding Saudi Arabia and 
The previous presentations have shown that Saudi Arabia has 
Malaysia are stable and do not reflect trends.
had a special relationship with Pakistan and especially with the 
people of FATA.  Saudi Arabia is the sight of the two Holy Cities of Opinion about Western countries - Canada, 
Islam that are the destination of pilgrims. Making the haj to 
France, Germany, UK and US
Mecca and visiting Medina is a life-long goal for Muslims and 
making that pilgrimage brings a respected title (Haji) to one's The 2010 survey was designed to measure the respondents' 
name.  Saudi Arabia is also one of the favoured destinations for opinions about some Western countries where a considerable 
emigration and work. During the Saudi support for the struggle number of the Pakhtun Diaspora have emigrated. All of the five 
against the Russians, training for religious leaders of Pakistan countries selected are the home to large populations of 
and Afghanistan was provided by Saudi benefactors and the Muslims from other countries, but their being a Western 
system of Madrassas in existence today in Pakistan was started destination for Pakistanis was important to their selection. In 
and supported by Saudi Arabia. There is also Saudi support in the case of the UK and the US, their historical relations are of 
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77.8 10.7 2.5 5.8 1.4 1.8
18.6 40.2 9.6 8.4 11.8 11.4
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   100
 100
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
Table 18 Opinion about major Islamic countries,
 Saudi Arabia and Malaysia
(9.4% to 16.7% - 2008) and away from the unfavourable end 
(78.1% to 69.5% - 2010). Perhaps the substantial development 
efforts in FATA, with the FATA Secretariat, and also the support particular interest, but those details will be explored later in this 
of the Frontier Corps with military training are factors behind chapter.
this improvement.  These programs are only a year or two old in 
The first observation is that approximately 25% of the the field, but perhaps they will change the opinion in the short 
respondents do not respond or have an opinion about Canada, term as well as long term.   
France or Germany indicating a substantial ‘disconnect’ 
compared with the UK and US.  Opinion on UK favourability over time
The low favourability classification, however, falls to the US, and The data from the 2008, 2009, and 2010 surveys, in the table 21 
that is reflected by 51.5% giving the US a 'very unfavourable' below, show a notable shift way from the 'very unfavourable' 
rating. The UK comes close to the US with its sum of end of the scale toward the ' favourable end.'  In 2008 the UK 
unfavourable ratings total (56.6% vs. 69.5% for the US). It is was on a par with the US-extreme of 2010 in ‘unfavourability.’  
important to point out that the UK has a level of 'favourable' 
responses similar to Canada, France and Germany.  Only France 
has a slightly less favourable rating than the Canada, Germany, 
and the UK. This may be because of its recent law against 
Muslim women wearing veils.
Opinion on US favourability over time 
The availability of data from the last three surveys may be useful 
to see if there is a trend toward or away from favourability for 
the US. Clearly, the opinion toward the US has been shifting 
toward the favourable end of the scale over the last three years 
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Canada 7.4
 
23.6
 
28.3 13.8 12.8 14.1
France 4.3
 
18.4
 
29.9 19.5 13.7 14.2
Germany  8.7  22.6 25.4 16.9 13.1 13.3
UK 8.2  20.6  18.2 38.4 6.7 7.9
US 4.3
 
12.2
 
18.0 5.3 0   51.5
100
100
100
100
100
Table 1 . 9 Opinion about Western countries -
 Canada, France, Germany, UK and US
Responses
  
US
 Percent 
2008
 
Percent 
2009
 
Percent 
2010
Very favourable
 
3.0
 
3.9
 
4.3
Somewhat favourable
 
6.4
 
8.6
 
12.4
Somewhat unfavourable
 
11.9
 
7.8
 
18.0
Very unfavourable
 
66.2
 
55.1
 
51.5
No response
 
8.2
 
12.5
 
5.3
Don’t know 4.5
 
12.0
 
8.5
Total
 
100.0
 
100.0
 
100.0
Table . 20 Opinion on US favourability over time 
Responses  UK  
Percent 
2008  
Percent 
2009  
Percent 
2010
Very favourable 5.4  6.1  8.2
Somewhat favourable 11.4  11.3  20.6
Somewhat unfavourable 12.7  9.5  18.2
Very unfavourable 58.0  42.7  38.4
No response 7.8  16.2  6.7
Don’t know 4.9  14.3  7.9
Total  100  100  100
Table 2 . 1 Opinion on UK favourability over time
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Here we see steady trends in supporting the notion that UK Exactly what happened in the last two years to change the 
helps to make the world peaceful and stable. In 2008, only 7.4% reputation of the UK needs to be assessed.  One possibility is the 
respondents believe so which rose up three fold (21.6) in 2009 change in Prime Ministers in England from Tony Blair to Gordon 
and remained stable in 2010 (20.4%). Brown.  That change was avidly covered in the Pakistani media 
and followed by the people of FATA as well because of the tight 
On the other hand, in 2008 nearly two thirds (61.1%) of 
link with the 'War on Terror.' The change was viewed as very 
respondents believed that the UK has no role in making the 
favourable in Pakistan because it was interpreted as a possible 
world peaceful. In 2009 the figure dropped down to 46.6% and 
change in the UK position on Iraq and Afghanistan.  Indeed, the 
then remained stable in 2010 (47.4%).
UK did make changes on both of those positions which were 
seen as moving away from its previous lock step with the US.  The UK values the United Nations (UN)
The following series of questions help to put the ‘favourable-
The respondents were asked if they thought that the UK values 
unfavourable’ opinions into a broader appreciate of the UK and 
the United Nations. The results over the last thee years show 
its place in the vision of the people of FATA.
that a third of the respondents do not offer an opinion. This 
probably indicates that the concept is not within their area of 
UK's role in making the world peaceful and 
concern nor on the news. Nevertheless, for those who did offer 
stable an opinion, the trend is toward a positive image.
The 2010 survey endeavoured to know the perception of the 
The UK helps to make the world more 
United Kingdom's role in making the world peaceful and stable. 
prosperousOnly 20.4% of the respondents believe this to be true.  Nearly 
half of the respondents, 47.4%, disagree. A quarter of the 
Another area of opinion was about the role of the UK in helping 
respondents did not know the answer, and 7.1% did not 
to make the world more prosperous. Note that more than 
respond. 
quarter of respondents remained either undecided or did not 
know the answer throughout the three years. This is probably 
because of their lack of knowledge on certain issues.  
Nevertheless, as shown in the table 22 below, the opinion has 
been shifting toward a more favourable opinion.
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Responses  UK & UN  Percent 2008  Percent 2009 Percent 2010
Yes  21.1  21.9 30.5
No  42.8  31.2 28.4
Don't know  27.9  37.7 32.6
No response  8.3  9.3 8.5
Total  100.0  100.0 100.0
Table 2 . 2 The UK helps to make the world more prosperous
7.4
61.05
25.05
6.5
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7.1
Yes No Don't know No response
2008
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2010
Fig 62. Uk’s role in making the world peaceful and stable
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The UK helps to safeguard the global 
environment
The three, consecutive surveys endeavoured to measure a 
trend with regard to whether UK helps to safeguard the global 
environment. 
Again, as shown in the figure , one third of respondents 
(33.3%) either do not know the answer or is undecided.  
Although there is a steady increase in support of the notion, 
there are more people undecided and against who need to be 
swung over by actions or news that reaches them in order to 
that the opinion is that the UK is not perceived as playing a 
positive role because twice as many people say 'No' than say 
'Yes.' 
The UK promotes respect for human rights
Another pillar of foreign policy and tradition has been support 
for human rights, but, as shown in the figure 65 below, the 
people of FATA do not perceive that to be the case by 2 to 1. 
above
make a substantial swing in opinion on this issue.
Promotes respect for democratic values
The promotion of democratic values has been one of the 
traditional UK foreign policy stances. From the consecutive 
surveys the following figure 64 shows the level of opinion on 
this subject. 
Once again, the subject matter seems to be beyond over a third 
of the people interviewed.  Trends are not shown, but it is clear 
11.1
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30.2
9.3
19.8
33.9
36.6
9.8
22.9
35.0
33.3
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Fig 63. The UK helps to safeguard the global environment
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Fig 64. Promotes respect for democratic values
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Fig 65. The UK promotes respect for human rights
Again, over a third of the respondents do not respond or offer 
and opinion. After analysing the three years' findings, we see no 
significant change in the behaviour of the respondents 
favouring or opposing the notion. The data is self-explanatory. 
The UK's relationship with Pakistan
In this question the subject was the type of relationship that the 
 66
above
finding because there is a decline in those stating that they are 
becoming 'less favourable' with time, but, that has to be put 
into the perspective that less than 10% of the respondents are 
saying 'more favourable.' It is difficult to interpret the ‘no 
change’ responses because one does not know if they held a 
positive or a negative opinion originally. 
UK has with Pakistan. Once again, as shown in the figure  
, a third of the respondents did not have an opinion. 
The trends consistently show a declining relationship toward an 
unequal relationship, less partnership for progress, diminished 
allies against terror, and, increasingly ‘a left over from 
colonialism.’ These are not positive assessments for positive 
foreign relations.
Opinion about the UK
The opinion was approached in another way, that is, whether 
they are changing or becoming more or less favourable toward 
the UK. Slightly less than a third of the respondents did not offer 
an opinion. The results are more pleasant than the previous 
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Fig 66. The UK's relationship with Pakistan
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Fig 67. Opinion about the UK
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has been in the press for a decade; it is reflected here in the UK and US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq
opinion of FATA.
The simultaneous involvement by western nations under US 
and UK leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq tie these two 
interventions together, but one is in a neighbouring country and 
the other in a country with which the people of FATA have had 
little contact. Nevertheless, the news about both military 
efforts has received world-wide attention. Data from all three 
years is used to try to point out shifting opinions or trends.
The UK's involvement in Afghanistan
In case of UK’s involvement in Afghanistan less than a quarter of 
the people do not offer an opinion. There is a decline in the 
theme that the intervention is an attack on Islam; that dropped 
from over a third of the population to less than a fifth. This could 
be the result of a nationwide media campaign about the 
legitimate presence of international forces, including UK. That 
has been an important theme, and it declined to half the 2008 
level by 2010. Over the years a steady third of the respondents 
stated that the UK should not be in Afghanistan at all.  The one, 
small, upward trend is in the belief that the UK is a partner in 
rebuilding, but it is held by only 11% of the respondents. The 
other small, but positive segment, is the UK being committed 
for the long term. 
 The UK and US role in Afghanistan
The question now comes closer to the people of FATA with a 
bordering country in which many of the people involved are also 
Pakhtun. Again we have data from three surveys and the figures 
are mounted to facilitate comparisons the US figure 68 and UK 
figure 69. 
Immediately the high 'not favourable' classifications for both UK and US role in Iraq
countries is clear, but they are improving, slightly, from over 
As shown in the two figures below with the US figure 70 and UK 80% to 75% and 70% levels in three years. The favourable 
figure 71; the UK has a slightly lower 'not favourable' rating than categories are increasing reflecting the decline in unfavourable 
the US, but neither country is held in high esteem for their opinions. Although the US has a greater unfavourable score, the 
intervention in Iraq.UK is not that much better. The UK-US alliance in foreign affairs 103
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Fig 69. UK role in Afghanistan
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Fig 68. US role in Afghanistan
Data from the three surveys about the perceived attitudes 
toward the UK and the US are presented below in figures with 
the UK figure 72 and the US figure 73.
UK and US attitudes towards the Islamic World
We will close this chapter with another general perception.  The 
question posed was 'what do you think the attitude of the US or 
the UK is toward the Muslim World?' Generally in Pakistan there 
is a wide spread perception that the West, including UK, is 
against Muslim World and that policies are made to hurt the 
feelings of Muslims around the world. The UK is an important 
player in the War on Terror after the 9/11 incident in US, and is 
perceived by the Muslim World as a close ally of US. 
The two figures show statistics similar attitudes toward the UK 
and the US. Again, the UK is not as ‘unfavoured’ as the US, but 
both countries are poorly perceived by the people of FATA. 
The people of FATA generally, and elite particularly, respect and 
relate themselves historically with the British, recalling their 
2.2
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Fig 72. UK attitudes towards the Islamic World
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Fig 73. US attitudes towards the Islamic World
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Fig 70. US role in Iraq
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Fig 71. UK role in Iraq
interaction with the British officials. The people of FATA believe 
that British knew them well and interacted with them 
accordingly. They argue that British would honour their words, 
comparing them with the Government of Pakistan. 
However, when it comes to the question of UK's attitude 
towards the Muslim World, then the respondents of FATA 
interestingly remained 'unfavourable', supporting the 
widespread perception of the people of Pakistan generally.  
However, in this context, UK remained behind the US, where 
more respondents believe that US has more unfavourable 
attitudes towards Islamic World.  The difference between the 
US and the UK is, however, very small. 
All three years surveys statistics suggest that the respondents 
have very unfavourable views of US in any context and the funds 
immigration policy may have been formed based on rumours 
that the US has allocated for FATA for the last few years, has not 
and the experiences of others. The final question concerns 
influenced the people's opinion in FATA.  
judging the favourability of immigration policies in both the UK 
and the US.
UK and US immigration policies
Immediately we see that at least 40% of the respondents do not 
The interest expressed in the survey about going overseas, if 
have an answer. That reflects the small percentage of the 
given the opportunity, included going to the UK and the US.  
people expressing interest in the first place.  It may indicate that 
Only a small percentage of the respondents indicated that the 
for many it was simply not a question relevant to their 
US was a destination; more stated the UK as a destination.  
experience or interests.  That being said, the main response for 
Nevertheless those small numbers may indicate an ability to 
both countries was that they were unfavourably disposed to 
compare immigration policies.  Of course the impression about 
receiving immigrants for over half of the respondents and the 
trend is more negative. In keeping with all of the other 
comparisons between the US and the UK, the UK appears to be 
doing better as far as positive attitudes, but for a few 
percentage points the UK and the US there is not a substantive 
difference.
Conclusion
In this chapter the range of the inquiry into the people's 
opinions about other nations near and far looked at dimensions 
as diverse as military and development assistance, attitudes 
toward the UN, emigration polices, the ideals of other nations 
and overall impression of these nations. The special relation 
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with India is flagged as a problematic one with a history of 
conflict and also of being used politically for internal purposes.  
The long relation with the UK also generates mixed and 
negative feelings. The more modern relationship with the US, 
when compared with the UK, is also a troubled one where trust 
is not held either.
Although it may be a simplistic conclusion, the most obvious is 
that these troubled relationships have been the product of 
poor communication between those nations and the people of 
FATA and also the product of Pakistani politics where distracting 
people from internal inadequacies by promoting fear of 
outsiders or projecting faults upon them is part of the political 
game. 
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politicians are behaving in a manner that supports the status Introduction
quo. 
In the text of the report we indicated the scale of the effort to 
However, if properly managed, then such initiatives could bring 
respond to the needs of the FATA and it bears repeating here:
prosperity and reduce the space for the militants to justify their 
acts. To change the approach and to frame the Because of the neglect by the governments in Pakistan 
recommendations that follow, CAMP would like to propose and previous Colonial rule, the FATA is one as the most 
three basic concepts for helping mainstream FATA: Cultural under-developed areas of Pakistan. However, the recent 
Appropriateness; Develop Local Capabilities and Community incidents have compelled the Government and the 
Participation and Tribal Involvement, but first the international community to take drastic measures in an 
recommendation is that the findings should be returned to the effort to develop the region. For the fiscal year 2003-04 
people.the Government, through FATA Secretariat, had allocated 
Rs. 3256 million for the development sector in FATA. In 
Devolving the findings2008-09 the budget went up to Rs. 8662 million, an 
increase of 266%. The international community has 
The 'Understanding FATA' series, through the generosity of both 
increased funding substantially: US Government has 
the BHC and the willingness of the people of FATA to participate, 
committed $750 million over five years (from 2008-13); 
has provided valuable information to interested policy makers 
European Governments such as the EU, Germany and UK; 
and scholars. The next step in this process should be to devolve 
Canadian and Japanese Governments have also invested 
the information to the people of FATA so that they can see how 
in FATA development. They are providing financial and 
their fellow citizens feel about these key issues. There is 
technical support to the Government of Pakistan and to 
diversity in FATA, therefore the data from this fourth report 
the civil society community for poverty alleviation, 
should be complied by Agency and FR in charts showing how 
infrastructure development, industrial development and 
each one compares with all of the others. Those charts and 
growth, creating employment (especially targeting the 
statistics should be presented and discussed at a workshop, 
youth) and economic opportunity zones, etc. 
better a series of workshops, in each Agency and FR in the 
format of a Jirga or Shura, that is, elder males and, separately, We also saw in the survey there is scant local trust in the very 
females so that they can judge their present state of opinion government officials and politicians who should channel the 
and reflect on future decisions. Although individuals have their funding to support the development and reform efforts. The 
own opinions, it is important for them to understand where experience of the people has been that, historically, funds have 
their opinion stands with regard to others. Ideally there would been manipulated and misallocated. Recently, one of the 
be people from both the surveyed and the inaccessible areas.strategic errors has been the lack of involvement of the 
community as a stakeholder in developing the FATA Sustainable 
This would be the first step toward the inclusion of the people of 
Development Plan.
FATA in the other recommendations. Now the three basic 
concepts will be presented.Despite all the unrest in the area, government officials and 
CHAPTER - 10
WAY FORWARD
109
W
A
Y
 F
O
R
W
A
R
D
large can hold the leadership responsible for the collective Cultural appropriateness
priorities established in the proposed participatory planning 
This survey has placed a great deal of emphasis on process. 
understanding the culture of the Pakhtun. The emphasis has 
been on customs, beliefs and traditions. The key to solving the Tackling the big issues
problems and engaging the people in a grand project of 
The recommendations that follow are focused on the priorities 
inclusive nationhood is through respect and recognition of their 
with the opinions from the survey. They are big issues that 
traditions. Moreover it should be assumed that these traditions 
require dedication to changing the way history has been. FATA 
are a solid foundation for meeting the call for 'law and order' 
cannot stay the same as should be gradually mainstreamed. 
and 'security' identified in this survey as their priority.
Governance includes the rule of law and also the way security is 
managed as will be described.Developing local capacities
Governance: The Government of Pakistan should recognise the 
In keeping with the recommendation of building upon the 
urgent need to introduce far reaching governance reforms in 
culture and traditions it would be crucial to have programmes 
the conflict stricken areas of FATA. The Pakistan People's Party 
that develop local capacities, of public and private sectors to 
Government has shown one political commitment to do this by 
assume the responsibilities that are inherent in local 
proposing amendments to the FCR in FATA, although these have 
governance and justice that should be devolved from present, 
not yet been implemented. These amendments, once 
inherited Colonial structures. Engaging the people of FATA is the 
implemented, will help address several local grievances and will 
key to success (success defined as peace and development). 
also help in creating a supporting environment for the 
Experience indicates that even in the most challenging 
stakeholders to undertake development and conflict resolution 
situations qualified local capacity has been able to negotiate 
initiatives. However, there is a need to fundamentally change 
with the insurgents to continue implementing programmes 
the governance structure of FATA and its constitutional status. 
under certain acceptable conditions. 
As the survey found, 'It is the need of the day.' The International 
Community will lend its public support to FATA reform Community participation and tribal 
measures, including extension of Political Parties Act and FCR 
involvement 
amendments, but the need for change is absolute and cannot 
be ignored since the people also desire change. The devolution of the findings would be the first step of the 
recommendations with the goal of starting a process of Accordingly and in keeping with the concepts expressed above  
community participation. As with all development participation, cultural and tribal structure - we have specific 
interventions, community participation at the field level is recommendations:
crucial for social change. Tribal dynamics for local political and 
The FATA Secretariat is viewed as a discredited organization. Its material gains are a 'known.' The competition between tribal 
employees and agents are held in low esteem and that low leaders to serve the needs of their people should be recognized 
esteem is reflected in the opinion of the people toward the for the traditional responsibilities and authorities that they 
Maliks and their Lungi assistants. Additionally, the merger of have had. But development partners should ensure that 
the executive branch and the judicial branch of central community at large is taken into confidence to ensure 
government, without checks and balances, is not in keeping ownership of the programme and also so that the community at 110
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with the constitution. The only solution is to continue as quickly Strengthening jirga institution: The recommendation then is to 
as possible with the attitude and program begun as seen in the build upon the traditional jirga by strengthening the 
cultural resolution to form Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the jirgamaars, and the elders who are members of Jirgas. There 
formation of political parties within that area. That is, the would be a need to ensure that participation was 
formation of one or perhaps more provinces that would representative and fair.  Although the work of Jirgas has been 
integrate rather than divide, administratively and politically, the part of the oral tradition, those traditions form the 
rural and urban areas. The FS should be seen as an artefact of jurisprudence that needs to be documented and converted into 
the Colonial past that was designed to control and not in a more formal jurisprudence that can be taught in high schools 
keeping with democratic ideals of representation. so that the citizens will know their rights and obligations. This 
formalized jurisprudence would also help in the formation of 
The FCR, as it is structured, does not provide the system of 
jirgamaars. This oral jurisprudence as it stands is a combination 
justice needed. The sarkari jirga as a board of inquiry does not 
of Pakhtun cultural beliefs, Sharia law and a blend of religious 
fit the cultural traditions nor fulfil the basis of modern judicial 
beliefs in the cultural context. Once studied in that context and 
principals for a system of justice. If the formation of provinces 
related to common law, then the jirga can be seen as a modern, 
were carried out, then the system of common law justice would 
conflict resolution and justice system for the practice of civil and 
be applied, but there is a cultural gap between common law and 
criminal law. The beauty of this approach to reform is that it can 
the imposition of the state as the aggrieved rather than the 
depend upon existing, locally prepared and trained talent and 
victim as the aggrieved. That statement deserves explanation. 
has the weight of culture behind it instead of the nebulous 
When a crime is committed, then the state exacts a 
weight of the 'State.' Moreover, it is a respected institution.
punishment, fine, jail time compensation, etc. But under the 
traditional jirga system the goal is to compensate the victim Strengthening the Frontier Corps (FC): There is international, 
and, more importantly, make amends and resolve the conflict national, and, importantly as found in the survey, local support 
between individuals, families and, even, tribes. The goal of the for the FC as culturally appropriate for the present security 
traditional system is to ‘heal’ the social fabric that has been torn situation. Being a member of the FC has been an esteemed and 
by the crime or transgression. By the Jirga the whole proud profession for over 100 years; it is not a new institution to 
community of elders oversees the conclusion. In the common be inserted. The recruitment and training should continue with 
law situation, it is the official of the state who must oversee the the medium-term goal that these men will become local law-
conclusion and law enforcement officials are few and far enforcement officers in their home areas. They should not 
between. become, as counter insurgency trainees have become in other 
nations, a terror for their own people or as excuses for one tribe 
This old and traditional perspective, i.e., to resolve conflict so 
to due battle with another. The value of their cultural ties is in 
that the parties and local society can move on in a constructive 
their ability to communicate and also to empathize. If the 
way is in keeping with modern judicial reform where local, non-
training dehumanizes them so that they no longer relate to their 
courts, offer a venue for conflicts to be aired and resolved by the 
own people, then peace and stability will be elusive. 
parties rather than by a magistrate. Fortunately that approach 
has always been a strong Pakhtun cultural tradition. How to The Frontier Corps could become the basis for security for new 
harness this more effectively as part of alternative dispute provincial governments. What could become of the Khasadars, 
resolution mechanism should be explored. Guides and so forth? If civil, local governance were to be 
established under a provincial system of Tehsils, then the role of 111
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these positions could be formalized. The formation of Lakhkars, and Afghanistan have been integrated for centuries both 
hopefully, would be on rare occasions and then, for meeting formally and informally. When the formality has broken down 
natural disasters, but the formalisation of the terms and or become rigid, then the informal 'sector' has thrived. 
purposes of a Lakhkars could include training for many useful Nevertheless, the natural resources and the resourcefulness of 
purposes (Red Crescent, emergency rescue, etc). This would be the people have kept trade flowing both ways across the border. 
a humanitarian role. But, as we have recommended through An opened border, which is the trend in the economies of the 
out, the review of these traditions and roles should be world, would provide greater opportunities for the people on 
conducted by the people in a participatory manner. both sides of the Durand Line and an incentive for both 
governments to collaborate. 
Integrating programmes across the Pak-Afghan border: Both in 
FATA and in Afghanistan, there are substantial international and Military strategies and tactics: As we have seen in the survey 
government commitments for development. The social and data, the people comprehend and support the Pakistani Army 
economic conditions in proximity to the common border are efforts to push out the militants in Swat and South Waziristan, 
similar, and just as the security conditions are similar and and the displaced people seem to be even greater supporters. 
require coordination, so too is there the need for involving The recommendation is that from these findings come the need 
counterparts across the border in Afghanistan. Many of the for more investigation into the specifics of resettlement and 
families living close to the border have close family ties across also how military operations are conducted. We do not have 
the unmarked Durand Line. At times development work on one that information.
side leads to despondency on the other side. International 
When it comes to external military involvement, for example 
development partners may either work in consortium or obtain 
strengthening the Frontier Corps, the people also support this. 
mandates to work on both sides of the border, ensuing holistic 
It may be that the support is for the FC as a favoured local 
impacts. Development corridors are a distinct possibility, and 
tradition and institution. Why the external help is favoured over 
they need to be developed using the recommendation to work 
local Army training needs to be examined. 
with tribal structures because they form links across the border. 
As was pointed out in the qualitative sections of the report, The finding on drones echoes what is written in the press, i.e., 
there are many important trading routes across the Durand that they are a perceived threat and, importantly, the people do 
Line, the improvement and management of those roads should not see them as justified any more than they see suicide 
be organized by local authorities whose citizens have direct bombing as justifiable. The use of drones may by part of a 
social and economic needs for the success of those linkages. Bi- strategy to remove militant leadership, but one looses the high 
national, local commissions with the authority and moral ground among the people. The practice should be ended 
responsibility for those linkages would devolve central and the conflict resolution process begun. Given the finding 
government to local governance providing the international that the people want to be rid of foreign fighters and forces, 
community with smaller projects that initially generate then the resolution of the local issues with the people and the 
employment and build local managerial capacity. The improved local Taliban would reduce the areas where foreign Taliban and 
communication and trade from these linkages would be a Al Qaeda would be able to find refuge. 
stimulus for towns and market centres in most of the Agencies 
Conclusionand some of the FRs. 
Pakistan-Afghanistan coordination We have prepared the 'Way Forward' as a substantial agenda for : The economies of Pakistan 112
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addressing the development, law and order, and international for stimulating the economy of the border area and the central 
issues identified by the people of FATA during the survey. places in the FATA. This would be important for the large towns 
Importantly, based on the cultural foundation of the Pakhtun, and cities along the old silk roads at the end of these cross-
the proposed 'Way Forward' includes the methodology to border routes. If development corridors were the geographic 
engage the people of FATA in the solution of century-old focus, then the economies in the tribal areas of both Pakistan 
governance structures and styles that are not appropriate or and Afghanistan would become dynamic and would bring 
efficient for modern Pakistan much less the integration of the prosperity to the people.
people of FATA into the national process.
One of the potential side effects of the development corridor 
The agenda proposed is a grand project that, unfortunately, strategy as a development tool would be the opportunity for the 
does not have short cuts for success. As described, it will require governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to work together on 
bold steps on the part of the Government of Pakistan common problems and to build trust. 
accompanied by dedicated and unwavering support from the 
Another theme of this chapter has been that both the 
international community. As we have stressed in the report, 
development strategies and the strengthening of the Frontier 
FATA has been and will always be an area of international 
Corps should be part of the effort counter the message and 
concern.
violence of insurgency. As shown in the chapters on military 
The first bold step recommended would be to return the strategies, militancy and religion, the people understand and 
information gathered to the people in each area for discussion. support military activity, but their support is conditional. The 
This would be the beginning of many steps toward change. military actions against the violent insurgency should be 
However, devolving the results of the survey is only deliberately calculated with the idea in mind that short term 
recommended if the government, supported by the expediency will cause disaffection and incur long-term costs.
international community, is serious about change and the 
The 'way forward' may be our concluding chapter, but it could be 
engagement of the people.
the beginning of a new chapter in modern history for Pakistan, 
It is clear from the opinions expressed that ‘engagement’ of the the international community, and, most importantly, for the 
people is desired. The platform for that engagement should be Pakhtun on both sides of the border.
devolution in three key areas: 1) the governance structure and 
Views expressed in this chapter are the views of CAMP alone on 
style; 2) the rule of law by formalizing jirgas and also the role of 
the bases of the survey conducted.
Sharia law; and 3) strengthening the Frontier Corps. The first 
recommendation would be a radical change in the FATA 
Secretariat as it is known today, because, in its place the 
recommendation is for elected leadership and local 
administration by elected officials. As described and pointed 
out in the report, the second and third key areas are important 
culturally and are respected local institutions. 
In keeping with the historical analysis and the strategic role that 
the cross border transportation routes can and do play in the 
business and employment of the people of FATA, we have 
identified development corridors as a geographic framework 
113
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68. Pakhtuns in the Crossfire: Pakhtun Politics in the 
Shadow of ‘War against Terrorism’, by Ijaz Khan, Brief 79. James W. Spain ‘The Pathan Borderland’  - 1963
Number 19, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), 
80. James W. Spain ‘The Pathan Borderland’  - 1963  page 
dated 5th September 2007
63
69. Interview with Dr. Tashfeen Khan, Secretary, Provincial 
81. James W. Spain, ‘The Pathan Borderland,’ page 65-66 -  
Government Housing, Department, Government of 
1963 
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, at Wiston House, London, 7 
November 2008. Dr. Tashfeen Khan also remained 82. Sir Wylly, ‘The Borderland, the Country of the Pathans  
Political Agent of 5 tribal agencies on different page 10-11  published in 1912
occasions.
83. S. Ifthikhar Hussain’ Some Major Pakhtun Tribes Along 
70. Pushtuns in the Crossfire: Pushtun Politics in the the Pak-Afghan Border’, Area Study Centre, University 
Shadow of 'War against Terrorism', by Ijaz Khan, Brief of Peshawar, Revised edition 2005
Number 19, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), 
84. Chopan  - wooden truss roofed with mud and hay, 
dated 5th September 2007
having pillars but no wall.  
71. Interview with Dr. Tashfeen Khan, Secretary, Provincial 
85. Kind of poem in Pakhtu poetry.
Government Housing, Department, Government of 
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, at Wiston House, London, 7 86. Rabbab is a musical instrument of Pakhtu. Mange is a 
November 2008. Dr. Tashfeen Khan also remained water pot and serves as a drum or ‘tabla’.
Political Agent of 5 tribal agencies on different 
87. Jirga is an indigenous conflict prevention/resolution 
occasions. 
tool to resolve personal, family, tribal feuds in a very 
72. FATA: Challenges and Response by Dr. Faqir Hussain, speedy manner and cost very little as compared to the 
Secretary Law & Justice Commission of Pakistan  un- modern justice system.
published paper
88. Lakhkar is a Pakhtu word which means militia or ‘group 
73. Updated figures from UNHCR, May 2010. of armed men’ or ‘war party’ formed for some purpose 
of fighting against a common enemy or towards a 
74. UNHCR Press Report: Pakistan's census of Afghans 
common objective. Lakhkar could be of any size in 
provides first detailed profile of the population. 
number and melts down when the purpose or mission 
www.unhcr.ch 
is accomplished.    
75. If provinces were formed based on capital cities such as 
89. Tigah or Teega or Tiga: In Pakhtun culture Tigah 
Peshawar, Quetta, and perhaps one between the two 
describes a truce between two warring parties 
with D.I. Kahn or one of those smaller towns as a center, 118
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following the decision taken by a Jirga with the consent 
of both the parties. 
87. All statistics are drawn from 1998 Census reports of 
Pakistan.
88. Unofficial Reports estimate the population of FATA from 
5 to 7 million. 
89. S. Ifthikhar Hussain ‘Some Major Pakhtun Tribes Along 
the Pak-Afghan Border’, Area Study Centre, University 
of Peshawar, revised edition 2005
90. S. Ifthikhar Hussain ‘Some Major Pakhtun Tribes Along 
the Pak-Afghan Border’, Area Study Centre, University 
of Peshawar, Revised edition 2005
91. It is noteworthy that after independence, the state of 
Pakistan continued with the colonial relation and 
structure with which the British had controlled the 
Pakhtun. That is, the state of Pakistan continued 
creating agencies and keeping those areas separate 
from the constitutional protections that other 
Pakistanis enjoyed.
92. Frontier Region
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Appendix I
From these descriptions of the traditional tribal hierarchy and TRIBAL STRUCTURE AND WAY OF LIFE OF 
the FATA Secretariat structure it can seen how Colonial rule was 
THE PAKHTUN grafted onto tribal structure to become a system for political 
control and administration.  
Introduction Household structures are alike; these fortress-like compounds 
may be comprised of many houses occupied by an extended 
Because the culture and traditions of the Pakhtun, the people 
family. An extended family consists of an elder head of family, 
of FATA, play a key role in the areas of inquiry presented in this 
married sons and wives, unmarried sons and daughters plus 
research, it is important that the reader have at hand a brief 
79
grandchildren.  James W. Spain writes:
description of the structure of family and tribe. In addition the 
way of life, Pakhtunwali, in its most basic concepts needs to be “The Pathan is above all an individualist, despite the 
 described so that the Pakhtun perspective can be appreciated rigid behaviour standards prescribed by clan 
 when reviewing the opinions expressed by the respondents to membership. Nonetheless, there are important 
the survey. traditional and social factors which guide community 
life and in many cases influence or even determine the 
action of individuals. These mores vary considerably in Tribe and family
different parts of the Pathan area, and codification of 
Each tribe is comprised of various clans (or Khels), sub-clans 
them is virtually impossible. However, certain of them 
and then extended families. Tribal society consists of many 
are almost universal, and some knowledge of these is 
characteristics that provide sense of unity and cohesion. It is 
essential to an understanding of what the Pathan is 
 80based on its inter-family linkages that then unite sub-clans, 
and how he got that way.”  
clans and tribes in a web of kinship. The family structure is the 
This un-codified set of rules, which guides Pakhtun way of life, is most complex feature of tribal society that shares family 
called Pakhtunwali. honour, property and intra-familial hate and love relationships.
Each family is headed by an elder male, who, by ascribed status 
Pakhtunwali
is respected and his decisions are obeyed by the entire family. 
77 78
Then Maliks  and Lungi  holders head each sub-clan and then Pakhtuns, living in the hilly areas on both sides of the Durand 
clan. Maliks are hereditary and sometimes Political Agents Line, have preserved their centuries old culture and tradition. 
grant this title with the consent of the Governor. Under the Pakhtuns are men of guns through which they protect their 
current governance system, the title of Lungi holder comes honour. Pakhtunwali  the code of honour and an unwritten 
after Malik and may be granted by Political Agents. Maliks and constitution - is strictly observed and quoted with pride. It 
Lungi holders are responsible for maintaining peace in their guides their lives. Pakhtunwali is their dearest value, which 
areas and for providing valuable information about their areas conducts and controls their routine lives, behaviour and 
to the Political Administration. In case of any conflict they attitudes. There are three main obligations of Pakhtunwali on a 
become responsible and accountable to the political Pakhtun elaborated in the following lines. 
administration. As pointed out in previous chapters, the 
Milmastya: Describes the open-handed hospitality and 
political administration pays allowances (Mojib) and subsidies 
protection to all who may or may not demand it. This custom is 
to these Maliks and Malik holders for their services. 
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one of the greatest demands of Pakhtunwali. Sometime, recruiting among the tribesmen was never brisker than 
protection [or hospitality] may be extended to an enemy as during the operations in Tirah of 1897-98. One thing, 
long as the enemy remains in the host community. The guest or however, the Pathan recruit does not give up, “but 
an enemy is provided with an escort that is called badraga. brings with him to his regiment, keeps through his 
During the British times, the status of badraga was later on service, must have leave to look after, will resign 
turned officially into local escorts, called levies. According to promotion to gratify, and looks forward to retiring to 
82
thoroughly enjoy  and that is  his cherished feud ”  Milmastya .the spirit of the term , the guest is never to be hurt 
both because of the obligation of the high regard for Milmastya 
Nanawati: There is a considerable confusion not only among 
and because the obligation of badal (revenge), would 
English writers but also among writers from settled districts of 
automatically be placed upon the host if he were to lapse in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as to the definition of this concept. It is 
providing safety. There are numerous incidents where hosts to 
also practised in other Pakhtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
strangers or even enemies, have died or been injured when 
Balochistan and Afghanistan. However, with the passage of 
defending their guests. James W. Spain, in his book ‘The Pathan 
time the sprit of Nanawati has faded in more urban areas, but it 
Borderland,’ writes about a British Administrator on the 
is still practised in the rural areas of Pakhtuns, especially FATA 
Frontiers who wrote in his official reports: 'For gold, they will do 
and Afghanistan.  
almost anything, except betray a guest'. He further adds: Any 
Nanawati means, literally, to enter into one's house and then person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only 
81
' 'begging for a pardon or forgiveness'. When a person realizes be safe, but will be kindly received.   
that he has been at fault in a killing, injury or insult of another 
Badal: This concept is the set of customs and actions 
person, he goes to the hujra, house or mosque of the aggrieved 
concerning revenge.  The custom imposes an offended person 
family and throws himself at their mercy, confessing his fault 
the right to and necessity for revenge by retaliation regardless 
and begging a pardon from the person or family whose sense of 
of consequences. Originally badal has to be taken only by the 83
honour he had injured.  On such occasions the offender brings 
victim or, in case of a murder, by the victim's family  against an 
tokens or gifts such as sheep or goats, and is accompanied by 
individual or a family who have committed the hurt or insult. 
his family women, and Qur'an, to show both his humility and 
Since Pakhtun is a martial race therefore, he believes in revenge 
sincerity. If the offended person or family forgives the person, 
in his own way obligatory by the concept of badal, but as will be 
then that family will also defend the offender from further 
described as Nanawati below, there is a counterbalancing 
punishment by both tribal and also political administrators. 
concept and way to resolve the conflict.
Thus Pakhtunwali may be at odds with civil law and the formal 
badal  administration of justice by the state. Because of non-mitigated , feuds start among the 
families, among clans and intra-clans, and they may last for 
Jirga:  In a few words a jirga is a gathering of elders, convoked 
years and sometimes for decades from generation to 
by an intermediary between contesting parties, a jirgamaar, to 
generation. Sir Wylly writes in his book about the blood feuds of 
hear the arguments of the parties. The process is similar to 
tribesmen in the following manner;
binding arbitration because both sides of the discussion agree 
jirga“The Pathans enlists freely into our services  there are to abide by the decision of the elders. The  is a conflict 
 at present moment something like eleven thousand resolution process. In this report, in the chapter on the 
jirgaPathans in the Indian Army, and probably the structure and style of administration of FATA the  is 
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described in the context of the Frontier Crimes Regulations.
Hujra: The hujra, is a male social centre and a place where the 
unmarried males sleep. Visitors may be housed in this space, 
and food and tea will be served there. The hujra, as a room or 
area within a compound, is rooted in Pakhtun culture and 
civilization forever. It is considered as mark of prestige not only 
as a furnished area but as a social area. The main features of a 
84
hujra are an opened patio-like area a ‘Chopan’  where bed-like 
seats are arranged, and a couple of rooms. Village folk singers 
85
sing Tapa  on winter nights and during festivities using musical 
86
instruments like Rabab and Mangey.  Now a day a television 
and radio are important components of a hujra, some may 
include internet and computers. A hujra may belong to a rich 
man of a village who happens to be a Malik or Khan. However a 
hujra may be a common property of a village. In the hujra any 
and all matters of civil affairs are discussed and may be resolved 
87
through a Jirga.  Marriage parties, funerals, and other rituals 
are celebrated in a hujra. Hujras are also used for raising 
88
Lakhkars  when needed. The hujra is the place where warring 
89
tribes or clans meet to agree on Tigah  to stop further 
bloodshed.
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Durand Line. It has an area of 2,296 sq. km., with a population FATA AGENCIES AND FRONTIER 
of 448,310.  The major tribes are the Turi, Bangash, Parachinari 
90
REGIONS  and Masozai - both Sunni and Shia sects. Kurram Agency 
borders with Afghanistan's Nangarhar province in the North 
Map 1 in the introduction to this report is an important 
West and Paktia province in the South West. The Agency bears 
reference for visualizing the Agencies and Frontier Regions 
the name of the pass providing an important trade and military 
described in this appendix.
route between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Agency centre, 
Parachinar, is a major market town on the cross mountain The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is located along 
route.  Pakistan's North-Western Himalaya zone and South-Western 
chain of the Sulaiman Mountains and runs as a narrow tract 
South Waziristan Agency: In 1895 two other Agencies were 
along the river Indus with the parallel lines almost North to 
created along the Pakistan-Afghan border North and South 
93South. It consists of seven semi-autonomous Agencies or 
Waziristan Agencies.  South Waziristan is the largest of all 
administrative units Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Kurram, 
tribal Agencies, 6,620 sq. km. inhibited by a population of 
Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. In addition, it 
approximately 429,841 persons. Major tribes include the 
includes ‘Frontier Regions’ adjoining the districts of Peshawar, 
Mehsud and Ahmadzai Waziris. It borders with Afghanistan's 
Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. This 
Paktia and Khost provinces on the West. In Pakistan to the 
constitutes an area of 27,224 sq kilometres, and it is inhibited 
South it borders with Balochistan province, Dera Ismail Khan 
91
by approximately 3.17 million   people belonging to different 
district to East and North Waziristan Agency to the North. Two 
Pakhtun tribes. The 1,400 mile (2500 KM) Durand Line, which 
major passes and corresponding trade routes to Afghanistan 
was drawn in 1893 by the British Colonial rulers of India, divides 
are in South Waziristan. Wana is the major trading town for the 
the Pakhtun tribes into two separate areas - Afghanistan and 
North route. 
Pakistan. As described in the first chapter of this report,  FATA 
North Waziristan Agency: It is the second largest Agency, has always been strategically important for Western forces 
covering an area of 4,707 sq. km, inhibited by 361,246 people.  since before the times of ‘the Great Game.’ 
The principle tribes are the Utmanzai Waziri, Dawa, Saidgai, 
Khyber Agency: Because of the importance of the pass 
Kharasin and Gurbaz. North Waziristan Agency also borders 
through the mountains for military and trade, the British rulers 
Paktia and Khost provinces of Afghanistan. There are also two 
first established the Khyber Agency in 1879. Although initially 
trade routes and passes to Afghanistan on the Western border 
there was to be a Political Officer as the Administrative Head of 
of this Agency.
the Khyber Agency, in actual fact, it wasn't until 1902 that a full-
92 Mohmand Agency: Mohmand Agency was created in 1951 just fledged Political Agent was assigned there.  It draws its name 
four years after the creation of Pakistan as sovereign state in from historic Khyber Pass, covers an area of 2576 sq. km. The 
94
1947.  It covers an area of 2,296 sq. km. with a population of famous Torkham border links Khyber Agency with 
approximately 334,453 people. The major tribes inhibiting the Afghanistan's Nangarhar province. It has an estimated 
area are Mohmand, Safi, and Uthmankhel. It shares borders population of 546,730 people. The main Pakhtun tribes are the 
with Bajaur Agency on its North, the Dir District to its East, Afridis, Shinwaris, Mulagooris and Shalmanis.  
Peshawar District to its South-East, and Kunar province in 
Kurram Agency: This Agency was the second Agency formed. It 
Afghanistan to the West. Between Mohmand Agency and 
was created in 1892, a year before the demarcation of the 
Appendix II
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Bajaur Agency is a river valley that forms another major pass District. The total area is 132 sq. km, with a population of 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The major Afghanistan around 6,987 people. The Bhittani tribe is the only major tribe. 
towns on that trade route are Asadabad and then Jalalabad It is bounded on the North by Karak District, on the East by 
and, finally, Kabul. Bannu District and on the West by North Waziristan Agency. 
Bajaur Agency: Bajaur Agency, the smallest in size 1,290 sq. FR Tank:  This frontier region adjoins Tank District with a total 
km., was created in 1973. It has a population of 595,227 area of 1,221 sq. km., and a population of 27,212. Bhittani tribe 
persons; sharing borders with Afghanistan's Kunar province on is the only major tribe inhibiting FR Tank. It is bounded on the 
the North-West. In Pakistan, Dir District is on the North East and North, South and West by South Waziristan Agency, on the 
Mohmand Agency on its West. Major tribes inhibiting the area North-East by Lakki Marwat District and on the South-East by 
include, Uthmankhel and Tarkani. Tank District. 
Orakzai Agency: This is the only tribal Agency that does not FR D.I. Khan: It is the tribal area adjoining Dera Ismail Khan 
share a boundary with Afghanistan. It was created in 1973, District. The total area covering FR D.I. Khan is 2,008 sq. km., 
covering an area of 1538 sq. km., with a population of 225,441 with a population of approximately 38,990. The Ustran and 
persons. It is bounded in the North by Khyber Agency, in the Sherani are the major tribes inhibiting FR D.I. Khan. It is 
East by FR Kohat, in the South by Kohat and Hangu districts, and bounded on the North by South Waziristan Agency, on the East 
in the West by Kurram Agency. Major tribes include, the by Kulachi Tehsil of D.I. Khan District, on the South by D.G. Khan 
Orakzai and Bangash  both Shia and Sunni sects. Districts and on the West by Zhob District.
95
FR  Peshawar: This is a small tribal Area adjoining Peshawar 
District with a total area of 261 sq. km. and a population of 
approximately 53,841 people. The Afridi tribe is the only major 
tribe inhabiting FR Peshawar. It is bounded on the North and 
East by Peshawar District, on the South by FR Kohat and on the 
East by Peshawar District.
FR Kohat:  This is a tribal area adjoining Kohat District. The total 
area is 446 sq. km, with a population of approximately 88,456 
people. The Afridi tribe is the only major tribe inhibiting FR 
Kohat. It is bounded on the North by FR Peshawar, on the East 
by Nowshera District and South by Kohat District and on the 
West by Orakzai Agency. 
FR Bannu: This is a tribal area covering 745 sq. km., with a 
population of approximately 19,593 people. The Wazir tribe is 
the only major tribe. It is bounded on the North by Karak 
District, on the East by Bannu District, on the South by FR Lakki 
Marwat and on the West by North Waziristan Agency. 
FR Lakki Marwat: This is a tribal area adjoining Lakki Marwat 
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research tool, helped in documenting views of key RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
informants. All sections of the FATA society were included in 
PLAN
these discussions. Participants were chosen so that they 
would have diverse political, social, technical and religious 
Introduction
backgrounds. They were also chosen because they were 
respected people within their circles. The technique was to This research report is based on both qualitative and 
quantitative data. For the qualitative information, ten 
focus-group discussions and two-day consultative dialogues 
were used to gather the opinions. Minutes were recorded, 
analyzed and utilized to both write this report and to inform 
the questionnaire design. Background and historical 
material used in the report came from a review of historical 
books, newspapers, reports, articles, journals and the 
experience of CAMP programs. 
The quantitative data was collected through structured 
questionnaires. The objective was to sample adult males 
and females to ascertain their opinion on key issues related 
to the people of FATA. Because gender plays such an 
important role in public opinion, the sample was designed 
to interview equal numbers of males and females in each 
community and, accordingly, it generated equal numbers of 
males and females in each village, FR and Agency. Although 
there may be slightly unequal populations of males and 
females in each Agency of FR due to seasonal migration and 
also emigration, plus the cultural tendency to keep women 
from working away, exact, current statistics were not 
available to guide a deviation from this target of equal 
numbers of males and females.
Research methods and instruments
provide all of the informants with substantial opportunity to 
express their viewpoints so that they would help provide I. Qualitative
informed and representative perspectives on key issues 
Focus-group discussions (FGDs) related to the FATA region. An average of 22 participants 
attended each FGD.  A total of ten FGDs were held as per the 
The organization of the focus-groups, as a qualitative 
following plan:
Appendix III
Table 23. Region and gender wise FGDs’ plan
Sub-region Agencies/FRs Date Gender  Youth Elders
Sub-region 1
Kurram  Agency, 
Orakzai  Agency 
and FR Kohat 
07 April 2010 Male  √
08 April 2010 Male  √
Sub-region 2
North 
Waziristan, 
Agency, FR 
Bunnu and FR 
Lakki 
12 April 2010 Male  √
13 April 2001 Male  √
Sub-region 3 
South 
Waziristan 
Agency, FR 
Tank and FR 
D.I.Khan
 
15 April 2010 Male  √
16 April 2010
 
Male
 
√
Sub-region 4 
Bajaur Agency,
 
Mohmand 
Agency,
 
Khyber Agency 
and
 
FR Peshawar
 
23 April 2010
 
Male
 
√
24 April 2010
 
Male
 
√
FATA
All seven 
Agencies and 
six FRs
 
27 April 2010
 
Female
 
√
28 April 2010
 
Female
 
√
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Stakeholders' consultative dialogue represented by a manageable number of interviews. The 
objective was to sample all of FATA with a sample size so that 
A two-day stakeholders' consultative dialogue was held on 
the margin of error would be small. The desired margin of 
June 11-12, 2010 in Peshawar to generate debate on the 
error for the whole of FATA of less than 2% was chosen.  This 
above mentioned issues. 
number, in reference to the estimated population of 
These events were attended by participants from relevant approximately four million, called for a sample of 4,000 
backgrounds and experience, including government. They interviews. Current population statistics for FATA are not 
were briefed by some well-known speakers who possessed available, so the first assumption was that the 1998 census 
political, tribal, religious and technical backgrounds to would be accurate enough.  
facilitate the discussions. 
The sample size of 4000 was drawn from the total FATA 
Desk review population of 3.17 million (1998 Census Report). 3480 
people were selected from 7 Agencies of FATA by using a 
As mentioned above, the research report includes: the 
Proportionate Stratified Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure 
historical background of the people and the area; facts 
a representative sample for the entire population as well as 
about the governance system of FATA; constitutional 
each Agency and Frontier Region. The following table 24 
standing of FATA; political impact of FATA on the politics of 
shows the sample size by Agency and Frontier Region.
Pakistan; and the Frontier Crimes Regulations. For this 
purpose, books, newspapers, reports, articles, journals and One of the practical advantages of quantitative methods is 
the CAMP experience were consulted. the use of small samples of people to make inferences about 
larger groups. The researcher uses information gathered 
Themes for the qualitative discussions and dialogue
from the survey to generalize findings from a drawn sample 
The themes included: the constitutional status of FATA; about the sampled population and accepts  planned limits 
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR);  Presidential  of random error.  
Ordinances/regulations and their impact on the 
Margin of error: The over all margin of error with all 
Governance system of FATA; FATA's present social, political, 
interviews pooled under ‘people of FATA’ for single 
economic and administrative structure; development pace; 
questions of a ‘Yes/No’ nature is approximately 1.5% at the 
participation of the people in development opportunities; 
95% confidence level. That is, if a random sample were 
FATA's current law and order situation; an in-depth analysis 
drawn 100 times, then in 95 of the cases, one would expect 
of present government's decisions in the aftermath of 9\11; 
there to be less than a 1.5% plus or minus difference around 
government crackdown on militant groups in FATA and Swat; 
a sample result. That being said, once one begins to partition 
US Drone attacks in FATA and its impact and the inclusion of 
the data set and look at specific FR or Agency, then, within 
women in the decision-making process.
those units, the margin of error increases because of the 
smaller population size and the proportional sample size. II. Quantitative
The right-hand column in the table below summarizes the 
In addition to a well structured questionnaire, the key to margin of error.
successful social research is in the sampling frame. If well 
designed, then the population and segments will be 
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the master list of all 960 villages. Of the master list across Sampling plan and field implementation
FATA, 403 (42%) were located in inaccessible areas. The 400 
Accessibility villages sampled came from the remaining 557 villages.
At the beginning of this project CAMP gathered information Two stages were used to select the sample. In the first stage 
on the accessible areas within FATA by making a list of CAMP randomly selected among the accessible tehsils. In 
villages, towns and tehsils that were not accessible because the second stage CAMP randomly selected 400 
of security concerns, government imposed curfews, and/or villages/towns in the tehsils that were selected in the first 
extreme weather conditions. That list was deducted from stage. 
A total of 10 interviews were assigned to each village. The 
gender balance in the overall sample was achieved by 
setting gender quotas. In every village and town half of the 
respondents were male and half were female. Because of 
the culture of the region female Enumerators interviewed 
females, and male Enumerators interviewed males. 
The resulting sampling frame is shown in the table 25:
Bias due to inaccessibility: As pointed out in the description 
of the selection of villages, access to all villages was limited 
due to the conflict and the threat of violence. Thus, the 
sample was biased toward more peaceful areas of each 
Agency and FATA in general. As will be shown in the 
comparisons between people who had been Internally 
Displaced (IDPs) and those who had not, there is a 
difference in opinion with regard to some of the questions.  
One would expect, therefore, that by not being able to 
include people in the conflicted areas that there is a bias in 
the conclusions. Unfortunately, except for the ex-IDPs, we 
do not know which way the opinion of those areas would 
swing the results. Inaccessible villages totaled 42% of the 
approximately 690 villages in FATA. Unfortunately, the 
characteristics of those un-sampled villages are not known, 
but one could assume that they were the more rural and 
remote villages and that would change the demographics 
and cultural perspective of the survey.
Table 24. Area accessibility analysis
Agency
 
Populati
on  
Sample 
Size  
Margin of 
error
Bajaur  595227
 
680
 
3.8
Khyber  546730
 
760
 
3.6
Kurram  448310
 
680
 
3.8
Mohmand  334453
 
360
 
5.2
North Waziristan  
 
361246
 
440
 
4.7
Orakzai  225441
 
280
 
5.9
South Waziristan  
 
429841
 
280
 
5.9
FATA Agencies Total
 
2941248
 
3480
 
1.7
Frontier Region
       
Bannu 19593
 
80
 
10.9
D. I.  Khan 38990
 
80
 
10.9
Tank 27216
 
80
 
10.9
Lakki 6987
 
40
 
15.5
Peshawar 53841
 
80
 
10.9
Kohat 88456
 
160
 
7.7
Frontier Regions Total
 
235083
 
520
 
4.3
FATA (Total) 3176331
 
4000
 
1.5
S.
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
S.
#
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Selection of interviewees
Method of selecting starting points 
In villages, the survey universe was divided into four areas 
i.e. two for male Enumerators and two for female 
Enumerators. In each area two starting points were selected 
by male and two by female Enumerators. Male and female 
Enumerators interviewed three respondents from one point 
and two from the other point. These starting points were 
local landmarks such as Hujra of a prominent Malik, famous 
shops, mosque, Imam Bargah of Shiite community, schools 
and hospitals, etc. From each point the Enumerators (both 
male and female) would interview five respondents. 
After the selection of the starting points, the male 
Enumerators selected a household on their left hand while 
female Enumerators selected a household on their right 
hand. In some areas where the houses were scattered and 
this rule could not be properly applied, the survey 
Enumerators made note of the difficulty on the contact 
sheet.
Bias due to ‘Starting Point’ methodology: As stated above, 
the starting points in each village were local landmarks such Method of respondent selection 
as Hujra of a prominent Malik, famous shops, mosque, 
Before selecting the interviewees, the Enumerators made 
Imam Bargah in Shiite communities, schools and hospitals. 
sure that the respondents were 18 years old or above, that 
From each point the Enumerators (both male and female) 
they were Pakistanis belonging to FATA, and were from the 
would interview five respondents by counting off every third 
Agency and from that particular village. The survey 
door or compound. This approach biased the sample toward 
Enumerators also ensured that the respondents had not 
the centre of villages. Typically the wealthy or more 
participated in any survey in the last six months. 
established families are located at these locations (for 
example, the Hujra) or in close proximity. These would be Guidelines for replacing respondents originally selected if 
the more urban and educated citizens of the community and unavailable (substitution)
their status probably influences statistics such as literacy, 
During the respondents' selection, if a desired respondent 
the use of media, educational status when compared with a 
was not available, the Enumerators skipped three houses 
more general population in those same villages and, of 
and knocked on the fourth door. Later on, the interviewer 
course, other parts of FATA and Pakistan. 
would try to contact the person who was not available 
S. # Agency/FRs  Total sample size X 
villages  
Total sample
A Agencies    
01 Khyber 
 
10 X 76
 
760 respondents
02 Kurram 
 
10 X 69
 
690 respondents
03 Mohmand 
 
10 X 36
 
360 respondents
04 North Waziristan
 
10 X 10
 
100 respondents
05 South Waziristan
 
10 X 28
 
280 respondents
06 Orakzai
 
10 X 28
 
280 respondents
07 Bajaur
 
10 X 68
 
680 respondents
B Frontier Regions
   08 Bannu
 
10 X 10
 
100 respondents
09 Tank
 
10
 
X 10
 
100 respondents
10 Peshawar
 
10 X 8
 
80 respondents
11 Kohat
 
10 X 16
 
160 respondents
12 Lakki Marwat
 
10 X 7
 
70 respondents
13 D. I. Khan
 
10 X 10
 
100 respondents
GRAND TOTAL
 
400 villages
 
4000 respondents
Table 25. Sample plan
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nd
22  February 2010. The average time of the interview initially. After three attempts and the person were still not 
during the pre-tests was 50 minutes. The minimum time available, the interviewer substituted the contact person 
taken to complete the interview was 40 minutes while the with someone next to the contact person  by applying the 
maximum time taken to complete the interview was 60 selection criteria mentioned above. 
 
minutes. Hence, the general understanding of the 
In summary, the overall sampling was robust and limited the 
Enumerators on the questionnaire was found to be 
margin of error for FATA-wide statistics. When specific 
adequate and satisfactory. The Enumerators were able to 
Agencies or FRs are noted the margin of error in the table 
handle the questionnaire well and they read the questions 
above must be considered. Overall, the urban and 
to the respondents as written on the questionnaire without 
accessibility biases must be kept in mind when reviewing 
introduction of bias. Enumerators were also able to comply 
the findings.  
with the field methodology for data collection. Their 
Questionnaire understanding of the house skipping pattern and following 
the left hand/right hand rule was also at par. The supervisors 
In 2010 CAMP used a structured questionnaire with both 
were able to manage the field supervision through different 
opened and closed response possibilities to replicate the 
checking methods. Feedback related to the substance and 
methodology used for 2008 and 2009 surveys. After 
structure of the questionnaire was shared with the senior 
consultation with BHC, the previous questionnaires were 
management of CAMP. 
revised for use in the 2010 survey. 
Data entry and cleaning
Interviewer training
Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP did the data entry 
Prior to conducting the survey, CAMP Enumerators were 
of the 4000 questionnaires using a database entry program.  
trained by independent consultants, under the supervision 
The data was then checked and cleaned using SPSS . 
of CAMP senior management who observed the training 
and pre-test interviews. The first training was conducted on Survey management and monitoring
methodology and pre-testing from 20-22 February and the 
nd
The CAMP Project Manager coordinated the survey with the 2  training was conducted on Security from 23- 24 February 
Project Officer based in the Peshawar regional office. 2010. 
CAMP's PM and PO coordinated the initial training of the 
Pre-testing of questionnaire aimed to:
Enumerators, the pre-tests, and the field implementation. 
During the implementation of the survey CAMP's head  Determine the time length of the interview 
office regularly followed up on the PM and his PO at CAMP's 
 Check questionnaire content  regional office in Peshawar. The regional office, in turn, 
coordinated closely with the field teams to monitor the  Check the skipping and coding patterns 
progress of the survey as well as to make sure that the 
 Correct and improve translation survey and sampling plan were being implemented 
properly. 
The pre-tests were conducted with adult Pakistani males 
and females aged 18 and above in suburbs of Peshawar on CAMP has field offices in Mohmand, Kurram, Orakzai, 
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Khyber Agencies, and FR Kohat of FATA. These field offices 
were used for supervising the survey. Although monitoring 
and supervision in North and South Waziristan was difficult, 
CAMP back checked by telephone contact with respondents, 
where possible. 
Description of field team  
1. The Enumerators were from the areas in which they 
interviewed.
2. The content of the questionnaire focused mainly on 
FATA problems, and respondents appeared willing 
and happy to participate in this study.
3. Because the sampling plan was based on the 
feedback received from the field teams, the areas 
leaders/elders and other resource persons for verification. 
where these interviews took place were relatively 
safe and accessible to the Enumerators. CAMP can also call and bring respondents randomly from 
each Agency/FR for verification to Islamabad.  
Back-checking and method of contact
Back-check by CAMP on 15 July 2010
The table below provides the breakdown of the number of 
The CAMP regional office senior staff also made contacts 
questionnaires back-checked per agency. Back-checking was 
with respondents by telephone on July 14-15, 2010. There 
done by CAMP's five field offices in FATA as well as from the 
are a total of 610 questionnaires carrying telephone 
CAMP regional office in Peshawar. The following table is a 
numbers, that have been recorded in the database. Out of 
summary based on the contact sheet used by the 
610 respondents' contacts, 402 respondents were 
Enumerators.
contacted. Out of 402 respondents, 179 confirmed that 
Back-checking of the data collection process were made interviews were conducted with them. 132 respondents 
through different methods. 10.8% of the total interviews telephone numbers could not be reached because of weak 
were personally observed by the supervisors during the network signals or because they were blocked by a military 
interviews. 69.4% of were back-checked by the supervisors operation in the area. 60 respondents were not at home at 
during the data collection process by revisiting the villages the time of the call and 31 refused to confirm either way.
and confirmed by the respondents, their family members, or 
locals. 3.1% of the interviews were back-checked and 
confirmed by telephone contacts from the CAMP regional 
office in Peshawar. 16.7% of the interviews were not back-
checked.  It is assumed that these were actually conducted.
Note: CAMP can provide the contact number of the local 
Method of back-check/Control  
 
Frequency  Percent
Direct supervision during interview 431  10.8
Back-check in person by supervisor  2777  69.4
Back-check by telephone by 
supervisor or the central office 125  3.1
Not subject o back-check 667  16.7
Total 4000  100.0
Table 26. Back-checking analysis
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In addition, because of the lack of education and exposure to 
these types of interviews, the respondents do not understand 
Issues faced during back-checking
the importance and use of such surveys. 
Network problem: In Kurram Agency some people are using 
Problems during fieldwork and data Entry
Afghanistan cell companies that are also difficult to contact. 
Below is a summary of major issues that emerged during field Network signal strength remains the main hurdle in reaching out 
work resulting in some delay in field completion:to these respondents. 
 There was a delay due to the military operation and curfew in Fear issue: FATA is going through a tough time, and there is a 
parts of Khyber Agency; CAMP had to wait a few extra days for general perception by the locals that behind this insurgency the 
things to become normal before they could complete ISI is involved. It is understandable that some of the respondents 
interviews there.may pretend or refused to confirm that they were interviewed.  
   
S. #
 
Agency/FR
 
Sample
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o
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d  
to
 c
o
o
p
e
ra
te
 
A
g
e
 n
o
t 
re
q
u
ir
e
d  
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d  
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w
 
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
fu
l 
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te
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w
s
 
T
o
ta
l 
C
o
n
ta
c
ts  
1
 
Bajaur Agency
 
680
             
680
 
680
 
2
 
Khyber Agency
 
760
 
16
 
189
 
6
 
6
 
37
 
13
 
760
 
1027
 
3
 
Kurram Agency
 
680
 
17
 
39
 
5
       
680
 
741
 
4
 
Mohmand Agency
 
360
 
8
 
13
     
2
   
360
 
383
 
5
 
North Waziristan Agency
 
440
 
5
 
17
         
440
 
462
 
6
 
Orakzai Agency
 
280
 
22
 
27
         
280
 
329
 
7
 
South Waziristan Agency
 
280
 
6
 
43
 
2
 
1
     
280
 
332
 
8
 
FR Lakki Marwat
 
40
   
4
         
40
 
44
 9
 
FR Bannu
 
80
 
9
 
15
 
10
       
80
 
114
 10
 
FR D.I. Khan
 
80
   
74
         
80
 
154
 11
 
FR Kohat
 
160
   
54
         
160
 
214
 12
 
FR Peshawar
 
80
   
27
         
80
 
107
 13
 
FR Tank
 
80
 
7
 
9
 
6
       
80
 
102
 Total
 
4000
 
90
 
511
 
29
 
7
 
39
 
13
 
4000
 
4689
 
 
Table 27. Contact analysis sheet
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 Initially, CAMP had difficulty interviewing women experience any delays there. 
respondents in both North and South Waziristan. CAMP 
Intermittent imposition of curfew in North Waziristan 
completed the interviews with the male population relatively 
resulted in a slight delay in delivery of the completed 
early in the project schedule. CAMP cited the deteriorating 
questionnaires. Road blockades in Kurram led to a substantial 
security situation, the local apprehensions regarding a 
delay in the delivery of the completed questionnaires.
possible military operation in the near future as well as the 
generally more conservative environment in these two Conclusion:
Agencies as the primary reasons for which women were not 
The methods chosen produced both the quantitative and the 
being allowed to interact with survey teams. However, in our 
qualitative information desired for ascertaining the opinions of 
interaction with the field staff we kept emphasizing the need 
the people of FATA. Although compromises or assumptions had 
to interview women without jeopardizing the security of the 
to be made due to a lack of current statistics and also because of 
Enumerators. The field teams were eventually able to 
the accessibility issue, the sampling frame was executed and 
interview women in North and South Waziristan. 
this provided the confidence intervals and margin of error 
Although there was unrest in Orakzai Agency during the time desired. When interpreting the results it is important to keep 
the survey was being implemented, the CAMP team did not the accessibility and the starting point biases in mind. The 
Name of Agency/FR
 t
ot
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 c
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s 
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r  
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l 
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n
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d 
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sp
o
n
d
in
g 
N
o
t 
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se
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h
o
m
e
R
e
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d
Orakzai  29 22 6 6 9 1
Khyber Agency 233 115 95 12 0 8
Mohmand Agency 97 73 49 9 0 15
Bajaur Agency 85 47 6 41 0 0
Kurram Agency 94 73 8 21 44 0
North Waziristan Agency 1 1 1 0 0 0
South Waziristan Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR Peshawar 25 25 6 13 3 3
FR Kohat 18 18 4 11 0 3
FR Bannu 20 20 3 12 4 1
FR Lakki Marwat
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0 0
FR Tank
 
3
 
3
 
0
 
3
 
0 0
FR D.I. Khan
 
5
 
5
 
1
 
4
 
0 0
Grand Total
 
610
 
402
 
179
 
132
 
60 31
 
Table 28. Back-checking by telephone
S
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
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LIST OF VILLAGES (AGENCY/FR AND TEHSIL WISE) SURVEY -2010 
Bajaur Agency  
List of Villages  (Tehsil Khar)   
List of Villages (Tehsil Utman 
Khel)  
  
List of Villages (Tehsil 
Salarzai)  
1 Shandi More Kalay Chenagai Kalay   Pashat Kalay  
2 Lashora Kalay Ghani Ado Kalay   Raz Gan Kalay  
3 Ali Jan Kalay Ghar Shamozai Kalay   Barani Kadao Kalay  
4 Jar Kalay Gardi Kalay   Chinar Kalay  
5 Haji Lawang Kalay Sikandro Kalay   Sheer Shah Kalay  
6 Haji Abad Kalay Qazafi Kalay   Chargo Kalay  
7 Shah Narlay Kalay Mula Kalay   Dagai Kalay  
8 Yousaf Abad Kalay Qazi Derai Kalay   Matasha Kalay  
9 Nari Qilla Kalay Mano Derai Kalay   Dando Gai Kalay  
10 College Kalay Palang Kalay   Bar Mai Kalay  
11 Farsh Kalay Gosam Kalay   Dera Kai Kalay  
12 Balo Lai Kalay Loi Baba Kalay   Changaro Kalay  
13 Dar Shah Kalay Shamozo Kalay   Naza Kai Kalay  
14 Tangi Kalay Soor Bat Kalay   Kochora Kalay  
15 Babar Shah Kalay Qilla Cha Kalay   Shah Goo Kalay  
16 Shamlo Qilla Kalay Gisarlay Kalay   Dara Kalay  
17 Chapori Kalay Daba Do Kalay   Maro Kalay  
18 Mamenro Tangay Kalay Loi Jowar Kalay   Baro Kalay  
19 Muslim Bagh Kalay Koka Kalay   Dag Qilla Kalay  
20 Changaro Kalay Behram Poor Kalay   Talay Kalay  
  Sha Gai Kalay   Kolay Kalay  
  Mianay Kalay   Khazana Kalay  
      Narwaba Kalay  
       Dandono Kalay  
       Hayat Kalay  
       Serai Kalay  
Appendix IV
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
21
22
23
24
25
26
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Mohmand Agency  
List of Villages (Haleem 
Zai/Ghalanai) 
  List of Villages (Prang Ghar)    List of Villages  (Ekka Ghund)
Shati Kore Seray Kalay  Sepavi  
Musa Khel Devo Deray  Baba Tabar  
Ghunda Khel Naway Kalay  Lo Lo Kalay  
Maluk Khel Kerra Kalay  Chamyaran  
Rana Khel Tarakay  Rashakai  
Naway Kalay Babu Kalay  Main Kalay  
Ghundi Kalay Ledan  Jumma Khan Korrona  
Wacha Khawra Chock  Musal Kore  
Sangar Kalay Spena Khawra   Pir Qilla  
Sultan Khel Baday Kalay  Aman Tabar  
Shani Khel Munda  Mazi Khel  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 Ghazi Kore Nao Kalay  Masho Khawar  
Orakzai Agency  
List of Villages  
(Lower Tehsil)  
List of Villages 
(Central Tehsil)
1 Kuraiz Largi Tan  Manri Khel
2 Ghari Kuraiz  Toti Bagh Utman Khel
3 Mera Ko Bala  Sabora Khel
4 Dargai  Arghunja
5 Suleman Khel  Gall  
6 Abi Shell  Tallay  
7 Stara Khapa  Gundi Tall
8 Sarabi Ghari  Khawaga Serai Ghelgoo
9 Lal Mela  Sara Khawra
10 Kalaya  Toori Kani
11 Qillat  Riba Khel
12 Ahmad Khel  Samana  
13 Masti Khel  Saiful Dara
14 Budh Khel  Spiddar  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2  
3
4
5
6
7 
8  
9
10
11
12 
13 
14
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Khyber Agency  
List of Villages 
(Jamrud/Mala Gori) 
  
List of Villages (Landi Kotal 
/Shalman)  
  List of Villages (Bara)  
1 Jabba Wazir Kalay Haji Gulmadar Kalay  Bahadar Khan Kalay  
2 Jabba Mulajan Kalay Nazeer Jan KalAy Shalman   Jan Khan Kalay  
3 Zaib Khan Kalay Jabba Haji Raas Kalay  Abdula Jan Kalay  
4 Pass Kalay Murad Khan Kalay  Paka Tara  
5 Braj Kalay Khatir Afridi Kalay  Shera Khan Kalay  
6 Ajmir Kalay Malak Sawabi Kalay  Haji Niazi Kalay  
7 Nattu Khel Meera Jan Dorma Khel Kalay   Malak Waras Khan Kalay  
8 Israr Kalay Jamrud Shah Zaman Kalay Shalman   Mian Gano Kalay  
9 Spilano Kas Malak Jaffar Afridi Kalay   Hussian Gul Kalay  
10 Sifat Shah Kalay Lakhkar Kalay  Haji Said Rahman Kalay  
11 Yar Baz Kalay Muhammadi Gul Kalay Gaagra   Inzaro Kalay  
12 Naiz Gul Khan Kalay Damak Kalay Ashkhel   Karigar Gharay  
13 Khanimullah Kalay Nadar Khan Kalay  Nala Kajurai  
14 Saleem Kalay Haji Zaree Shah Kalay  Ismail Abad (ArabI Jumat)  
15 Lwara Mina Malak Bosaid Kalay  Mashomano Adera(shalobar)
16 Chinar Kalay Janat Gul Kalay  Safdar Ali Shaheed Kalay  
17 Nekdad Kalay Gulasan Kalay  Roshan Abad  
18 Abdullah Jan Kalay Zarnoor Afridi Kalay  Gul Wazir Kalay Sheikhmal Khel
19 Mian Murcha Haji Aurang Zeb Kalay  Mashenai Kalay  
20 Gudar Sikandar Khel Speen Haji Kalay Shalman   Ali Akbar Kalay  
21 Peepal Kalay Rasool Gul Kalay  Wazir Khan Kalay Alam Gudar
22 Abbas Khan Kalay Aratoona Shalman  Farsh Kalay  
23 Jalandar Kalay Jandool Kalay Azamkhel   Daolat Khel  
24 Sardar Kalay Pirano Kalay  Mina Dar Kalay  
25 Jalal Din Ziarat Koroona Shalman   Arjalinaday  
  Zargaran     
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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Kurram Agency  
List of Villages 
(Upper Kurram Parachinar) 
List of Villages  
 (Lower Kurram Sadda)    
List of Villages  
(Central Kurram)  
1 Agra Sadda  Tando  
2 Shublan Pir Qayyum  Sateen  
3 Alamshir Manduri  Badama  
4 Sadara Alizai  Marghan  
5 Dangila Bagan  Makrani  
6 Mali Khel Tangi  Dagger  
7 Ahmad Zai Billy Amin  Chenarak  
8 Kirman Mandori  Mandan  
9 Bughaki Maroo Khel   Manatoo  
10 Badama Makhi Zai  Gawaki  
11 Ziran Nazari Kalay   Warasta  
12 Malana Inzari  Zarami  
13 Luqman Khel Bagzai  Sham Kai  
14 Shalozan Jelamay  Marghan  
15 Pewar Balish Khel  Marghan Dara  
16 Burki Sameer  Awai Dara  
17 Kharlachi Ibrahim Zai   Taki Tangai  
18 Shingak Shakar Dara   Sar Pakh  
19 Nistekot Topaki  Koraat  
20 Karra Khela Besatoo  Tabbai  
21 Lalmai Amal Kot  Nake Zairat  
22 Kach Kina Gharbina  Kamal Bazi  
  Choota Mandori   Sra Gurga  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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North Waziristan Agency 
List of Villages  
1 Hurmaz 
2 Musseki 
3 Hassu Khel 
4 Issurri 
5 Zeereki 
6 Hyder Khel 
7 Eppi 
8 Iddak 
9 Khaddi 
10 Hakim Khail 
South Waziristan Agency  
List of Villages   List of Villages 
1 Wana 15  Jawar  
2 Makeen 16  Landi Doog
3 Laddah 17  Laman  
4 Jandola 18  Nakho  
5 Khaisoor 19  Gasra  
6 Joni Mela 20  Piza  
7 Bar Mal 21  Tara Nara  
8 Kari Kot 22  Raghzai  
9 Shakai 23  Shaheed Mor
10 Saro Kai 24  Farjal  
11 Hanjar 25  Sherana  
12 Azam Warsak 26  Speen  
13 Tiar Zaa 27  Tanai  
14 Sheen Warsak 28  Loi Khulo  
FR Peshawar  
List of Villages  
1 Jinnah Kor
2 Sama Badah Ber 
3 Musa Dara 
4 Kohi Hasan Khel 
5 Asho Khel 
6 Sra Dargai 
7 Matani 
8 Arhat Baba
FR Kohat  
List of Villages  
1 Dara Bazar Main 
2 Bazi Khel 
3 Akhorwal 
4 Shah Nawaz Kalay  
5 Zor Kalay 
6 Suni Khel 
7 Sheraki 
8 Bosti Khel 
9 Tor Chappar 
10 Babary Banda 
11 Sheen Dand 
12 Zhuwaki 
13 Azadi Mela
14 Shpalkay 
15 Ferozi Mela 
16 Molvi Haya ud Din Kalay  
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FR Bannu  
List of Villages 
1 Beezan Khel 
2 Azeem Kalay 
3 Mohmand Khel Wazir  
4 Narmi Khel
5 Sardi Khel 
6 Wali Noor 
7 Mameetoon Khel  
8 Ali Khel Koohi 
9 Hindi Khel 
10 Qamar Qilla
FR Lakki  
List of Villages 
1 Masti Khel Upper  
2 Masti Khel Lower  
3 Ghundi Hussain Khel  
4 Hussain Khel 
5 Kotka Arab Khan  
6 Ghabber Betani 
7 Kotka Malik Qutab Khan Betani  
FR Tank  
List of Villages   
1 Jandola 
2 Manzai 
3 Barzai 
4 Umar Ada 
5 Shah Zamani 
6 Kari Haidar 
7 Dara Buta 
8 Tatur 
9 Chesan Kach 
10 Kot Piran 
FR D.I. Khan  
List of Villages 
1 Kohi Bahara 
2 Kari Samozai 
3 Dara Zanda 
4 Kohi Khawar 
5 Damini 
6 Mughal Kot 
7 Sheikh Mela 
8 Sarai Misa 
9 Sarai Zarkai 
10 Sarai Fateh Ali 
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KEY SPEAKERS OF THE TWO-DAY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATIVE DIALOGUE
1  Justice (Rtd.) Mian Mohammad Ajmal, Chair Fata Reforms Committee,
Former Chief Justice, Peshawar High Court 
2. Sang e Marjan Mehsud, Former Secretary Northern Areas, Pakistan
3. Ambassador (Rtd.) Ayaz Wazir
4. Khalid Mahmood Khan, Manager Industries, FATA Development Authority Peshawar
5. Zubair Mehsud, Assistant Professor, Law College, University of Peshawar
6. Zahir Shah Safi, Advocate High Court, Peshawar
7. Brig (Rtd.) Mahmood Shah, Former Secretary Security FATA
8. Rahimullah Yusafzai, Resident Editor, The News International, Peshawar
9. Ibrahim Shinwari, President Tribal Union of Journalists 
10. Hamidullah Khan, Minister for Environment and Member National Assembly from FATA
11.  Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Chief Executive, CAMP
Appendix V
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33 Musa Khan
 
FR D.I. Khan
 
34 Shamshad Khan
 
FR Tank
 
35 Syed Akbar Jan
 
FR Tank
 
36 Nafi Ullah Khan
 
Orakzai
 
Agency
 
37 S.M. Sajad Din
 
Orakzai Agency
 
38 S. Wasi Syed
 
Orakzai
 
Agency
 
39
M. Syed Badshah 
Hussain
 
Orakzai
 
Agency
 
40 Engr Hidayat Hussain 
 
Kurram
 
Agency
 
41 Najmul Hassan
 
Orakzai Agency
 
42 Liaqat Ali Khan
 
South WaziristanAgency
43 Nisar Ahmed 
 
Mohmand Agency
44 M.Zahir Shah Safi
 
Mohmand Agency
 
45 M.Khan Marjan
 
N. Waziristan
 
Agency
46 Mukaram Khan Atif
 
Mohmand
 
Agency
47 Muhammad Alamgir 
 
Bajaur
 
Agency
 
48 Badri Zaman
 
Mohmand
 
Agency
49 Hussamud
 
Din
 
Khyber
 
Agency
 
50 Banaras Shinwari
 
Khyber  Agency
 
51 Malak Said Abbas
 
Khyber  Agency
 
52 Tahira Bibi
 Orakzai Agency  
53 Haseeba
 FR Kohat  
54 Laila Afridi
 FR Kohat
55 Nazia Begam
 MohmandAgency
56 Sadia Iqbal
 Kurram  Agency  
57 S.Jehanzada Bajaur  Agency  
58 Haji Habib Ullah Khan Bajaur  Agency  
59 Khalid Mahmood Khan FATA Dev. Authority
60 Dr. Naseem Afridi Dara Adam Khel  
61 Niamat Ullah FR Lakki  
62 Shams Momand Mohmand  Agency
63 Uma Kalsom Kurram  Agency  
64 Naeem Ullah FR Lakki  
S. # Name Agency/FRS. # Name Agency/FR
1 Alam Gul 
2 Samina Asad Bajaur Agency  
3 Noor Zia Afridi Khyber Agency  
4 Farida Afridi Khyber Agency  
5 Laiq Shah North Wazirstan Agency 
6 Sami Ullah Dawar 
7 Atta Ullah Kurram Agency  
8 Engr M. Zaman Khan 
9 Iqbal Hussain Kurram Agency  
10 Munir Hussain Kurram Agency  
11 Amin Ullah Jan FR Bannu  
12 S. Shabiul Hasnain Orakzai  Agency  
13 Shadi Khan FR Lakki  
14 Khalil Ur Rehman FR Lakki  
15 Ihsan Dawar North Waziristan  Agency
16 Mian Saidur Rehman  
17 Sahibzada BahaudDin  
18 Mir Nawaz  
19 Sultan Hussain  
20 Akbar Hussain  
21 Aminzada Afridi  
22 Nayam Ullah 
23 Gabel Khan 
24 Ibrahim Shinwari  
25 Javed Iqbal Afridi 
26 Faheem Alam 
27 Gul Shah Khan 
28 Umar Khan 
29 Dilawar khan 
Bajaur  Agency
Bajaur Agency
FR Peshawar
FR Peshawar
FR Peshawar
Khyber  Agency
FR D.I. Khan  
FR Tank  
Khyber  Agency
FR Kohat  
FR Kohat  
FR Bannu  
FR Bannu  
Dara Adam Khel  
30 Khurshaid Wazir 
31 Qaleem Ullah 
32 Abdul Hhaleem 
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE TWO-DAY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATIVE DIALOGUE
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North Wazirstan Agency 
North Wazirstan Agency 
South Waziristan  Agency
South Waziristan  Agency
FR D.I. Khan  
South Waziristan  Agency
Appendix VI
MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE
Opinion Poll 2010
Section A:Sources of Information
(Q.1) What sources of information do you have access to?  (Multiple responses are   allowed) 
 
(Q.2) Which sources of information do you value the most?   
Response Code Response  Code  
Pakistani press 1 Internet, books and films  10  
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family  11  
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues  12  
British press 4 Neighbours  13  
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon  14  
British radio 6 Communal gathering  15  
American press 7 Government officials  16  
American TV 8 Tribal elders  17  
American radio 9   
(Q.3) Which newspapers do you read regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)  
Response Code Response  Code  
Ausaf 1 Express  12  
Daily Times 2 Pakistan  13  
The Dawn 3 The Post  14  
The Frontier Post 4 Aaj Kal  15  
Jang 5 Aaj 16  
Khabrain 6 Mashriq  17  
The Nation 7 Wahdat  18  
Nawa e Waqt 8 UK newspapers  19  
The News 9 Afghan newspapers  20  
Observer 10 Other (specify)  77  
The Statesman  11 Don’t know  88  
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(Q.4) What television stations do you watch regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)  
 
Response Code  Response  Code  
Aaj   1  Waqt  12  
ARY 2  Bolan  13  
AVT Khyber  3  CNBC  14  
ATV 4  Star  15  
Pakistan Television (PTV) 5  Century TV  16  
Hum  6  Al Jazeera  17  
Dunya  7  BBC  18  
Samma  8  CNN  19  
Express News  9  Sky News  20  
Din 10  Other (specify)  77  
Dawn News 11  Don’t know  88  
(Q.5) Which radio stations do you listen to regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)  
Response Code Response  Code  
BBC Pashtu 1 FM 101  8  
Radio Pakistan  2 FM 100  9  
BBC Urdu  3 FM 103  10  
FM 104 Buraq 4 BBC English  11  
FM 88 Lakki  5 Dewa (Voice of America)  12  
RADIO Pak MW 6 Other (specify)  77  
FM 106 7 Don’t know  88  
Section B: Opinion about Pakistan and Current Political & Security Issues
GENERAL
(Q.6) Do you think things in Pakistan are going in the right direction?  
 
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
 
147
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 V
I
(Q.7) In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing Pakistan?  
Response Code  
Law and order 1  
Bad governance 2  
Corruption 3  
Political instability 4  
Bad economy 5  
Inflation 6  
Energy crisis 7  
American influence 8  
Bomb blasts 9  
Poverty 10  
Human rights violation 11  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
(Q.8) In your opinion, what is the biggest problem  facing FATA?  
 
Response Code  
Law and order 1  
Outdated governance 2  
Corruption 3  
Unemployment 4  
Drone attacks 5  
Military operation 6  
Bomb blasts 7  
Lack of development 8  
Social justice 9  
Human rights violation 10  
Water 11  
Poverty 12  
Talibanisation 13  
Presence of foreigners  14  
Lack of education and health services 15  
Extremism 16  
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 17  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
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(Q.9) Would you live outside the FATA, if given the option to?   
 
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.9a) If yes, where would you prefer to live? (Multiple responses are allowed)
 
Response Code  Response  Code  
Peshawar 1  Saudi Arabia  8  
Other cities of Pakistan 2  Afghanistan  9  
USA 3  Dubai  10  
UK 4  Other Middle Eastern countries  11  
Germany 5  Other  European countries  12  
Canada 6  Other (specify)  77  
Iran 7  Don’t know  88  
 
(Q. 9b) If no, why would you prefer to live in the FATA ?  (Multiple responses are allowed)
 
Response Code  
I like to live within my own village and community  1  
I like the way we live in our tribal culture and tradition  2  
I feel more secure in FATA 3  
We have been living in FATA since long 4  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
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(Q.10)  Which of the following are the most important services that the GoP should be 
providing to your district ?
 
Response Code  
Security 1  
Justice 2  
Policing  3  
Education/schools 4  
Health services/hospitals 5  
Water and sanitation 6  
Roads 7  
Tackling terrorism 8  
Food supply 9  
Electricity supply 10  
Political education of the masses 11  
Good governance 12  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know  88  
(Q.11) Who are you most in contact with? 
Response Code Response Code
Political Agent 1 Tribal elders  
Military  2 Mullah 8
Frontier Corps 3 NGOs 9
MNAs 4 Government Officials  10
Teachers 5 None 66
Doctors 6 Other (specify) 77
Senator 7 Don’t know 88
(Q.12) Which of the following do you trust the most?   
Response Code Response Code  
Political Agent 1 Tribal elders  
Military  2 Mullah 
8
 
Frontier Corps 3 NGOs 
9
 
MNAs 4 Government Officials  
10
 
Teachers 5 None 66  
Doctors 6 Other (specify) 77  
Senator 7 Don’t know 88  
8
11
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 (Q.13) What do you want for your children? (Single response only, divided by gender)  
 
For boys Code For girls  Code  
More education 1 More education  1  
More security 2 More security  2  
Employment opportunities 3 Employment opportunities  3  
Marriage 4 Marriage 4  
Religious education 5 Religious education  5  
Other (specify) 77 Pardah (veil)  6  
Don’t know 88 Other (specify)  77  
  Don’t know  88  
 
POLITICAL ISSUES
(Q.14) Should Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas:
Response Code
Be fully integrated into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 1
Keep its current governing arrangements 2
Have more amendments in the FCR 3
Be established as a separate province of Pakistan  4
Be established as a FATA Council 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
(Q.15) Do you agree with the President’s decision of August 2009 allowing
political parties to  organise and operate in FATA? 
 
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.16) What do you think of FCR? 
 
Response Code  
It should be abolished 1  
Fundamentally reformed 2  
Partly reformed 3  
Retain in its present form 4  
No opinion 55  
Don’t know 88  
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(Q.17) What do you think of the Government of Pakistan’s current proposals for reform of the FCR? 
 
Response Code  
Fully support 1  
Partly support 2  
Fully oppose 3  
Partly oppose 4  
No opinion 55  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.18) Which would you participate most in the following?  
 
Response Code  
The activities of political parties 1  
Elections 2  
Citizen forums to discuss local issues 3  
Agency councils 4  
Monitoring of government service delivery 5  
Process of development 6  
None 66  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
(Q.19) Are you on the voters register? 
 
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
 
(Q.21) Which living politician do you admire the most? 
---------------------------------Don't know    88            None  99  
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Security Issues
(Q.22) What can the Pakistan Government do to deal with suicide bombers and other terrorists?  
 
Response Code  
Use the army to defeat them 1  
Negotiate with the terrorists 2  
Dialogue with local political/tribal authorities  3  
Empower moderate Islamic voices 4  
Enforce bans on terrorist organisations  5  
Provide employment  6  
Stop following the instructions of the West  7  
Ask for more help from the West 8  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.23)  How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?   
Response Code  
Very great 1  
Fairly great 2  
Not a threat at all 3  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
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(Q.24) Who/what is to blame for the high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan?
Response Code  
Afghan Taliban 1  
Tehrek e Taliban Pakistan 2  
Other Pakistani Taliban groups 3  
Lashkar e Toiba  4  
Jash e Mohammad 5  
Pakistan Army 6  
Lashkar e Islam (Mangal Bagh group) 7  
Ansar ul Islam  8  
Al Qaeda 9  
Saudi Arabia 10  
India 11  
Iran 12  
Israel 13  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
(Q.25) Who/what is to blame for not doing enough to stop high rates of suicide
bombing in Pakistan?
 
Response Code  
Police department’s lack of capacity 1  
Intelligence agencies failing to intercept   2  
Pakistan’s Army lack of capacity 3  
Lack of education 4  
Unemployment 5  
Lack of social development 6  
Poverty 7  
Lack of political will 8  
Western influence  9  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
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 (Q.26) Where do the bombers come from? 
Response Code Response  Code  
Afghanistan 1 Punjab  6  
Kashmir 2 Other parts of Pakistan  7  
West 3 Other (specify)  77  
India 4 Don’t know  88  
FATA 5 No response  99  
(Q.27) Do you think possessing nuclear weapons enhances Pakistan’s security? 
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 88   
(Q.28) Which of the following agencies do you believe should be primarily  responsible for 
security in FATA? 
 
Response Code  
The tribal communities/Lakhkars 1  
The Khassadars and levies 2  
The military  3  
The Frontier Corps 4  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
(Q.29) Do you think the FC plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know  88  
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(Q.30) If trained with international assistance, would you have more or less
confidence in their ability to do their job?
 
Response 
More confidence 
Less confidence 
Don’t know  
Code
1  
2  
88
(Q.31)  What are the main reasons of conflicts in FATA?  
 
Response  Code  
Conflict over land  1  
Family  2  
Tribal  3  
Political  4  
Crime  5  
Extremist  6  
Other (specify)  77  
Don’t know  88  
 
(Q.32)  How secure do you feel in your daily life?  
Response  Code  
Very secure  1  
Somewhat secure  2  
Somewhat insecure  3  
Very insecure  4  
No opinion  55  
Don’t know  88  
(Q.33) Compared to last year, do you feel your security is getting better or worse?
Response Code
Much better 1
Somewhat better 2
No difference 3
Somewhat worse 4
Much worse 5
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
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(Q.34) What are the biggest threats to your security?  
 
Response Code  
Conflict 1  
Terrorist attacks 2  
Army activity 3  
Sectarianism 4  
Drone attacks 5  
Crime and banditry  6  
Inadequate food 7  
Inadequate healthcare 8  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
(Q.35) Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years? 
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
(Q.36) If so, where did you go?  
(Q.37) What is the most important issue that affects your and your family’s quality of life? 
Response Code 
Unemployment 1 
Inflation 2 
Poverty 3 
Access to education 4 
Access to health services 5 
Access to food 6 
Insecurity 7 
Access to justice 8 
Infrastructure 9 
Housing 10 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
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(Q.38) How do you rate the performance of the FATA Secretariat?  
 
Response Code 
Excellent 1 
Good 2 
Fair 3 
Poor 4 
Very poor 5 
Don’t know 88 
 
(Q.39) How do you rate the performance of the FATA Development Authority?  
 
Response Code 
Excellent 1 
Good 2 
Fair 3 
Poor 4 
Very poor 5 
Don’t know 88 
 
(Q.40) Various foreign countries, including US and UK, have expressed an interest in providing 
development assistance for FATA. How do you think that assistance could be most valuable? 
 
Response Code 
Roads 1 
Electricity 2 
Education 3 
Health 4 
Livelihoods 5 
Supporting employment 6 
Humanitarian assistance 7 
Security 8 
No international assistance is needed 9 
No assistance is needed from US or UK 10 
No opinion 55 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
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(Q.41) What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military offensive in South Waziristan? 
 
Response Code  
Fully support 1  
Partly support 2  
Fully oppose 3  
Partly oppose 4  
No opinion 55  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.42) What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military offensive in Swat/Malakand? 
 
Response Code  
Fully support 1  
Partly support 2  
Fully oppose 3  
Partly oppose 4  
No opinion 55  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.43) How would you describe Pakistani Taliban?  
Response Code  
Are they freedom fighters 1  
Defenders of Islam 2  
Defenders of tribal communities 3  
Terrorists 4  
Uneducated youth 5  
Foreign fighters 6  
No opinion 55  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88   
(Q.44) Do you know what Al Qaeda is? 
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
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(Q.45) If yes, what do you think of Al Qaeda? 
 
 Code 
Very favourable  1 
Partly favourable 2 
Unfavourable 3 
Very unfavourable 4 
No opinion 55 
 
(Q.46) What should happen to any foreign fighter/Jihadi currently living in FATA? 
 
 Code 
They should be allowed to stay 1 
They should be allowed to stay but only if they cease violence 2 
They should be asked to leave   3 
They should be forced to leave by the Pakistani military 4 
There are no such people in FATA  5 
No opinion 55 
Don’t know 88 
(Q.47) What do you think of US drone strikes in FATA?
 
 Response Code
Always justified 1
Sometimes justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are 
avoided 
2
Never justified 3
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
 
Response
Response
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Section C :
Religion & Politics
(Q.48) Which religious authority do you trust the most?    
Response Code Response  Code  
Javed Ghamdi 1 Al  Huda  6  
Prof. Anees 2 Jamaat ud Dawa  7  
Amir Liaqat Hussain 3 Other (specify)  77  
Tahir ul Qadri 4 Don’t know  88  
Dr. Israr Ahmed 5   
 
(Q.49) Which religious authority outside of Pakistan do you trust the most?
 
 
Response Code Response  Code  
Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman 1 Imam Khumenae  5  
Hamza Yousaf 2 Other (specify)  77  
Dr. Zakir Naik 3 Don’t know  88  
 
(Q.50) Is there any justification in Islam for suicide bombing
1
?  
 
Response Code Response  Code  
Justified 1 Don’t know  88  
Rarely justified  2 No response  99  
Never justified 3   
 
                                                
1
 Some people think that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against 
civilian targets are justified to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people 
believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified.
 
(Q.51) What do you think of Pakistani Taliban groups?   
Response Code  
Very favourable  1  
Partly favourable 2  
Unfavourable 3  
Very unfavourable 4  
No opinion 55  
Don’t know 88  
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(Q.52) Should religion ……  
 
Response Code  
Provide a moral code that everyone should follow  1  
Play no role 2  
Dictate women’s rights 3  
Define criminal and civil laws 4  
Define how governments are chosen 5  
Other (specify) 88  
Don’t know 77  
 
(Q.53) In your opinion what is the most important human rights issue in Pakistan today?  
 
 Code  
Violence against women 1  
Violence against children 2  
Violation of minority rights 3  
Freedom of expression 4  
Freedom of movement 5  
State’s inability to provide basis amenities of life  6  
Other (specify) 88  
Don’t know 77  
  
(Q.54) Do you think that a person has the right to kill a relative to protect the honour of their 
family? 
 Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 77  
(Q.55) What phrase best describes the Afghan Taliban?
Response Code  
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation  1  
Ignorant of Islamic values / teaching 2  
A terrorist group 3  
A political group 4  
An anti-women group 5  
Other (specify)  77  
Don’t know 88  
 
Response
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(Q.56) Will the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan?
 
 Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 88  
 
AFGHAN REFUGEES 
 
(Q.57) Should all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan return to Afghanistan?  
 
 Yes   1   No   2   Don’t know   88    
(Q.58) To what extent do you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan? 
(Ask separately for each statement) 
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Make a contribution to Pakistan and 
Pakistan’s economy 
1 2  3  4  5  88  99  
Damage Pakistan’s economy 1 2  3  4  5  88  99  
Undermine Pakistan’s security 1 2  3  4  5  88  99  
Create tension with the local 
Pakistani population  
1 2  3  4  5  88  99  
 
(Q.59) What do you think of Pakistani Taliban groups? 
 
Response Code  
Very favourable  1  
Partly favourable 2  
Unfavourable 3  
Very unfavourable 4  
No opinion 55  
Don’t know 88  
 
Response
Response
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Section D: Opinions on other Countries
(Q.60) If you were given the opportunity to emigrate from Pakistan, would you do so?
 
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
 
(Q.60a) If yes, which country would you choose to go?  
 
 
(Q.60b) Why
 
(Q.61) Which of the following countries should Pakistan aspire to be more like: (Read list and 
circle only one) 
 
Response Code Response Code 
China 1 USA 9 
Iran 2 Australia 10 
UK  3 Saudi Arabia 11 
Japan 4 Malaysia 12 
India 5 Germany 13 
Turkey 6 Other (specify) 88 
France 7 Don’t know  77 
Canada 8   
 
 
(Q.61a) Why?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Q.61b) Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK 
and USA for military build up?  
 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
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(Q. 62) Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and 
USA for development? 
 
Response Code  
Yes 1  
No 2  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.63) Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, 
somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the following countries:  
 
Response
 
Very 
favourable 
Somewhat 
favourable 
Somewhat 
unfavourable  
Very 
unfavourable  
No 
response  
Don’t 
know
Afghanistan 1 2 3  4  99  88  
India 1 2 3  4  99  88  
Iran 1 2 3  4  99  88  
China 1 2 3  4  99  88  
Saudi Arabia 1 2 3  4  99  88  
Canada 1 2 3  4  99  88  
France 1 2 3  4  99  88  
Germany 1 2 3  4  99  88  
Malaysia 1 2 3  4  99  88  
The United States 1 2 3  4  99  88  
The United Kingdom 1 2 3  4  99  88  
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Section E: Opinion about Pakistan and United Kingdom relations and policies 
(Q.64) Do you think that the UK: (Ask separately for each statement)  
 
Response 
Yes  No  
Don’t 
know  
No 
response  
Helps to make the world more peaceful & stable 1  2  88  99  
Values the United Nations (UN) 1  2  88  99  
Helps to make the world more prosperous 1  2  88  99  
Helps to safeguard the global environment 1  2  88  99  
Promotes respect for democratic values 1  2  88  99  
Promotes respect for human rights 1  2  88  99  
 
(Q.65) Which of the following best describes the UK’s relationship with Pakistan?
 (Read list and circle only one) 
  
Response Code  
Unequal 1  
Partners for peace and progress 2  
Close allies in the war against terror 3  
A left over from colonial days 4  
Partners in development and dealing with emergencies  5  
Home of many British Pakistanis 6  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
 
(Q.66) Which of the following best describes the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan?
 (Read list and circle only one) 
 
Response Code  
Committed in the long term to a stable Afghanistan  1  
Will leave Afghanistan as soon as Osama Bin Laden is found  2  
Should not be in Afghanistan at all 3  
Engaged in an attack on Islam 4  
Is a partner in rebuilding and developing Afghanistan 5  
Other (specify) 77  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
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(Q.67) Is your opinion of the UK generally becoming more favourable, less favourable or has
stayed the same? 
Response Code  
More favourable 1  
Less favourable 2  
Stayed the same 3  
Don’t know 88  
(Q.68) What is your opinion of the UK and USA on the following? 
(Ask separately for each statement) 
Response UK Code  USA  Code  
Role in Iraq Most favourable 1  Most favourable  1  
Less favourable 2  Less favourable  2  
Not favourable 3  Not favourable  3  
No opinion 55  No opinion  55  
No response 99  No response  99  
Role in Afghanistan Most favourable 1  Most favourable  1  
Less favourable 2  Less favourable  2  
Not favourable 3  Not favourable  3  
No opinion 55  No opinion  55  
No response 99  No response  99  
Attitude towards the Islamic 
World 
Most favourable 1  Most favourable  1  
Less favourable 2  Less favourable  2  
Not favourable 3  Not favourable  3  
No opinion 55  No opinion  55  
No response 99  No response  99  
Immigration policy Most favourable 1  Most favourable  1  
Less favourable 2  Less favourable  2  
Not favourable 3  Not favourable  3  
No opinion 55  No opinion  55  
No response 99  No response  99  
167
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 V
I
 D 1: Gender of respondents (On observation): 
 
 Male       1      Female    2
Section F:    Demographics
D 2: Age group of  respondent  
     
Response  Code  Response  Code  
18 –  29 years  1  50 –  64 years  3  
30 –  49 years  2  65 + years  4  
 
D 3: Education  level of respondent  
 
Response  Code  Response  Code  
Not schooled  1  Schooled upto Bachelor level  7  
Religious education only  2  Master degree  8  
Schooled upto Primary level  3  Specialisation: MBBS/doctor  9  
Schooled upto Middle level  4  Specialisation: Engineering  10  
Schooled upto Secondary 
Certificate level  
5  Those upto professional education   
Schooled upto Intermediate level  6    
 
D 3a:  Education level of head of the household  
 
Response  Code  Response  Code  
Not schooled  1  Schooled upto Bachelor level  7  
Religious education only  2  Master degree  8  
Schooled upto Primary level  3  Specialisation: MBBS/doctor  9  
Schooled upto Middle level  4  Specialisation: Engineering  10  
Schooled upto Secondary 
Certificate level  
5  Those upto professional education  11  
Schooled upto Intermediate level  6    
 
D 4:  Monthly income of respondent’s family  in PKR?   
Response  Code  Response  Code  
Upto Rs 3000  1  Rs 7001 –  Rs 10000  4  
Rs 3001 –  Rs 5000  2  Rs 10001 –  Rs 15000  5  
Rs 5001 –  Rs 7000  3  More than Rs  15000  6  
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D 5: Occupation of respondent 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Agricultural labourer 1 Provincial civil servant 11 
Chowkidar (watchman) 2 Skilled labourer 12 
Civil servant of FATA  3 Small business owner 13 
Clerical employee 4 Teacher 14 
Farm owner 5 Technician 15 
Home-based worker 6 Unskilled labourer 16 
Lady health worker (LHW) 7 White colour employee 17 
Large business owner 8 Unemployed 18 
Management/supervisor 9 Other (specify) 77 
Military, police, security personnel 10   
 
D 6: Marital status of respondent 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Married 1 Single 4 
Widowed 2 No response 99 
Divorced 3   
 
D 7: How many people live in your household/compound? 
  
Number of People: ___________________ 
 
Male (adult) Code Female (adult) Code Male 
children 
Code Female 
children 
Code 
1-5 persons 1 1-5 persons 3 1-5 
children 
5 1-5 children 7 
6 and above 
persons 
2 6 and above 
persons 
4 6 and 
above 
6 6 and above 8 
 
D 8:  Religion of respondent  
 
Response Code Response Code 
Christian  1 Sikh  4 
Hindu 2 Other (specify) 77 
Muslim 3 No response 99 
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(Ask if answer is 3 in D8) 
Shiite        1   Sunni   2
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8) 
 
D 9: Please tell me whether you regularly, sometimes, or never engage in the following 
religious practices 
 
Response  Regularly Sometimes Never Not asked 
No 
response 
Pray five times a day   1 2 3 4 99 
Fast during Ramadan 1 2 3 4 99 
 
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8) 
 
D 10: How often do you pray at the mosque? 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Five times a day/daily 1 Several times a year 5 
Several times a week 2 Once a year or less 6 
Once a week 3 Never 7 
Monthly 4 No response 99 
 
D 11: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year? 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Yes 1 No 2 
Don’t know 88   
 
170
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 V
I
Read closing statement 
to the respondent: “Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the 
next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work 
and answer any other questions you may have about the interview. To help him 
do that, could I have your telephone number?"
Respondent information: Name:  ______________________________
Address:  _____________________________
Tel No. _____________________________
CNIC Number __________________________
Interviewer certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided to me. 
Name:  _______________
Signed: _______________
Date: _______________
To be completed by the supervisor:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interview subject to Back-check/Control 
1.  Yes
2.  No
Method of Back-check/Control  
1.  Direct supervision during interview
2.  Back-check in person by supervisor
3.  Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office  
4.  Not subject to back-check 
Initial questions (for interviewer only)
Name of surveyor ---------------------------------- Date of interview -------------------------
Agency/FR ----------------------------- Tehsil ----------------------- 
[1] Rural [2] Urban
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TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS
A total of 4,000 adult respondents were interviewed in all 
seven Agencies and six FRs of FATA region. Following figures 
and tables provide demographic and socio-economic detail of 
the respondents. They also provide the employment status, 
educational status income status and marital status of the 
respondents. 
Gender of the respondents
The survey was planned to incorporate male and female 
perception on different issues affecting the life of the people of Age groups
FATA. The following statistics show that over the surveys we 
The sampling consisted of people over 18 years of age who agreed were able to gradually reduce the gender disparity ratio from 
to be interviewed and who were residents of FATA.  The intent was 2008 (71:29), to 2009 (60:40) and (50.40:49.6) in 2010, male to 
to interview adults and not a sample of the age profile of adults in female respectively. This also shows that in 2010 the 
the population. Inference is specific to adults of FATA.circumstances were more favourable for field work and that 
CAMP gained considerable access to women's opinion in most 
As shown in the figure 77, most of the respondents were young or 
parts of FATA for this survey.
middle-aged and not elderly persons.    
Education
The following figure 78 shows statistics from the three surveys for 
the educational level of the respondents. The 2008 survey shows 
the surprising result that only 23.4% did not have schooling. This 
would indicate that the people of FATA have a much higher level of 
educational achievement than the rest of Pakistan. Even the less 
impressive statistics from 2009 and 2010 show that our 
respondents are more educated than the general population. The 
proportions of middle school to college educated people in the 
sample are impressive. When one examines the way that 
households were chosen in villages, it is understandable that 
more educated people were sampled. See the reference to the 
‘Starting point bias’ in the Methodology section of the report.
It is not established properly in the 1998 Census Report whether 
Appendix VII
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Fig 76. Gender of the respondents
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Fig 77. Age groups
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those who have religious education come under the Education of the head of the family
'educated' category, but a substantial portion of the 
If the respondent was not the head of the family, then they were respondents specified religious education only. In 2008, 
asked the education level of the head of the family. We hardly see 10.4% respondents were found to be 'religious educated 
a women as the head of the family in Pakhtun culture. Fewer only', which remained similar in 2009 (11.8%), but went down 
respondents in the older generation are schooled. In 2009, to 7.8% in 2010 survey. 
55.4% of the respondents were found 'not schooled' while in 
2010 it went down considerably to 46.5, however, for both years 
this group remains still higher than in 2008 and in Pakistan in 
general. 
In general, the FATA survey has sampled a much more educated 
person than the general population for the given age group.  This 
may be attributable to the ‘Starting point bias’ described in the 
methodology section.
Income level of the respondents
The income levels in FATA are low when compared to the income 
level of urban centres of Pakistan. There is a general 
misperception about the people of FATA, that is, that majority of 
them are rich due to enormous illegal opportunities such as 
smuggling of goods, heroine and opium trade, opium cultivation, 
23.4
10.0 10.5
23.1
12.5
8.2
4.2
41.1
11.8
9.8
7.7
12.5
8.7
6.1
2.4
34.9
7.8
14.1
10.5
13.5
9.5
6.5
2.7
0.4 0.1 0.20.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
Not schooled Religious 
education only
Schooled upto 
Primary level
Schooled upto 
Middle level
Schooled upto 
Secodary 
school 
certificate
Schooled upto 
Intermediate 
Schooled upto 
Bechelors 
degree
Master
degree
Specialisation: 
MBBS/doctor
Specialisation: 
Engineering
Those upto 
professional 
education
8.3
2008
2009
2010
Fig 78. Educational level of the respondents
Table 29. Education of the head of the family (respondent)
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Responses Percent 2009  Percent 2010
Not schooled 55.4  46.5
Religious education only 4.7  9.9
Schooled up to Primary level 10.0  11.0
Schooled up to Middle level 11.4  7.7
Schooled up to Secondary school 
certificate
10.2  11.8
Schooled up to Intermediate  3.2  5.8
Schooled up to Bachelors degree 2.9  4.0
Master degree 1.7  2.4
Specialisation: MBBS/doctor 0.2  0.6
Specialisation: Engineering 0.1  0.2
Other upto professional education 0.2  0.2
Total 100.0  100.0
arms manufacturing and smuggling, etc. However, the 
Household size
wealthy are few in numbers although more visible. 
Because of the extended family nature and the custom of living 
The figure reveals that the respondents' level of income, and 
in compounds, the concept of household in FATA includes the 
the average, has shifted from 2008 to 2010.  It has shifted 
head of the family, his sons (married and unmarried) and 
from low income toward middle income and slightly toward a 
daughters (un-married), daughters-in-law, and grand children.  
larger proportion of wealthier people during the last three 
This custom makes for a very large-sized household. 
years. These figures are misleading because inflation has 
been a major contributor to this shift. We have to assume that when asked the size of the family that 
the respondents are referring to the number of people in the 
compound.
The figure 80 reflects that we have sampled very few small 
families. The families of 6-10 and 11-15 are the 'Norm.'
Occupation
The occupation of the male and female respondents was noted. 
We see that more respondents identified 'housewife' option, 
and that goes with the increased percent of female respondents.  
The fact that Agriculture labour is the 2nd highest category of 
occupation chosen by the respondents is an indication of the 
more urban-type of respondent. ‘Urban’ in the small town and 
village context.  This is also seen in the diversity of employees 
Fig 79. Income level of the respondents
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Fig 80. Family size (of a household)
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15.0
8.6
11.9
10.5
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Marital status
In the rural Pakhtun areas, early marriage is still the norm. This is 
shown in figure 81 that nearly three quarters of the respondents, 
for all three years, are found to be married as opposed to just 
average 20% un-married. A fifth of the population, probably 
among the very young in the same, is not married. Widowed or 
divorced are found to be a very small part of the sample
and business owners in the table 30 below.
Religion
Occupation by gender FATA is a predominantly Muslim society with few non Muslim 
The occupation results for 2008 - 2010 surveys show that 
agriculture is purely male dominated skill, while we see 
home-based workers, Lady Health Workers, teachers in the 
female category of the FATA respondents. We also see some 
skilled worker in the female category such as those women 
working on embroidery, tailoring, etc. Men are more 
unemployed than women. Surprisingly, in the rural tribal set-
up we see some women as owners of small businesses. 
In the tribal society, inheritance for women is discouraged; 
however, the data also reveal some female farm owners. 
Responses 
Percent 
2008 
Percent 
2009  
Percent 
2010
Agricultural Labour 11.3 10.0  9.0
Farm owner 12.6 7.1  1.4
Unskilled labour
 
4.4
 
5.2
 
3.6
Skilled labour
 
5.1
 
7.3
 
6.9
Technician
 
1.5
 
1.9
 
1.8
Clerical employee
 
1.8
 
1.8
 
1.0
White collar employee
 
12.0
 
4.1
 
2.0
Management/supervisor
 
1.0
 
0.9
 
1.2
Small business owner
 
8.3
 
12.1
 
5.1
Large business owner
 
3.5
 
1.2
 
1.5
Government employee
 
9.3
 
9.8
 
0.0
Home based worker
 
0.0
 
5.7
 
2.7
House wife
 
14.0
 
18.7
 
37.6
Lady health worker
   
2.6
Student 2.9
 
2.3
 
3.0
Chowkidar/watchman
   
3.5
Civil servant of FATA
   
1.8
Military, police, security 
personal
 
 
0.6
Provincial civil servant
   
0.9
Teacher
  
6.8
Unemployed
 
8.1
 
5.3
 
6.6
Others 4.6
 
6.7
 
0.4
Total 100.0
 
100.0
 
100.0
Table 30. Occupation of the respondents
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Fig 81. Marital status of the respondent
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120.0
Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh No response
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Fig 82. Religion
populations. There are some Christians, Hindus, and Sikh but 
are very few and in recent times, due to the insurgency, most 
of them have left their homes in FATA. 
Shiite Sunni proportions in FATA  
Respondents who indentified themselves as Muslim, were 
subsequently asked which sect they belong to. For both 
years, the average ratio is Shiite 13.2% and Sunni 86.8%. In 
FATA we have both Shiite and Sunni population in Kurram and 
Orakzai Agencies, while the rest of FATA is Sunni dominated. 
0.0
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40.0
50.0
60.0
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80.0
90.0
100.0
13.2
86.8
12.9
87.1
Shiite Sunni
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Fig 83. Shiite Sunni proportions in FATA
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